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Political Science Quarterly

Vol. LXXXVI No. 2 June 1971

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Edited for the
Academy of Political Science
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The Historians and the Presidency: An Essay Review
REXFORD G. TUGWELL

Redemption and Politics
ROGER W. SMITH

Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence, 1937-1942
WARREN F. KIMBALL

The United States and British Bankruptcy, 1944-1945: Responsibilities Deferred
GEORGE C. HERRING JR.

Reviews

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Contributors to the June Issue

REXFORD G. TUGWELL, senior fellow of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, is a former under-secretary of agriculture, governor of Puerto Rico, and chairman of the New York City Planning Commission. He is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Chicago and a former professor of economics at Columbia University.

ROGER W. SMITH teaches political theory at the College of William and Mary, where he is assistant professor of government. He is editor of *Guilt: Man and Society* (1971).

WARREN F. KIMBALL is associate professor of diplomatic history at the Newark College of Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. He is the author of *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941* (1969) and is working on a study of the influence of Henry Morgenthau Jr. and the Treasury Department on the foreign policy of Franklin Roosevelt.

GEORGE C. HERRING JR. is associate professor of history at the University of Kentucky.

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The Historians and the Presidency: An Essay Review

REXFORD G. TUGWELL
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
Santa Barbara, Calif.

An Intellectual Among the Populists

One chapter in Eric F. Goldman's book about Johnson[1] is a reminder of a sourish remark made by Senator Burton K. Wheeler at a time when he, like some other Progressives, was annoyed by Franklin D. Roosevelt's tendency to ignore their claims in favor of those put forward by Democratic party bosses in their states. "We made the wrong Roosevelt President," he said, referring to Eleanor Roosevelt's more consistent support of Progressive causes. The Goldman book's description of Lady Bird Johnson's activities could be interpreted in the same way. He found hers the kind of good influence her husband could well have paid more attention to. She usually knew when he was going wrong; she saw before he did that his situation had become impossible; and her own modest political ventures were invariably successful.

Her own book, *A White House Diary*,[2] a dictated day-by-day

[1] Eric F. Goldman, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.——xii, 531, xxi pp. $8.95.

[2] Lady Bird Johnson, *A White House Diary* (New York, 1970).

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comment on White House events, naturally omits the more intimate exchanges on public questions, but there is conveyed, somehow, a good sense and stability of purpose the country could have used more of in the Johnson years.

If Goldman does not go so far as Senator Wheeler, the contrast he finds between husband and wife comes through as perhaps the severest criticism he has to make of the president. He saw, as he watched, that Johnson was offending some extremely vocal people with access to the media—they were academicians, literati, and artists, mostly—and he himself was there to transmit their ideas and make them helpful in the country's governance. His obvious failure resulted in faint praise for Johnson's achievements and thunderous denunciations for the policies disapproved of by the Goldman constituency.

Johnson's tragedy was only partly that he adopted policies inimical to the national interest; his predecessors had done that too. It was also that he did it in such arbitrary ways, seeing himself as the embodiment of final power and then refusing to acknowledge the causes of the turn against him. Lady Bird certainly would not have been a good president for other reasons; but she would not have made the same mistakes, and she would not have been abrasive, evasive, and abusive in the oval office as her husband was. Even the intellectuals might have softened toward her. Especially she would not have adopted the dictatorial habit so easy for a president who faces growing disapproval—so easy, but, in the United States, so fatal.

Goldman, as a presidential assistant, fell rather quickly into disfavor. He had no luck in mollifying Johnson's early critics; his fellow assistants soon copied the president's distaste for those who would not see things his way; and the proposals for which Goldman did find some acceptance were sabotaged. He retired defeated and what he thought he had learned, as an historian, he has elaborated in this book. As most good books are, it is emotional and eloquent, even fascinating; but it explains more about Goldman, really, than it does about Johnson. That is too bad because the time has come for reappraising not only the situation of the president in his office but the kind of presidents being chosen to occupy it, and it is not of much importance to Goldman that he should be vindicated for accepting a service he could not survive with credit.

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No one could have succeeded who began with his terms of reference and his handicaps.

It was not new for presidents to be treated superciliously by those who consider them intellectually or culturally inferior. It will be recalled that the then aged John Quincy Adams refused to attend when Harvard conferred an honorary degree on Jackson, his successor. He wrote that he could not bear to witness the disgrace of his alma mater in awarding her highest honor to a barbarian who could not spell his name. He went on at some length in this vein. (The word "ruffian" somehow stands out.) Lincoln was savagely ridiculed by those who considered themselves his betters. He was cartooned as an ape and called an ignoramus. Truman was never allowed to forget the county courthouse where he learned the lessons he carried with him to Washington. And although Eisenhower had been graduated from West Point and had been president of Columbia, his jumbled syntax was endlessly dwelt on by his detractors as evidence of inferior attainments.

For such presidents as the Jeffersonians, the Adamses, and the Roosevelts, it was an advantage among the literati that their cultural credentials were impeccable. Obviously, however, humble origins have not deterred the masses of voters. They have readily accepted rough-and-ready types. Indeed, for a long time, as we know, birth in a log cabin rather than in an affluent home was regarded as a favorable start. If one man was as good as any other, the reasoning ran, he was as good for any job as any other, too. The line of mediocrities in the presidency after Polk (Lincoln being the happy exception) confirmed the conviction of the electorate that the presidency needed no movers or shakers.

It began thus with Jackson who unashamedly brought the frontier to a Washington he denounced as effete, and the tradition was persistent. It continued well into the twentieth century. It was not dissipated altogether by the Roosevelts of Harvard, Taft of Yale, and Wilson of Johns Hopkins. It showed itself again in Truman, who never got so far as college; but if Johnson was not at first inclined to dwell on the circumstances of his parents' lives and his own sketchy education, he learned that they could not be escaped and that doubtful preparation for statecraft is no longer approved of because it is the situation of so many others. Even with Johnson, his earthiness may have been more injurious than he evidently

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anticipated. The intellectuals, who were unwilling to overlook it, drew away as he was alternately apologetic and defiant. No sympathy was offered for one who tried so hard and accomplished so much even for causes they believed in. When there was Vietnam to complain about, night-long teach-ins and demonstrations produced a fair imitation of rebellion. Goldman had to sit it out as well as he could in the East Wing of the White House, looked at by the Johnson people as probably a doubtful loyalist himself and by his friends as a traitor.

Much of Johnson's overreacting, his imperiousness, his alternating humility and intemperate outbursts, were caused, Goldman believes, by Johnson's knowledge that he did not measure up to even a low cultural standard and that his critics were in a way right. He always suspected that all around him there were those who were waiting for successive embarrassing shows of crudeness. It was this he dwelt on when questioned after his retirement by Walter Cronkite for the television audience. By then his self-pity had become slightly sickening.

Franklin D. Roosevelt would certainly have been embarrassed to hear that old Justice Holmes had remarked, after a pious visit from the younger man, that Roosevelt had a mediocre mind but a superior temperament. Holmes probably did not think this at all bad equipment for a president, and his judgment was considered accurate by later appraisers. The Roosevelt records at Groton, at Harvard, and at the Columbia School of Law were indeed less than distinguished. In fact, although he qualified for admission to the bar, he did not attempt the final examinations for his law degree. It is true that he could rely on the still prevalent preference among the upper classes for a "gentleman's C" and so was comparatively immune to disparagement from academic detractors. About his schooling, much as many would have liked to find them, there were no openings for the thrusts that would have made him wince and might have distorted his behavior in office.

Johnson was frankly hopeful of becoming known as having completed the New Deal program. Perhaps he even hoped at first to be regarded as another Roosevelt—one who used his position to better the lot of those less fortunate. But he could not carry it off. Quite a good case could be made for claiming that he accomplished much more than Roosevelt, even if in different—and easier

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—times; his war on poverty was profusely implemented by legislation. That much of its effect was lost by inept administration and by the shift in priorities, is responsible for the adamant refusal to recognize his achievement. This should not confuse historians; 1964-66 were years when the nation faced up to problems long neglected and seemed about to become the Great Society Johnson talked about.

It was after 1966 that his pretentiousness became notorious and sneers his daily fare. He was not a man to suffer hurt quietly, and his fury was visited on everyone within reach. This, of course, became known too; and even his self-serving explanations were counted against him. It was then that he frequently winced and became defiant. He would demonstrate that a boy with the meager equipment furnished by a political career could match the achievements of more fortunate men. If his faith in himself was shaken, he did not admit it. This accounted for his unwillingness to have about him helpers who reminded him of his deficiencies. He liked them smart, as Moyers was, but they must not have the superior finish that he found so intolerable.

There were exceptions to his selection of sycophants for helpers, but they are accountable. Fortas, on whom he relied for advice, was out of Yale Law School, but earlier he had been out of Memphis and not its gentlefolk either; Clifford used language he could understand; and Rusk was used as a kind of front to maneuver behind—besides he was a stony-faced anti-communist and believed in a fence around China. The same was true of Rostow in the basement. Those nearer him who were in and out of his office—Jenkins, Watson, and the others, as well as Moyers—were submerged to a degree that must have made them useless except as servants. They were nobodies, anyway, in the general view. Kennedy's "Irish mafia" had been amusing. The Texans were not, especially after Baker and Jenkins had cast a shadow over the whole entourage. The self-made political types are apparently more at ease when surrounded by the crafty clubhouse professionals, who so often find the standards of the White House too high for their moral stamina.

Uneasiness about his beginnings seems not to have bothered Johnson in the Senate. He had worked up to his majority leadership by much approved methods. He made the best use ever of

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legislative manipulation, and found presidential dependence on his skill agreeable. He used all the tricks of the political trade, including the kind of doubtfully scrupulous persuasion taken so naturally among professionals. In the national interest even a Republican president—Eisenhower—must have help in legislation, and Johnson was a patriot. His colleagues in the Senate were not disposed to examine his history; and anyway it was one none would have questioned. The style of most, if not the same as his, had similar marks of hard trading. It was a job he had the talent for, and since only results counted, his expertness was widely admired; everyone knew but no one objected to the way he got results. The Senate is a peculiar, anachronistic institution. Johnson knew how to make it work.

He had no intimation, apparently, that his gifts as a legislative manipulator would not qualify him for the presidency, that, indeed, they might even be ones better not possessed at all by the man in the White House. The disappointment involved in discovering this was, of course, the origin of the famous "credibility gap." What a legislative trader can do covertly to move stubborn colleagues is the sort of activity a president cannot pursue without being exposed. He gets found out; and resorting to duplicity, so usual on the Hill, becomes damaging to one who is expected to occupy an exalted position of leadership. He is watched constantly by a sharp-eyed and critical press corps. Leakage of gossip in Washington is inevitable, and the appetite for it is insatiable; even presidents can seldom make secret deals.

Immediately on succeeding Kennedy in the tragic circumstances of Dallas, the heavy refinement he adopted in public was generally noted. Comparison soon became a fixed habit. Qualities were attributed to Kennedy that no one had thought much about until then—youth, wit, elegance, all that sort of thing. Johnson brought the barnyard, or, at least, the cattle corral, into the mansion so elegantly reconstituted by Jacqueline Kennedy and her helpers. The rocking chair was banished from the office, but the Kennedy image would not depart.

What had done very well in the Senate, where Johnson had been a member of the inner circle as Kennedy never had, was disparaged by the Kennedyites who were, of course, still presidential assistants. Disaffection soon became scorn; but it would not have been

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taken seriously or have become a kind of issue, if there had not been a good deal to feed on. Such superficialities as manners, language, and social habits may have nothing to do with capability for great affairs, and certainly nothing to do with dedication to the national interest. Jackson and Lincoln left their detractors to be buried by later historians, their idiosyncracies smiled about and fondly forgiven; but in Johnson's case, they were taken as indications of inner qualities that did have much to do with capability for leadership. Cruelties and insensitivities, even if only rumored, are transformed into fact, and they are not likely to be forgotten or forgiven.

Goldman cannot be faulted in his exposition of Johnson's strengths and weaknesses. He was there in the White House quite long enough to make the assessment, and no one could have been made more miserable by Johnson's fury at the refusal of academics to accept him at his preferred valuation. Goldman was as often ashamed of the intellectuals' crass behavior as he was of Johnson's. Perhaps he ought to have seen sooner that rapprochement was impossible and even undesirable considering the deep reasons for the breach; but he did choose to try over and over for some reconciliation, failing each time more abysmally than before. On the whole, he probably made matters worse rather than better. A good many of the unfortunate emanations from a smallish coterie, as well as the more honestly felt alienation of a much larger number of academics, might have had a good deal less attention if Goldman had not provided occasions for its expression. In the end, there was a divisiveness such as the nation had not known since the Civil War, and Goldman was severely hurt that he had been unable to attenuate its bitterness. The strain runs all through his anguished account.

Besides the Kennedy undercutting and his successor's increasing annoyance, there were the circumstances. Events—at least after his own election in 1964 and the euphoria of the next two years—seemed to conspire against Johnson's acceptance as leader. Especially there were the recurrent outbreaks of those who, resenting his manners, refused to recognize the reasons for their own hysteria and sought excuses for attacking him. They were not hard to find, however superficial and irrelevant they might have been. It is notable that they offered no alternatives to the policies they

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found so objectionable, or, if they did, offered demonstrably irresponsible ones; but this weakness made them more willing to act like ill-bred clowns themselves. Some of them behaved far worse than would have been tolerated in Johnson's home precincts. The privilege of boorishness, they seemed to feel, was reserved for those who knew better but felt it necessary to tackle the barbarian with his own weapons. The chapter in Goldman's book describing the Arts Festival in 1965 should make anyone ashamed to be even remotely associated with those who behaved as many of the artists and literati did before and during that occasion.

The excuse for rudeness—the more reprehensible in retrospect because it was handed down from newly discovered moralistic heights—was the enlargement of the Vietnam involvement. A few years before, when Kennedy had sent upwards of twenty thousand "advisers" to assist the beleaguered South Vietnamese, who were being attacked from within by savage guerrillas and from without by predatory communist armies, the move had been accepted as a traditional American effort to support independence. Self-determination was as nearly a consensus idea as ever infused American opinion, and it was strongly reinforced by the other consensus that containment of communism was essential to the free life Americans had created. These strong, sometimes violent, attitudes had sustained Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy in their Asian policies. A compromise solution had had to be arranged for Korea, but it had come hard and was never really accepted. It was still being glossed over in Johnson's time, out of the news but a constant source of incipient danger to the Koreans. Also, it might have been thought a lesson to presidents, but no president ever seems to learn from his predecessors' mistakes, and Johnson gave the armed forces a much more difficult—even if very similar—mission in Vietnam.

The Korean frustration had called out some irresponsible demonstrations toward the last, such as that curious one when MacArthur, come home after being relieved as commander, found himself received with public acclaim clearly meant as reproof for Truman. The humiliation seemed to make more acute the fear of communist expansion, but the warning about military adventures in Southeast Asia was missed. The belief that Russia was behind the North Koreans, although the armies were Chinese, persisted in

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spite of evidence to the contrary and heightened an apprehension already intense. There was a firm conviction that the communists were a solid bloc and that all possible resources must be used in checking their outward lunges. Vietnam was considered to be such a drive for hegemony in Southeast Asia.

The necessity for containment was not only a popular conviction, it was almost unanimously supported by liberal opinion. The thought of being disciplined by the communists was intolerable. Besides, it was infuriatingly presumptuous. American power was at its mightiest and no better uses for it could be conceived than the defeat of Russian initiatives. When Johnson followed the logic of self-determination and containment, and the precedent of his predecessors, he was acting not only on his own belief but on one he had every reason to believe was shared by most Americans—and certainly by those who had invented these policies and since 1945 had supported them when they were acted on.

When the hard core of Johnson haters began to infect liberal opinion generally, and he found himself with really massive disaffection to deal with, he was bewildered; and he could hardly be blamed for feeling beleaguered. Being a strong-willed man who was now commander-in-chief, he could not have been expected either to recognize the disenchantment as justified or to modify his own certainty that he was serving his country in ways it really approved. He fell into one of those moods deserted statesmen find so comforting—he would be vindicated by history!

Goldman came to the White House in December 1963 and stayed until September 1966; so that he was there during the campaign of 1964 and well into the revolution of opinion after 1965. He was aware of the difficulties with those Kennedyites who seemed to feel that somehow the presidency had been usurped by an outsider. He was also aware—he was after all a professor of American history—how Johnson's prickly style contrasted with Kennedy's gracefulness. What he did not anticipate was that the president's detractors would be so soon aided by disillusion over Vietnam, something quite beyond Goldman's ability to smooth over or soften. Nor did he have any adequate preview of his own position as an emissary from the Ivy League among the Texans in the White House.

If he very soon began to feel sorry for himself, it is understand-

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able. He had not asked for the job and he sought only to serve the president of his country as any American feels bound to do if he can. The master in the Oval Room (Goldman was out in the East Wing where Schlesinger had been during the Kennedy regime) turned out to be an immoderate worker who required immoderate work from all those around him. He was also subject to fits of rage when he was not suited. He lashed his Texas lads with savage words; he stamped on any sensibilities they might have had; he was secretive and incredibly vain. He had fixed his eye on history, and he expected all his assistants' efforts to center on the enhancement—and presently the repair—of his public reputation.

Added to this, however—and this was what kept Goldman from going back to Princeton forthwith—Johnson saw himself as the first effective national leader since Roosevelt, and this view was reinforced by the victory over Goldwater. He emerged into 1965 the most approved president in recent history. With the new Congress he would be able to complete the agenda abandoned by Roosevelt as the war came on, even add to it some projects—racial equality, for instance—Roosevelt had not thought pressing. He aspired to be known as the president who made certain that the education, health, and welfare of all Americans was fixed safely in legislation. These were worthy intentions; and if he could help in them, Goldman felt, he could tolerate the abrasions and contentions he had been warned about as inevitable in Johnson's service. So he tried and kept trying. He had little luck. Some of his suggestions—the presidential scholars, for instance—found acceptance. Many others were lost in their journey from Jenkins, Watson, Moyers, or Valenti to the presidential desk. Others were either ignored or rejected by Johnson himself.

Goldman found at once that he was resented as the house intellectual, also as one who was spoken of by outsiders as occupying a post initiated by Kennedy. He was watched; he was boxed in; he was required never to show himself or to disclose any suggestions he might think of making; and he had to attempt the impossible by enjoining all those he consulted not to mention the contact. If his subsequent book, however eloquent, and however valuable as an account of one president's methodology, is somewhat querulous, he has ample excuse; much more might well have been expected and probably there was much more in his first drafts.

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Except for some details, he has no disclosures to make. This account must be said to stand as an indictment not so much of Johnson as of those who put him there; but it is a tale both to infuriate and to arouse sympathy. Johnson thrashed about like a stallion in a stall, shouting instructions to his intimidated staff. Goldman was often kicked and sometimes badly hurt. If Johnson never seemed to know it, that was Johnson: he was important, no one else was. That this was hardly a contribution to his ambition to loom large and right in the view of posterity—Goldman being a writer of history—Johnson seemed not to have considered. Perhaps he thought that any account written by a Princetonian would be overwhelmed by the memoirs that would issue from the neighborhood of Austin in Texas.

Johnson's Immolation

Reviewers often comment not on the book before them but on the one they think the author should have written. To do so is manifestly unfair unless what is not said is obviously germane to the author's purpose. This is the excuse for saying here that the tragedy of Johnson was not visited on him so much because he was a misfit and conducted himself so badly that his constituency was alienated; the causes were deeper.

Presidents are not long in office; but the office is permanent, something none of them seem to realize. Many detractors insist that presidents have become modern emperor-kings, determining domestic policy, commanding the means of public communication, shaping foreign policy, and, if necessary, enforcing it with armed might. George Reedy is one who insists on this description. It may be an exaggeration. Certainly their tenure is temporary, but they do live in a luxurious enclave, surrounded by helpers usually described as sycophants, and they are able to withdraw from dispute with those who might oppose their policies—until, that is, the tide of disillusion swamps even the White House, as it did in 1968.

In recent times presidents have been forced to become the originators of all significant legislation and their staff of lobbyists has become more elaborate, even if not necessarily more effective, than that of even the most powerful of private interests. They are also forced to stake their reputations, and risk their continuance in of-

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fice, on what they can persuade the Congress to accept. Persuading congressmen is often a very difficult task, since they are in the fortunate position of being able to make forays at their own convenience, use the expertise of the best lawyers their affluent supporter-lobbyists can procure, and never have to put forward any project for the good of the country if it happens not to be good for them as well. This is true, however, mostly in domestic matters. In foreign affairs presidents can make the most momentous commitments and not be seriously opposed unless the adventures prove disastrous, and then it may well be too late for extrication with any credit. They have indeed become temporary armed royalty, and, unless they persist too long and incur too much expense, are almost always supported by congressional majorities.

Being thus royal they possess access to that unrivaled communicator, television; they have fleets of limousines, helicopters at the door, the largest and fastest planes, aides of their own choosing, a special guardian service for themselves, their families, and associates, and alternate headquarters transformed instantly into command posts when visited. Also, of course, they have numerous technicians, assistants to assistants, dedicated secretaries, and secretaries to secretaries.

All this seems incongruous to such incorrigible democrats as Reedy, who, after having been a congressional aide and serving Johnson as his press secretary had had more than he could tolerate. He, too, has written about his experience. In *The Twilight of the Presidency* he is more acerbic than Goldman.[3] The president's power and pomp seem to him incompatible with American traditions; moreover, all this pretension is recent. He points out that no president before Roosevelt was fitted out with such appurtenances, and not even he until he became the active commander-in-chief during the Second World War. Even then he did not seem to live in such a fenced-in spread—as it would be called in Texas; or perhaps it was that the surroundings seemed less strange for a Roosevelt than for a Johnson. Roosevelt, indeed, seemed to have arrived at the White House by some sort of magic and to belong there when he arrived. Everyone knew how Johnson had got there: by political infighting of the fiercest and most ruthless sort and by a deal for the vice-presidency that lacerated his ego.

[3] George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York, 1970).

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At any rate, only in Johnson's time did the position and style of the man in the White House arouse active general resentment such as Reedy has voiced. They were not something Johnson invented. Kennedy had had them, too; so had Eisenhower and Truman. But Kennedy was the young master come to live in the old house; and neither Eisenhower nor Truman seemed, whatever they did, to be inherently arrogant. The conclusion was that Johnson did not belong there. It did not seem right, somehow, that he should live like royalty and dispose of all that power. Perhaps it was that he used it with mock humility yet was so assured, and so demanding. At any rate, he could do nothing right in the view of those who had thought Kennedy could do nothing wrong.

It was only when aversion to his behavior spread so widely that reappraisal of the presidency, apart from its incumbents, began to be thought of seriously. It is not too much to say that even the preliminary assessment was appalling. Of course it was not only that the most recent incumbent was incongruous in the gracious traditional surroundings; other circumstances contributed to the sudden dismay. The most important of these was his inheritance of certain policies from those impeccable predecessors. They had undertaken to implement the two national pursuits they regarded quite correctly to be what all right-thinking Americans agreed to; and they had done it as the surrogates of their majority. Johnson always seemed to be out somewhere on his own, operating willfully in a kind of self-contained headquarters, surrounded by the machinery of command. Yet he, like the others, was pursuing the two purposes most generally agreed to. It had become harder because the conditions had changed. American power was no longer so much more massive than any other that challenge seemed absurd; and there were limits to the logistical costs even for so affluent an economy. Johnson did not face the hard facts involved in paying for world hegemony and at the same time creating a Great Society at home. Both needed to be done; therefore they must be done.

Johnson viewed America's duty to the world much as any new convert views his duty to his cause. Self-determination did go back to the war for independence and had been perpetuated by sympathy for all people bound to the great empires; but active intervention had not aroused much enthusiasm until the communists

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began their monstrous aggressions. The antithesis of democracy was all too visible. It glorified the state, reached out beyond its borders, exerted a harsh discipline, and, worst of all, was indefatigable in proselytizing. It offended easy-living Americans with its harsh regimentation. It had to be opposed. If it could not be exterminated—and an army had been sent to help the White Russians do just that as far back as 1918—it had to be confined.

When Lyndon Johnson became president the United States was pledged to defend no less than 43 nations of lesser power if they should be threatened by this communist expansion; and the commitment had been expanded to include internal threats as well—so-called wars of liberation. That American protection often had the paradoxical effect of protecting dictatorial regimes from dissenters was not exactly overlooked; but there was a tendency to accept dictatorships as the opposite of communism. Americans found themselves, after some years of John Foster Dulles, locked into a web of treaties the inevitable result of which appeared in Korea and then in Vietnam. Johnson was an innocent in a cruel scene when he took responsibility.

Vietnam was an impossible undertaking for a democracy, and especially for one with a leader who exhibited, with conversionary gusto, his power to dispose of lives and resources. The enemy was elusive and treacherous; it excelled in such tactics as assassination, kidnaping, and the terrorizing of civilians. Johnson could not know that American generals had lost the Indian-fighting skills once known to all soldiers. They opposed the guerrillas with search-and-destroy missions that seldom found and even less often destroyed, because the enemy was indistinguishable from farmers and villagers. German and Japanese had opposed armies with armies; the Vietnamese opposed armies with almost invisible hordes of fighters dressed in black pajamas. Johnson, frustrated, was persuaded that bombing their territory would at least bring about negotiations if not surrender. It had the same effect it had had in the 1940s on the British and the Germans; it hardened their resolution and reduced their effectiveness very little.

The effort went on too long, was too futile, and was far too costly. It began to usurp resources urgently needed if the well advertised Great Society, now on the books, was to become more than a promise. The expectations aroused by the flood of legislation in

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1964-66 and the proliferation of administrative agencies were disappointed. The surge of the poor toward equality was being dissipated in disappointments.

Matters were made worse when Johnson increased the forces fighting in Vietnam—and incurred the inevitable losses in battle. These, together with the extravagant costs of war, became intolerable. Almost at once, boiling up from the frustrations of disappointed hopes, those who had so long held self-determination and containment to be articles of faith discovered that they were not applicable in Southeast Asia. Very soon it appeared that they were not applicable anywhere. The United States became an interfering capitalist imperium with a military-industrial complex demanding to be fed by overseas adventures.

This transformation of attitudes became, as such phenomena do, extreme. It was not long before the nation was pictured as taking sides in a civil war with right on the other side. The word "escalation" became a slogan to beat Johnson with and soon there was attached to it a modification. It was "immoral." In two years what had been the most approved undertaking in a usually selfish world —the protection of a helpless people from aggressive neighbors— became the wicked adventure of generals and industrialists who meant to make of South Vietnam what Korea had become—a satellite operated for profit.

Johnson ordered the escalation; but he was not the author of self-determination or containment. He happened to be there when both these liberal rubrics were exposed as obsolete and he did not discover until too late that his following had so dwindled that he was marching pretty much alone.

Goldman understood all this. What Goldman seems not to have understood is how the man in the White House had come to have the disposal of such mighty forces with only such advice and preparation as seemed to him sufficient, or how the immolation of so dedicated and energetic an elected leader had become inevitable. When the crunch came, Lyndon Johnson, being the same man who had been so overwhelmingly chosen and who had pursued the consensus policies so faithfully, had to stand and take it. It was too much. It was betrayal; he had done what he ought to have done. He was right. Those who were stoning him in 1968 had not only elected him in 1964, they had elected him to do what he had done

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—to get the Great Society on the books and started and to pursue the foreign policies that had been orthodox since Truman.

The man being thus brought low was indeed a tragic figure, but a reading of the Goldman book explains only the phenomena of the ordeal, not why its time had come.

Alternatives

Goldman's Johnson should not have become president, and no president should have been put in Johnson's position. These propositions are the ones Goldman does not explore. Reedy went somewhat further but offered as the solution only organized confrontation. Unless the confronters shared his power, or could make good any objection they might have, it is hard to see how confrontation would result in more than making an impulsive president more belligerent. It would not provide a better incumbent and would not make his decisions any wiser. True, it might make him stop and think; but stopping and thinking in Johnson's case would not have resulted in alterations. He believed himself to be acting in the national interest, and since he had been given the responsibility, his actions ought not to be questioned.

Confrontation, which, in the past, has been offered as a solution by others who have argued for some variety of the same thing, would also intensify the worst fault of government as presently constituted—obstructionism. There already exist too many advantages for any interest desiring to block action. There is, to begin with, the checks-and-balances system within government, so much valued by the Framers; but their concern that there should be no lodgment anywhere of absolute authority resulted in an independence among the branches that quickly deepened into hostility. The massive support a president must assemble to secure acceptance by the Congress of almost any measure he may propose uses energies and facilities far beyond reason; the task has been known to absorb all his attention for protracted periods, and he must maintain a lobby whose activities are in direct and demeaning competition with the lobbies of interests which oppose or would emasculate even the most necessary measures. One of the more curious features of the legislative process as practiced in this

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country is the way congressional committees preside blandly over bitter contests between the president and those who have sent their lobbyists to do battle with him.

Those who argue for confrontation are not proposing that parliamentary government as a whole be adopted—that is to say, that the president be a member of the Congress—but unless the whole system were accepted, matters would only be made worse. The president would still be separately elected and the two branches, however much they might be required to argue with each other, would still owe their political lives to different constituencies.

There is no doubt that the Johnson presidency offered climactic evidence of insufficiency. The presidency had been gaining power and accumulating resentment for some time. It no longer provided the democracy with adequate leadership capable of the essential tasks of presidential government nor with the means for implementing policies approved by the electorate. In fact, no formal means for the formation of those policies and the instruction of leaders existed.

If the party platforms and campaign pronouncements had once given notice of intention, they no longer did. Both had become neutralized. The effort was not to persuade anyone but rather not to offend anyone. This brought presidents to their office quite uncommitted and allowed them full scope for their accumulated powers. They had only to pursue the programs they somehow sensed the public—or their select supporters—wanted.

For a high-pressure politician such as Johnson was, this condition constituted an invitation to act whenever it seemed to him necessary. Even his gestures toward consent, such as the Tonkin resolution, were limited to foreign affairs. He assumed in domestic ones that he knew best, and since for a while he had a compliant Congress, the result was a multitude of hastily devised measures the administration of which had constantly to be revised and which never were adequately funded. He presided over a confusion he himself had created and had, of course, to suffer the consequences.

Why was this? Everyone has known for a century that the choosing of a president is a kind of state- and city-bosses' game, the object of which is something other than finding for the country the leader best suited to its needs. As for the vice-president who

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may become his successor (has become his successor eight times through death), he is picked by the presidential nominee for no better reason than that he may help to carry a doubtful state or region. This process yielded Lyndon Johnson. Before him it had yielded Tyler, Andrew Johnson, Arthur, Coolidge, and Truman, among others.

When everyone knows the risks being run of finding an incompetent or a misfit in the White House and no one moves to see that a better process is adopted, no one is really entitled to turn on the resulting individual as Johnson was turned on. Among those most vitriolic in their castigation of him were exactly those who have consistently refused to consider the likely results of the selection process or the handicaps of presidential leadership. They have always treated suggestions for a recasting of constitutional assignments as irresponsible fantasies.

Suppose, however, this curious constitutional lacuna should be corrected and a legitimate electoral process should place the best possible national leader in the White House; are his duties and his powers what they must be in modern circumstances? Again, everyone knows they are not. He has too much power; and he has not enough power. He can send the armed forces into any part of the world, risking war on any scale, and he can only be hindered in this by the refusal of funds when it is too late. Of course he can be rebuked by adverse public opinion and even forced out of office, but in the nuclear age this must happen long after confrontation that may result in disaster. Even without the use of the big weapons, it has resulted in Korea and Vietnam.

As to his lack of needed power, the Constitution designates the president clearly enough to be chief executive; but his other duties as chief legislator and maker of foreign policy are authorized with considerable ambiguity. He is to recommend legislation from time to time but the inference is that this will be unusual; and he has only the veto to sustain the integrity of what he recommends. The Congress was obviously expected to make the laws and the president to see that they were faithfully executed. The fact is that in recent history no important law has originated in the Congress; and instead of insisting on its prerogative, its members become querulous if needed measures are not prepared for them in the White House.

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To make all complete, the president is no longer actually an executive in domestic matters. The carrying into effect of laws is the one activity he no longer has time or energy for, as was well illustrated by the Johnson failure. Recent presidents have had few if any cabinet meetings, and occasionally it comes to light that department heads have difficulty consulting their nominal superior. Ickes at one time did not see Roosevelt for more than a year, and a successor secretary, Hickel, had to communicate with President Nixon by letter. That these are not at all unusual situations all students of the federal government are aware. Recognition of it, and abstraction of the president from duties he does not and cannot perform, would open the way to an arrangement for their performance by others who could.

What is wrong in the relationship of the president and the Congress stems directly from the Constitution. What is needed is such a change as will lead to cooperation rather than friction—with the caution that cooperation shall not become subjection. This is a difficult condition, only to be reached by both having a common mandate from the people. This requires electoral reform; more, it requires constitutionalization of the electoral processes, left out of the Constitution and never put in.

The party system once helped in the making of legislation, but it has broken down and congressional blocs are now almost as apt to be sectional or ideological as partisan. Then, too, conflicts of interest, perennially exposed, are a painful departure from theoretical allegiances.

There is the matter of those far-too-great powers as well as the far-too-weak ones. It has only to be asked what body or what official, as things are, might suitably be established to share or to modify such decisions as took the nation into Southeast Asia, into the Near East, and into Africa and Cuba. The list of presidential adventures, undertaken with only such advice as he himself thought good, has become a long one; and each has made the next more likely because of the precedent.

Doubtful presidential wisdom is not limited to foreign affairs either. There has only to be recalled the massive transfer to the cities of the displaced rural folk of the South. It was allowed to happen without the slightest attempt at either prevention or accommodation. After two decades the enclaves of misery in a land

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of affluence are a reproach to all who allowed them to develop—but primarily, of course, to a blind national leadership.

A situation had been reached in 1970 when unthinkable assaults on the public interest occurred with frightening frequency. Teachers refused to teach; railroaders brought the trains to a halt; police and firemen abandoned their posts; controllers of air traffic absented themselves. Even the head of the largest labor organization was appalled. Strikes, he said, are an obsolete way to settle disputes. About these, and about many other problems—such as suddenly discovered pollution, unanticipated and mishandled economic recessions, the deception of consumers, the despoliations by land developers—not only had action been lacking but formulation of policies had been neglected until the repair of damage seems almost impossible.

It is quite unthinkable that any *existing* agency should share the president's power to decide what shall be proposed or done. The senators, and even more the representatives, are responsible to local constituencies. They owe no constitutional duty to the national constituency; only the president does. The most casual examination of experience will cause anyone to shudder at the suggestion of the actual sharing of presidential power with any members of the Congress or with any of its committees. And what the president gets from his elaborate system of consultants, such as the Security Council, not to mention the Council of Economic Advisers, the Environmental Council, and the Office of Management and Budget, is a dialogue, verbal or written; and such phenomena as the sponsorship of Chiang Kai-shek, the invasion of Santo Domingo, the Bay of Pigs, the intervention in Lebanon, and the clinging to weapons systems known to be unusable make this kind of assistance seem lacking in the wider kind of wisdom. What such complex, vulnerable, and downright dangerous decision making needs is the application of more than one mind and the actual sharing of responsibility by others who are neither subordinate, self-seeking, nor diverted from single loyalty to the country. This is the picture of a senate—or council—chosen differently and separated permanently from other interests, without legislative initiative, but able to delay while reflection goes on and when decisions are made to share in them.

If it seems that what is suggested is that the presidency be re-

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formed by first reforming the Congress, that is what does indeed appear to be necessary.

Historians' Duty

So it may be admissible to point out the limited profit in a critique, however acute, of any president. This is not only a comment on the Goldman work, but also on those of many others, such as that of Reedy. To say that there is no real satisfaction in studies of Johnson is also a comment on even the best of the books about the Kennedy regime, that of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.[4] Both these accounts—and others, as well—are lucid, penetrating, and credible about the central individuals of their titles and about the events they have tried, with more or less success, to master, and sometimes to direct. Why the events happened and why they appear as crises, why the hero of the occasion had to improvise and risk disaster—these are not adequately explained.

That Kennedy was appallingly unprepared for his responsibilities and that Johnson was wrongly conditioned for them—and yet that both did become president—ought to raise the most serious questions about the selection process and about the immense powers conferred so carelessly on those selected. It is not that the historian as a professional has an obligation to be a political inventor as well as an observer; it is that even the most meticulous account of events, the most penetrating analysis of character, or even descriptions of those who have somehow arrived there and have the duty to do their best, is not enough. More than two hundred million Americans are locked in life together. There is no possibility that they will either become fewer or be much changed in character. They must have institutions suited to this circumstance, first, and then to the continual alterations in the technologies supporting their way of life. Does it sound heartless to say that it does not much matter whether Kennedy was attractive to intellectuals and Johnson was not and that this resulted in tragedy for Johnson? There was a deeper tragedy developing for the nation; and its historians in the postwar years ought to have seen the events and characters as part of a tidal movement and not only as individuals confronting the challenges they were presented

[4] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, 1965).

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with.

Goldman and Schlesinger are two among possibly the most gifted group of historians any era of the American past has had. To ask more of them than we have had is at once recognition of their capabilities and reproach for not giving us more, but surely the demand is justified.

Lyndon Johnson was caught in a dilemma, but it was one that had been developing for a long time. He was not the man for the times, but he did not pick himself to deal with them; others did. Historians dealing with such a situation must certainly address their contemporaries and not their ancestors; but there is a limit not only to the recasting of events for illumination, but to the ignoring of momentous movements and the obsolescence of institutions. Against such difficulties individuals who are unprepared or who are the wrong sort labor in vain. Their failure is not only theirs. It deserves to be recorded as mostly that of those who expected them to do the impossible.

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Redemption and Politics

ROGER W. SMITH
College of William and Mary

The underlying premise of this essay is that there are degrees of risk beyond which few persons will go. This is, in fact, the basis of all theories of deterrence. But whereas the idea of deterrence is ordinarily applied to problems such as war or crime, I want to apply it to the acceptance of political responsibility. Essentially I shall argue that the inability to exorcize guilt—the lack of the possibility of redemption—acts as a deterrent to the acceptance of all responsibility, but especially political responsibility. I shall argue, moreover, that the modern world as a whole is nonredemptive, and thus the acceptance of political responsibility becomes, for the actor, risky, for society, uncertain, and this at the very time that it is needed most.

I

For modern man, the burden of responsibility has increased[1] yet he rejects that responsibility. He does so, in large part, because

[1] Individual responsibility increases because of the decline of "tribal" morality, the growth of a universalistic ethic, the increase in and better distribution of knowledge, the tendency of democracy to spread responsibility, the greater complexity and interdependence in society, the continuing shock at

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every failure results in guilt from which there is no exit. He has come to live in a moral and political universe in which "virtue's door unsealed is never sealed again."[2] In such a world, a world without redemption, the past dominates the present and the future. Guilt cumulates, embraces, and destroys. What is man to do?

The rich opportunities for redemption which were provided by classical society are gone: no more laying on of hands, no more rituals of purification, no saturnalian release through orgy and role reversal, no cancellation of debts, and, above all, no day of atonement. To be sure, there are modern scapegoats, a term which to us means a method of avoiding guilt by transferring responsibility to another person, but this apparently easy way out only means that, everyday, we must take precautions not to become scapegoats ourselves. In any case, it is significant for a theory of political guilt that we think of the scapegoat as a zero-sum game, for in ancient Israel the scapegoat was a means of encouraging man to accept collective responsibility for the community.[3] Only by accepting responsibility for what one had done, and for what the community had done, could one be released from guilt.

At first glance, though, the reconstruction of the attitudes of society, with the consequent alteration of the boundaries of guilt, would still seem open to us. Orestes, after all, ends up a king, the old order having been swept away by the process his guilt set in motion.[4] The case of Orestes, however, can provide little incentive for the acceptance of political responsibility; for, like Orestes, the political actor would be caught up in a situation the outcome of which would remain wholly in doubt. Faced with

the horrors of the Nazi period, and because of certain intellectual demands—existentialism, for example—which have altered our understanding of responsibility.

[2] The quotation is from Aeschylus, *The Choephori* or *The Libation-Bearers* in *The Oresteian Trilogy*, trans. Philip Vellacott (Baltimore, 1956), 106. Aeschylus, however, is not to be identified with the idea contained in the quotation; on the contrary, he is a poet of redemption, as all his works attest. He simply knows what he has to contend with: the words are spoken by the Chorus and represent commonly held views.

[3] Lev. 16: 21. See also T. H. Gaster, "Sacrifices and Offerings, OT.," *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* (New York, 1962), 4, p. 153.

[4] Aeschylus, *The Oresteian Trilogy*.

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the prospects of uncertainty, failure, and guilt, he has little reason to initiate anything new. And, in fact, Orestes acts only because he is threatened by a god; left to himself, he either would not have acted at all or would have, at most, acted out of blind passion.

For the elected official in a democracy, of course, a somewhat pale form of redemption is possible by way of vindication at the polls. But this is subject to the same problem that reconstruction is—uncertainty—so that one is reluctant to initiate anything new, reluctant to take personal responsibility for major shifts of policy. Moreover, it is a pale form of redemption, and thus lacks efficacy, because, in general, the question of guilt is not ordinarily met head-on in an election and because, in any case, even a victory at the polls involves reconciliation with only a portion of the population.

If, to be sure, we had the kind of public order envisaged by Nietzsche—one with strength, nobility, and, consequently, generosity—redemption would be politically possible. Such a society, Nietzsche tells us, would be "flushed with such a sense of power that it could afford to let its offenders go unpunished":

> 'Why should I both about these parasites of mine?' such a society might ask. 'Let them take all they want. I have plenty.' Justice, which began by setting a price on everything and making everyone strictly accountable, ends by blinking at the defaulter and letting him go scot free. Like every good thing on earth, justice ends by suspending itself. The fine name this self-cancelling justice has given itself is *mercy*. But mercy remains, as goes without saying, the prerogative of the strongest, his province beyond the law.[5]

The members of this society could perhaps even accept the invitation of Thomas Paine to hold out the "hearty hand of friendship" and "bury in forgetfulness every former dissension." The past might, in other words, be overcome by an "'act of oblivion."[6] But lacking this kind of public order and lacking the possibility of redemption, modern man engages in a kind of "preventive innocence"; that is, he carefully limits his responsibilities, ac-

[5] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals* in *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), 205.

[6] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* in *Common Sense and Other Political Writings*, ed. Nelson F. Adkins (New York, 1953), 52.

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cepting in so far as he must his private guilt, but denying his responsibility for a common, public world. He cannot escape being the private man, but he sees no need to enter into the gratuitous responsibilities of the public man. Whether one is citizen or officeholder, the important point is to retain one's innocence.

II

To be sure, redemption is not a problem for a writer like Jean-Paul Sartre; for it is axiomatic to him, as to others today, that in fact there is "no exit."[7] Yet Sartre believes, paradoxically, that to close off the exits will force man to become more responsible: with no place to hide he will abandon his "bad faith" and accept the guilt which is his inescapably.[8] The difficulty with Sartre's position, however, is that man is more likely simply to constrict his identity and refuse action as far as possible. To reply, as he does, that even inaction is action is, no doubt, true, but for a man in panic, it is not convincing. And if Camus has shown anything in his novel *The Fall*, it is that modern man is in a panic, obsessed with the problem of his own innocence and, consequently, with the ways in which he can fend off guilt.[9]

We first meet Jean-Baptiste Clamence, the "hero" of *The Fall*, in a seedy, waterfront bar in Amsterdam. It is here that, night after night, he practices his strange profession of judge-penitent, the object of which is to avoid judgment. Clamence believes that the more he accuses himself, the more he has the right to accuse

[7] See, for example, Jean-Paul Sartre, *No Exit* (1944) in *No Exit and Three Other Plays*, trans. Stuart Gilbert and Lionel Abel (New York, n.d.) and *The Condemned of Altona* (1960), trans. Sylvia and George Leeson (New York, n.d.).

[8] Sartre writes, for example, that "existentialism's first move is to make every man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him"; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism*, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York, 1947), 19.

[9] Albert Camus, *The Fall*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York, 1956). No doubt the quest for innocence has always afflicted man—Adam points to Eve, Eve points to the snake, and the snake suggests that it is somehow all God's fault. And, indeed, as Nietzsche suggests, one of the historic functions of the gods was to relieve man of responsibility for his acts: "in those days they were not agents of punishment but, what is nobler, repositories of guilt"; Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, 228. Nevertheless, there is a modern dimension to the need for innocence that is qualitatively quite different from anything that

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others. Though there is "apparently no escape" from judgment,[10] in this way he can thin out his guilt at the start by spreading it to others. By pretending to be a penitent, he can end up a judge. To be sure, this is only one of a number of techniques that Clamence uses to neutralize guilt. But it conveys well the panic, and even hysteria, involved in Clamence's bid for innocence:

> Covered with ashes, tearing my hair, my face scored by clawing, but with piercing eyes, I stand before all humanity recapitulating my shames without losing sight of the effect I am producing, and saying: 'I was the lowest of the low.' Then imperceptibly I pass from the 'I' to the 'we.' When I get to 'This is what we are,' the trick has been played and I can tell them off. I am like them, to be sure; we are in the soup together. However, I have a superiority in that I know it and this gives me the right to speak.[11]

As a judge he is protected from judgment; moreover, when he hands out "definitive testimonials of bad character and habits," a sense of power and righteousness impresses itself upon him. A sensitive and cultured man, Clamence recognizes, however, "the melancholy of the common condition" and he understands the "despair of not being able to escape it." Nevertheless, he makes a point of never granting absolution to anyone.[12]

Although Jean-Baptiste Clamence is the hero of the novel, the book is, as Camus suggests,[13] a portrait, not of an individual, but of an age—an age which is in flight from guilt and yet "forgives nothing."[14] What Camus describes in this work, in fact, is the loss of the possibility of redemption, that which, according to Weber, gives rise to "the secret anguish that modern man bears."[15] This anguish, in turn, is converted into a "mania

has gone on before, even during the Reformation. It is this that Camus brings out so beautifully in *The Fall.*

[10] Camus, *The Fall,* 131.

[11] *Ibid.,* 140.

[12] *Ibid.,* 143.

[13] In the epigraph to *The Fall.* But Camus, in all his novels, used a large canvas: "What, in fact, is the aim of every creative artist? To depict the passions of his day"; Albert Camus, *Lyrical and Critical Essays,* ed. Philip Thody (New York, 1968), 353.

[14] The phrase is from Albert Camus, *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death,* trans. Justin O'Brien (New York, 1961), 251.

[15] In an extraordinary passage in *The Sociology of Religion,* trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Boston, 1964), 206, Max Weber speaks of the plight of modern man: his "godless feeling of sin," his "anguish," his "malaise." The individual today

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for virtue,"[16] into a feverish quest for innocence.

The quest for innocence, Camus realizes, springs in part from man's nature:

> The idea that comes most naturally to man, as if from his very nature, is the idea of his innocence. From this point of view, we are all like that little Frenchman at Buchenwald who insisted on registering a complaint with the clerk, himself a prisoner, who was recording his arrival. A complaint? The clerk and his comrades laughed. 'Useless, old man. You don't lodge a complaint here.' 'But you see, sir,' said the little Frenchman, 'My case is exceptional. I am innocent!'
>
> We are all exceptional cases. We all want to appeal against something! Each of us insists on being innocent at all cost, even if he has to accuse the whole human race and heaven itself.[17]

Man is so in love with his innocence that he will do anything to preserve it, even commit murder.[18] Clamence cannot help wondering how many crimes must have been committed because "their authors could not endure being wrong":

> I once knew a manufacturer who had a perfect wife, admired by all, and yet he deceived her. That man was literally furious to be in the wrong, to be blocked from receiving, or granting himself, a certificate of virtue. The more virtues his wife manifested, the more vexed he became. Eventually, living in the wrong became unbearable to him. What do you think he did then? He gave up deceiving her? Not at all. He killed her.[19]

And yet the problem is not simply one of man's nature; the historical period in which he lives must also be considered. Tillich, for example, sees the loss of innocence as a natural, ontological con-

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"feels that both he and the others are inhuman, because there is no significant possibility of 'forgiveness,' 'contrition,' or 'restitution'—in much the same way that these human qualities were impossible under the religious belief in predestination, with its picture of a mysterious divine plan."

[16] Albert Camus, *Notebooks, 1942-1951*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York, 1966), 197.

[17] *The Fall*, 80-81.

[18] He will murder himself or others—the demands of innocence are mysterious, above all, in their indifference to the choice of a victim. Significant in this respect is the man called Cottard in Camus' novel *The Plague*. When we first meet him, early in the book, Cottard has just attempted suicide out of a desire to preserve his innocence. At the close of the novel, he is still trying to defend his innocence, this time by firing randomly at persons in the streets; Camus, *The Plague*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York, 1948), 30-32, 272-76.

[19] Camus, *The Fall*, 18-19.

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cern of man, comparable to the concern over death and meaninglessness.[20] Indeed, guilt, death, and the loss of meaning are the three basic threats to man's existence; man will always be concerned, anxiously so, with these basic manifestations of nonbeing. But if these concerns are always present in the individual, the age, nevertheless, may accentuate one of these threats, making it the central anxiety of the period. Thus, after the collapse of the ancient world, man experienced the threat of death; in the aftermath of the breakdown of the medieval world, man experienced guilt; and in the present cultural crisis, Tillich suggests, man experiences a loss of meaning. But Tillich would not deny that where one form of cultural anxiety is present, others may be present also and may even be the result of the other, predominant form of anxiety. Camus sees as well that the loss of belief in the structure, order, and purpose of the world—the loss of meaning—is what heightens the sense of guilt for modern man. For it is not so much that man has fallen—though man has certainly done that—as that the world has fallen; there is nothing solid underfoot and nothing one can catch hold of. Through *The Fall*, Camus forces us to recognize a major phenomenon of our times—the kind of guilt that marks a period of cultural breakdown, that vague, diffuse, and pervasive sense of guilt which seems to have no apparent explanation. With the dissolution of our cultural boundaries ("reality"), guilt, far from being lifted from man's shoulders, becomes more pervasive, more troublesome.[21] Following the laws of social physics, guilt and the desire for innocence expand to fill the space available.

In a "universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy. . . ."[22] Jean-Baptiste Clamence is middle-class man confronting absurdity. A man of the law, he has begun to suspect himself, not only because he failed to rescue a young woman who plunged into the Seine,[23] but because the law itself has come to seem uncertain. The absolutes of the old order have disappeared, but nothing has

[20] Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven, 1952), 40-63.

[21] Cf. Robert Jay Lifton, "Protean Man," *Partisan Review*, XXXV (1968), 25.

[22] Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York, 1960), 5.

[23] A reference to the fall of France in 1940 and the ensuing crisis of conscience. For a personal account of the guilt experienced in this situation, see

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taken their place. Faced with metaphysical uncertainty, Clamence readies himself for the "leap": "for anyone who is alone, without God and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful." What is essential, he believes, is that "everything should become simple, as for the child, . . . that good and evil should be arbitrarily, hence obviously, pointed out."[24] And yet he knows that this is only wishful thinking on his part. For wherever Clamence looks, he sees dividedness and uncertainty—the world appears ambiguous, not in its accidental features, but in its essence. Moreover, everything appears to have been turned inside out: Clamence's virtues (modesty and humility) only have helped him to conquer and oppress, while his shortcomings (coldness and indifference) have unjustly worked to his advantage. Defensively, Clamence suggests that he is unable to believe that human affairs are "serious matters"—they no longer seem to make any sense; they appear to be absurd. Yet, Clamence discovers, even in a world without meaning, he is still responsible for the choices he makes; he is still subject to judgment. But he will not accept responsibility for his choices; instead he will try to "elude judgment." He has become a body in a void, absent, he says, at the moment when he takes up the most space.[25] He has learned that he is afraid of freedom.

For Clamence, moreover, the whole world has become a dead sea on which man drifts along without the benefit of any landmarks, unable to gauge his progress. Though constantly in motion, man has lost his sense of direction:

> You are wrong, *cher*, the boat is going at top speed. But the Zuider Zee is a dead sea, or almost. With its flat shores, lost in the fog, there's no saying where it begins or ends. So we are steaming along without any landmark; we can't gauge our speed. We are making progress and yet nothing is changing. It's not navigation but dreaming.

The world of Greece, on the other hand, with its clarity, meaning, and delight, is the world that man can still recall, but has irretrievably lost:

Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*, trans. Gerard Hopkins (New York, 1968), chap. 3.

[24] Camus, *The Fall*, 133, 135.

[25] *Ibid.*, 87.

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> In the Greek archipelago I had the contrary feeling. Constantly new islands would appear on the horizon. Their treeless backbone marked the limit of the sky and their rocky shore contrasted sharply with the sea. No confusion possible; in the sharp light everything was a landmark. And from one island to another, ceaselessly on our little boat, which was nevertheless dawdling, I felt as if we were scudding along, night and day, on the crest of the short, cool waves in a race full of spray and laughter. Since then, Greece itself drifts somewhere within me, on the edge of my memory, tirelessly. . . . Hold on, I, too, am drifting. . . .[26]

Modern man, condemned to an earth without meaning, is aware that he has fallen. The power of recollection makes his situation even more painful; Eden beckons, but he can find no way to return. Man has slipped his moorings and drifts without destination. Yet he is never far from judgment. To Clamence, the concentric canals of Amsterdam represent the circles of Hell—a hell "peopled with bad dreams."[27]

Clamence drifts with the times, but he is also tormented by them. It is, he says, as if we were forced to live again in the medieval "little ease."[28] That ingenious device, forged in the dungeons of the middle ages, was a torture cell, the dimensions of which did not allow one either to stand up or lie down: "One had to take on an awkward manner and live on the diagonal; sleep was a collapse, and waking a squatting." Clamence suggests that man, forced to live in such a world, without reprieve or redemption, can easily come to believe that he is guilty. At the very minimum, "diagonal man" finds himself leading a life of "hunchbacked" innocence: unable to stand upright (because there is no known point from which to judge his life), he continually doubts his own virtue. And lacking trust in himself, he is incapable of extending generosity to others;[29] he thus swells the ranks of those for whom the vocation of judgment is irresistible.

[26] *Ibid.*, 97.

[27] *Ibid.*, 14.

[28] *Ibid.*, 109-10.

[29] This is the position Camus takes in *The Fall*—men like Clamence can "find nothing better to do than accuse others in accusing themselves"; Camus, *Lyrical and Critical Essays*, 320. But in a later work Camus goes further—without trust, man dies; William Faulkner, *Requiem pour une nonne: Pièce en deux parties et sept tableaux*, adapt. A. Camus (Paris, 1956), 180-81. And already in Clamence we see something of this. Symbols of death—stagnant

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The Last Judgment, Clamence reminds us, takes place every day: "God is not needed to create guilt or to punish. Our fellow men suffice, aided by ourselves." Modern man reverses the biblical injunction—he judges in order not to be judged.[30]

Clamence feels comfortable only at the theater and the soccer matches. For these, he confesses, are the only places where he feels innocent. Lost in the crowd, he experiences the comfort of anonymity. Moreover, with the memory of personal guilt haunting him, he mobilizes his efforts to drown conscience, awareness, the past. Sex, gin, ideology, the fatiguing and evasive flow of words, the vision of being a master calling the tune—all of these —are ways of evading judgment, of wiping out the knowledge of good (that others may be innocent) and evil (especially one's own). But what is bothering Clamence, this modern everyman without mercy or trust, is not primarily the guilt involved in what he has done or has failed to do. Rather he feels driven to innocence by the lack of meaning in the world: "He who clings to a law does not fear the judgment that reinstates him in an order he believes in. But the keenest of human torments is to be judged without a law. Yet we are in that torment." To find others guilty is, thus, a way of restoring structure to the world. If men are guilty, we tell ourselves, there must be a law. Driven on by the ambiguity of the world, and the loss of meaning, we develop a passion for judgment, a passion comparable to the sexual in its insistence and urgency, except that here there are no inadequacies to fear.[31] Without the checks imposed by a settled law (structure), the judges are loosed to range at random through the world. Guilt becomes pervasive and, like despair for Kierkegaard, a "sickness unto death."[32] Not surprisingly, in the last chapter of *The Fall*, Clamence, his spiritual sickness having overtaken him, lies delirious in his bed.

Yet even in this state Clamence is capable of a curious kind of

water, the smell of dead leaves—hold great attraction for him; Camus, *The Fall*, 43. For Camus' thoughts on the need for a "generous psychology," see his *Notebooks, 1942-1951*, 7-8.

[30] Camus, *The Fall*, 110-11, 80.

[31] *Ibid.*, 117, 77.

[32] Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death* in *Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City, N. Y., 1954).

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insight: "Don't bear down too hard on me," he asks. "I'm like that old beggar who wouldn't let go of my hand one day on a cafe terrace: 'Oh Sir,' he said, 'it's not just that I'm no good, but you lose track of the light.' Yes, we have lost track of the light, the mornings, the holy innocence of those who forgive themselves." Man tries desperately, in other words, to scratch out a kind of innocence for himself, but he lacks that "holy innocence" which rests on trust. Lacking strength within himself, a victim of a fragmented world, he robs existence of its purity—in Clamence's eyes, not even the child, the traditional symbol of innocence, is free from guilt. Clamence knows, then, what is bothering him, but he cannot do anything about it; both he and the world appear to have lost their way. Nevertheless, when the snow begins to fall on Amsterdam, Clamence rises from his sick bed, hoping to partake of the purity of the snow. He knows that by tomorrow, do what he will, the snow will have turned into mud. To be sure, Jesus "spoke softly to the adulteress: 'Neither do I condemn thee!' " "But that doesn't matter," Clamence says, for today men simply "condemn without absolving."[33] For Clamence, innocence is the insistent demand; guilt, the ultimate reality. His leap to innocence fails.

For Camus, the key to the novel is in the title; *La Chute* means both "fall" and "disaster." He recognizes, of course, that under ordinary circumstances (that which formerly prevailed), guilt is not itself a disaster. Man can learn from his wrongs, exorcize his guilt, and gain reconciliation with himself and others.[34] But in a world without redemption (for Camus, the modern world), guilt does become a disaster. A fragmented world stimulates a sense of guilt, yet blocks any release from that guilt. Man bumps into no-exit signs everywhere. He becomes vulnerable; his reactions to personal guilt become excessive. Unable to free himself from the elusive guilt of cultural breakdown—his inheritance,

[33] Camus, *The Fall*, 145, 112, 115.

[34] So it is with D'Arrast in "The Growing Stone" in *Exile and the Kingdom*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York, 1957); Temple Stevens in *Requiem pour une nonne;* and Maria Shatov in *The Possessed: A Play in Three Parts*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York, 1960). Significantly, each of them finds redemption in a *pre-modern* setting: Brazil, Faulkner's Mississippi, tsarist Russia.

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as it were, from a modern Adam[35]—an unrelieved sense of guilt develops. Nor can he any longer exorcize the guilt that he is personally responsible for: "With me," Clamence boasts, "there is no giving of absolution or blessing. Everything is simply totted up, and then: 'It comes to so much. You are an evil-doer, a satyr, a congenital liar, a homosexual, an artist, etc.' " Or again: "I pity without absolving, I understand without forgiving. . . ." In a world in which innocence, and the recovery of innocence, is no longer possible, the question, Clamence says, is simply "to elude judgment."[36] But as he well knows, this is not easy, especially in one's private affairs. What is possible, however, is to refuse any responsibility for the society in which one lives.[37] One limits one's commitments to the private and personal, accepting responsibility where necessary, avoiding it where possible. In a world of pervasive guilt, one engages in "preventive innocence," neutralizing guilt in advance and as far as possible. Modern man, as Camus puts it, is "forced to take the same precautions as the animal tamer. If, before going into the cage, he has the misfortune to cut himself while shaving, what a feast for the wild animals!"[38] Thus, in a world where innocence has vanished and judgment has become a vocation, the public self will be allowed to shrink. Guilt may be inescapable, but one does not have to take on, gratuitously, the responsibility for a common world.[39]

[35] Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York, 1956) is Camus' mythic history of that breakdown.

[36] Camus, *The Fall*, 131, 143, 76, 82.

[37] Camus' desire to remain outside "History" has been interpreted in this way by Sartre: "this man has already abandoned us. He has gone into a corner all by himself to sulk." He "deliberately turns his back "upon "an era." "And I suppose that if I believed, with you [Camus], that History is a pool of filth and blood, I would do as you do, and look twice before diving in. But suppose that I am in it already . . ."; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Situations*, trans. Benita Eisler (Greenwich, Conn., 1966), 68, 76. Camus satirizes this view of himself in "The Artist at Work" in *Exile and the Kingdom*, and in *The Fall*. On the latter, see Roger Quilliot, "An Ambiguous World" in *Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Germaine Brée (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962), 159.

[38] Camus, *The Fall*, 77.

[39] Superimposed on this theme is Camus' old fear—totalitarianism. Camus is worried that, in an attempt to relieve the tension of guilt, man may adopt totalitarian attitudes, demanding absolutes without regard to the costs in-

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III

That Hannah Arendt, who has written extensively on the decline of the public realm and the refusal to accept responsibility for a common world,[40] would turn her attention also to the problem of redemption is perhaps only to be expected. For the problems are, as I have suggested, intimately connected. What must be viewed with alarm, however, is her discussion of political redemption in terms of "forgiveness."[41] For this is in itself an indication, a symptom, if you like, of the no-exit character of our political world—that a theorist of great stature should be reduced to pinning her hopes, and ours, on a form of redemption which is, politically, neither possible nor appropriate. And, in a way, Arendt seems to realize this, for she acknowledges that forgiveness, "perhaps because of its religious context, perhaps because of the connection with love attending its discovery," has always "been deemed unrealistic and inadmissable in the public realm." She knows, moreover, that while love is not required for

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volved. Thus Camus has Clamence say, "Without slavery . . . there is no definitive solution. . . . So hurray for the master, whoever he may be, to take the place of heaven's law. 'Our Father who art provisionally here. . . . Our guides, our delightfully severe masters, O cruel and beloved leaders . . .'"; Camus, *The Fall*, 132, 136. See also, Philip Thody, *Albert Camus: A Study of His Work* (New York, 1959), 79, 147. On this plane, the "disaster" of the fall is totalitarianism—the quest for innocence in its most brutal expression; Camus, *The Rebel*, 4, 135-37, 178, 183-84, 243-44.

[40] Notably in Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Garden City, N. Y., n.d.); *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New Edition; New York, 1966), chap. 5; and "Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility," *Jewish Frontier*, 12 (1945), 19-23.

[41] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, chap. 5. Arendt, it is true, couples the faculty "to make and keep promises" with the faculty of "forgiving." The former, she suggests, is the remedy for the predicament of unpredictability; the latter the remedy for irreversibility. She does not, however, adhere to this distinction: for the premise on which she rests her discussion of forgiveness is that men "know not what they do"; that is, that men can never know in advance what the consequences of their action will be. The reason we forgive, then, according to Arendt, is not because the doer cannot undo his deed, but because he did not intend to do what he did. Arendt is quite explicit in saying that if one intended to do injury, then forgiveness is not applicable. What Arendt might have argued, consequently, though there are problems with it, is that a broken promise can be taken as a sign of an intention to do injury.

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forgiveness, respect is, and modern society fails to understand respect, confusing it with admiration or esteem. Still, she asks, how is man to bear the burden of political action—"the burden of irreversibility and unpredictability"—if there is no redemption? For man has always known that

> he who acts never quite knows what he is doing, that he always becomes 'guilty' of consequences he never intended or even foresaw, that no matter how disastrous and unexpected the consequences of his deed he can never undo it, that the process he starts is never consummated unequivocally in one single deed or event, and that its very meaning never discloses itself to the actor but only to the backward glance of the historian who himself does not act.[42]

With guilt hanging over him like Damocles' sword, and with no hope of redemption, man has reason enough, she says, "to turn away with despair from the realm of human affairs." Lacking, in fact, the possibility of redemption, he seeks to escape from politics altogether: "the only salvation . . . seems to lie in non-acting, in abstention from the whole realm of human affairs as the only means to safeguard one's sovereignty and integrity as a person."[43] It is in desperation, then, that Arendt turns to forgiveness.

Forgiveness asks us to reject the crime and accept the man.[44] Acceptance through forgiveness, thus, does not mean that one's transgressions are denied or excused. On the contrary, forgiveness confirms guilt, but nevertheless allows reconciliation and a new beginning.[45] In forgiveness, Arendt suggests, "*what* was done is forgiven for the sake of *who* did it."[46] The who that is

[42] *Ibid.*, 219, 218, 209.

[43] *Ibid.*, 209-10.

[44] Durkheim had argued that a certain amount of crime (more broadly, transgression) is useful, but carefully added, "it does not follow that we must not abhor it." Tarde answered, "But since when is it permitted to hate a benefactor?" In theory, at least, forgiveness would seem to provide a way out of the dilemma. The quotations are from Joseph Neyer, "Individualism and Socialism in Durkheim" in *Essays on Sociology and Philosophy*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York, 1964), 65.

[45] Tillich is particularly insightful on this point. See his *Systematic Theology* (Chicago, 1951-63), I, 288; *Love, Power and Justice* (New York, 1960), 86, 121; *The Courage to Be* (New Haven, 1952), 163-67. Those of us who view forgiveness as "too easy" would do well to reflect on Raskolnikov's anguished cry: "if I am guilty forgive me (though I cannot be forgiven if I am guilty)"; Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, trans. Constance Garnett (New York, 1950), 503.

[46] *The Human Condition*, 217.

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forgiven can only be one with whom we share. Unlike punishment, which mobilizes our sense of virtue and sets us apart from the transgressor, forgiveness arouses in us, and depends upon, a sense of shared weakness. We are moved to forgive out of our own need to be forgiven for what we have done in the past and for what we may do in the future. Forgiveness, unlike punishment, moreover, depends upon a life of common values and concerns. We do not forgive the stranger, he who, even when he lives among us, is set apart and isolated from the common life.[47] With repentance, the other side of forgiveness, the emphasis is also on a basic sharing, rather than on a debt incurred. Repentance (*metanoia*) means that the offender must "turn back" to the common order by way of a "change of mind."[48] In showing that he is contrite (literally, "bruised"), with sorrow for the wrongs he has done, the repentant person gives evidence that he is now prepared to share in, and maintain, the structure of common concern.

Forgiveness can be an effective mode of reconciliation, and thus of redemption, only where men share common concerns and possess a sense of mutual moral weakness. In view of what Camus has revealed through his character Jean-Baptiste Clamence, the role of forgiveness would seem to be greatly limited in modern society; one cannot, for example, have "sweet dreams of oppression" and still be capable of forgiveness.[49] But there is more. Modern man, as Tocqueville acutely noted, tends to be

> a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. . . . As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; . . . if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country.[50]

This rather strict economy of affection—or to use Parsons's terms, "self-orientation" combined with "affective neutrality"—was noted in a different way by Dostoevsky. In modern society, he

[47] When a man's guilt is too great for us to forgive, he becomes a stranger through expulsion and exile—we no longer know him as a man like ourselves.

[48] S.v. "Repentance" in *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, 4, pp. 33-34.

[49] Camus, *The Fall*, 55.

[50] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York, 1954), II, 336.

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says, we prefer "to look people under the eyes."[51] That is, we view man as function, role, and object, rather than as person. This dissection, when its quality is recognized, can produce a shared sense, not of moral weakness, but of having been victimized. The road toward this sense of having been victimized, however, does not lead to forgiveness; it can go no further than excuse or indignation. The logic of modern legal thinking also works against a sense of shared moral weakness—we are all, as it were, innocent until proved guilty. No wonder Clamence has an old and faithful attachment for dogs: "I like them," he says, "because they always forgive."[52]

Political forgiveness is not a genuine possibility in modern society and perhaps it never has been available to society as a whole; even Jesus had to threaten men with torture by God to make them forgive.[53] Nevertheless, Arendt argues that forgiveness is one of the potentialities inherent in political action and, in any case, a necessary accompaniment to political life. Forgiveness, as she conceives it, rests on the assumption that men "know not what they do": forgiveness is thus applicable only where men do not intend the wrong which flows from their actions.[54] Yet she believes that since "he who acts never quite knows what he is doing," all action leads to "inevitable damages," all action produces harmful unintended and unforeseen consequences. Regardless of the precautions we take, we can never wholly predict the consequences of any course of action. Only the historian (who is described by Arendt as a nonactor) can know what we

[51] Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Letters From the Underworld*, trans. C. J. Hogarth (New York, 1913), 12.

[52] Camus, *The Fall*, 121.

[53] Matt. 18:23-25.

[54] *The Human Condition*, 212-23. What Arendt maintains, in effect, is that Luke 23:34 contains the paradigm of forgiveness. On this basis, she would bar from forgiveness those involved in crime or evil. In the course of upholding this position, she declares (incredibly) that "crime and willed evil are rare"; and in her interpretation of the Last Judgment, she confuses crime with lack of compassionate love. Moreover, in a later work, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (New York, 1964), she concludes that crime is compatible with lack of intent.

In any case, forgiveness does not turn on a distinction between crime and trespass, or between the intended and the unintended. Rather, it depends on the degree of indignation which we experience and on our relationship to the offender. Therefore, no one can specify in advance what acts we can or cannot forgive.

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did or did not do. Our action, moreover, is not only unpredictable, it is irreversible. No matter how disastrous the unforeseen consequences, we can never undo them. All of us, insofar as we engage in political action, thus, stand in need of forgiveness: "Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victim of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell."[55] Forgiveness may not be possible, but it is, Arendt seems to assert, still necessary.

One is tempted to ask: But is forgiveness, one mode among other modes of redemption, really necessary? Is it, in fact, appropriate for politics at all? But then we realize that we have still not penetrated to the bottom of Arendt's idea of political forgiveness. The full measure of desperation is yet to come.

Arendt's theory of forgiveness rests on the assumption that we can distinguish what was intended from what was unintended. Yet she asserts that we have an almost "complete incapacity" to "foretell the consequences of any deed." Nor, for that matter, do we have any greater capacity to gain "reliable knowledge" of the motives for a particular deed. What Arendt confronts us with, then, is neither intended nor unintended consequences, but simply consequences which we are asked to forgive.[56] Implicitly though, Arendt views political forgiveness as taking place on two levels. Redemption in the present comes from a forgiving public —though it is difficult to think of this body as a public since the ability to distinguish and choose between actions has now been taken away. Future and ultimate redemption, on the other hand, comes from the historian, who provides a kind of political Last Judgment. The public forgives the apparent consequences; the historian, the only one capable of knowing what was actually done, forgives the real consequences. The upshot of this is that neither in time-present nor in time-future is the political actor's degree of skill called into question. In the political theory of forgiveness, repentance takes the place of a vote of confidence.

[55] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 213.

[56] *Ibid.*, 209. The central political objection to forgiveness remains, however, even if we purge her theory of its gratuitous contradiction.

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The Kennedy administration's venture at the Bay of Pigs furnishes an excellent example of what, in Arendt's conception, stands in need of forgiveness for those involved in this ill-fated attempt to overthrow the Castro dictatorship literally did not know what they were doing. Arthur Schlesinger, historian and presidential adviser, has now testified to what Kennedy virtually admitted at the time, that the whole plan was misconceived politically and technically.[57] Theodore Sorensen, one of the president's closest friends and advisers, has written that the invasion plan was "diplomatically unwise and militarily doomed from the outset" and that the president's own mistakes were both serious and numerous.[58] Kennedy became a depressed, lonely man; he felt personally responsible for the many lives lost in the swamps of Cuba. He was contrite, repentant, aware of the need for reconciliation. There is every reason why we should forgive him as a man. But can we, as Arendt would have us do, make forgiveness the major theme in our response to the political man? For the price of forgiveness is the exclusion of skill and judgment from politics.[59]

Politically, forgiveness is an alternative not to other forms of redemption, but to skill. Indeed, Arendt's political theory is a sustained attempt to wean us from the politics of skill, and in this she keeps company with the American Puritan, John Winthrop:

> When you agree with a workman to build you a ship or house, etc., he undertakes as well for his skill as for his faithfulness, for it is his profession, and you pay him for both. But when you call one to be a magistrate, he doth not profess nor undertake to have sufficient skill for that office, nor can you furnish him with gifts, etc.; therefore you must run the hazard of his skill and ability.[60]

[57] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Thousand Days* (Boston, 1965), chaps. IX-XI.

[58] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York, 1965), chap. XI.

[59] The institutions of presidential government, unlike those of parliamentary government, allow the office holder time to show that he has recovered his skill. Thus, Kennedy more than made up for the Bay of Pigs with his performance during the Cuban missile crisis. In this sense, Ernest Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea* (New York, 1952), with its theme of the patient recovery of skill, is a work of great political relevance.

[60] "Speech to the General Court" (1645) in Perry Miller, ed., *The American Puritans* (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), 91-92.

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But unlike Winthrop, who insists on a politics of faith, Arendt insists on a politics of disclosure. In the political realm man is to seek glory and immortality; there he is to reveal, in anguish, not what he can do, but what he essentially is. We are, therefore, to forgive what the political actor did, for the sake of who he is. On this level, the appeal for forgiveness (the attack on skill) is a means of criticizing the materialism and depersonalization of public life and the loss of respect for the person, which Arendt sees as endemic to modern society. At bottom, however, her attack on skill and her appeal for forgiveness is an attack against the destructiveness of violence and the violence of totalitarianism. In her view, to consider politics in terms of skill is to turn politics into a question of ends and means. Once we do that, she argues, everything becomes permissible: "As long as we believe that we deal with ends and means in the political realm, we shall not be able to prevent anybody's using all means to pursue recognized ends."[61] Politics must therefore dispense with skill because it must dispense with ends. The argument is fallacious, however, in that Arendt fails to see that while ends, or norms, may lead us into violence, they can also restrain us from violence. What is decisive, in other words, is not the existence of norms, but the pattern of norms. But to Arendt, the ultimate counter to violence is not skill, as Machiavelli had thought, nor the pattern of values, as Durkheim would have argued. Violence, Arendt believes, can be avoided only if men show a readiness "to forgive and to be forgiven."[62]

What began as a search for a mode of redemption which would make it possible for men to accept public responsibility has now become something else—an attempt to redeem society from the violence that it inflicts upon itself. But in order to achieve this more narrow kind of redemption, we shall have to forgo the question of political skill and we shall have to forget about the

[61] *The Human Condition*, 122-26, 197-206.

[62] In other words, forgiveness is a structural prerequisite of action, "action" being that which stands in opposition to the ends-means schema which leads to violence; *ibid.*, 214, 217. To be sure, Arendt also relies on promises—but what are we to do if promises are not kept? May we forgive nevertheless? She does not address herself to this question. But she does make it clear that, in her view, action and its necessary correlate, forgiveness, are closely related to miracles; *ibid.*, 222.

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ends of action altogether. Forgiveness, at this point, becomes an abstraction; a concept rather than an experience. Its function is no longer reconciliation, but alienation from the existing society. Politically speaking, forgiveness is a method of criticism, but one caught between past and future: it hangs in limbo even while it seeks to steer society away from materialism, utilitarianism, and violence. As a method, however, it curiously distorts and undermines the role of politics in human affairs and, ultimately, deprives all but a few leaders of any real opportunity to participate in politics. Politics becomes a game in which the few display their essences, while the many are denied even the right to boo the players, however inept they might be. This tendency becomes even more pronounced in *On Revolution* where Arendt seeks to revoke, not the vote of confidence, but "general suffrage as we understand it." Society would be governed by a self-selected group of "aristocrats," and these would be the only persons who "would have the right to be heard in the conduct of the business of the republic." Arendt adds, however, presumably to soften the blow, that no one should consider this exclusion from politics as "derogatory . . . since a political elite is by no means identical with a social or cultural or professional elite." To voluntarily exclude themselves from the republic would mean that men were exercising one of their "most important negative liberties," namely, "freedom from politics." Thus in the end, Arendt retreats not only from forgiveness, but also from political responsibility. It is a sad ending, but a peculiarly modern one.[63]

IV

If the classical modes of redemption no longer seem available and if forgiveness seems neither possible nor appropriate in politics, there still remains the possibility of redemption through punishment. Arendt, in fact, suggests that punishment is an alternative to forgiveness, "but by no means its opposite." For punishment, like forgiveness, is an attempt to "put an end to something that without interference could go on endlessly."[64]

[63] Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York, 1965), 283-84.
[64] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 216-17.

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Punishment, then, is an attempt to unburden man of the past, to allow both offender and offended to begin their lives anew. On the basis of this possibility even Jean-Baptiste Clamence, if he could take his punishment and get it over with, would be willing to overlook the fact that he had been judged and found wanting. Clamence, though, can find no way to expiate his "crime"; judgment hovers over him, yet no formal sentence has been pronounced. On these terms one is unable to gain release from the past even if one is willing to submit to pain: "No, on the contrary, it's a matter of dodging judgment, of avoiding being forever judged without having a sentence pronounced."[65] But Clamence would have little to gain from punishment in any case. For to view punishment as it exists in modern society is again to see the possibility of redemption evaporate before one's eyes.

Modern society, on a manifest level, operates on the assumption that guilt is a form of debt:[66] suitable compensation, usually in a nonmonetary form, can therefore remove blame. Guilt is separable from the person; the debt discharged, one can expect reconciliation with the other members of society. In practice, however, we operate on other assumptions. To describe a man as a thief, for instance, is not, in modern society, to say what he has done, but rather to describe what he is. His public identity is that of criminal—a man who not only will steal again, but, because he lacks respect for law, will probably commit other offenses as well. His guilt cannot be compensated for; it has become cumulative. In this we do not depart so much as might appear from the metaphor of debt; rather, we articulate another facet of economism, the stare of Medusa. By turning men into stone—that is, by freezing them into solid and permanent categories—we force the offender to become regular, calculable, predictable. This certainty and economy of thought, however, comes with a price attached; it denies the offender the possibility of change and, consequently, the possibility of redemption through reconciliation. Like the Puritans of old, we brand the transgressor, con-

[65] Camus, *The Fall*, 77.

[66] On the relationship between guilt and debt, see Nietzsche, "Second Essay," *The Genealogy of Morals*.

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demning him to wander outside the confines of society. Indeed, Kai Erikson, in his excellent book *Wayward Puritans* argues that Puritanism has shaped the way America at least views the transgressor. The old gods, in this account, ascend from their graves to dominate our lives.[67] The explanatory power of Puritanism, however, is weak in this instance; the classic description of the thief and his rejection is Sartre's portrait of Saint Genet in contemporary France.[68] Moreover, the Puritan rejection of the damned rested on ideology; our rejection of the transgressor is a product of foreshortened identification. For us the sense of separateness is prior to nemesis; what we share is not each other, but rather an attachment to society, an attachment all the more intense for its precariousness. Morover, nemesis—the indignation that gives rise to punishment—further intensifies our attachment to society and, in so doing, accentuates the preexisting separation: virtue now stands in sharp contrast with transgression. What we punish is not a man—who shares some resemblance to us—but a transgressor—a being, as Durkheim put it, "unlike us."[69] Punishment takes on an impersonal quality: we punish "without regard to the person in question, . . . without hate and without love, without personal predilection and therefore without grace . . . ." In contrast to Yahweh's "fervent quest for vengeance," we offer the "impersonal retribution of *karma*."[70] Punishment in modern society is without malice, but it is also without redemption.

Punishment, thus, does not fulfill the rhythm (separation, transition, incorporation) implicit in the rites of passage;[71] the transitional stage of outsider becomes permanent. In an attempt to provide an exit from punishment, the theorist has therefore offered an ideological substitute for the ritual of acceptance. Freud, for example, sought to pry open the door of

[67] Kai T. Erikson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York, 1966).

[68] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr*, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York, 1964).

[69] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (New York, 1964), 396.

[70] Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, 235.

[71] Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, trans. Monika Vizedom and Gabrielle Caffee (Chicago, 1960).

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reconciliation, using the leverage of punishment interpreted psychoanalytically.[72] Basically, psychoanalysis works toward reconciliation because it dissolves any sharp distinction between offender and offended; in accepting the transgressor we are accepting ourselves. Prohibitions, Freud argues, do not eradicate desires, but only control them through a more or less internalized, countervailing fear.[73] Consequently, we are emotionally ambivalent toward the rules laid down by society—not even the prohibition against murder has our full support. The primary reason we punish the transgressor is because his example is contagious, serving to arouse our own repressed, ambivalent desires to indulge our passions in prohibited activities. The transgressor tempts us and makes us anxious in the face of our aroused, fearful desire. Moreover, we ask ourselves, why should he be allowed to do what we are forbidden to do? We grow envious of the Other.[74] Finally, to resolve the tension and eliminate the frustration that the transgressor has created in us, we punish him. "If the violation were not avenged by the other members," Freud says, "they would become aware that they wanted to act in the same way as the transgressor." Punishment represses the source of temptation; it dampens the awareness of our own criminal desires. Yet the very punishment which is supposed to protect the community against the prohibited act, often is a repetition of it. Thus, under the cloak of expiation, the community gains the opportunity to commit the same outrage that led to punishment in the first place. In effect, Freud asks, who really is the criminal? Despite this

[72] Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey (London, 1955-), XIII, 31-35, 50, 70-72, from which the quotations below are taken.

[73] This is a sophisticated version of the Lockean assumption that society is concerned with the external rather than with the internal, with the act rather than the man; John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* in *The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. J. W. Gough (New York, 1966). But in Freud's hands, it is used as a way of defending the individual without, at the same time, becoming indifferent to him.

[74] This is the theme also of the Danish sociologist, Svend Ranulf. Moral indignation is a form of disguised envy. Envy leads us to look for an opportunity to ruin others; punishment is the form that ruin takes, all of which Ranulf associates with the presence of a middle class; see Svend Ranulf, *The Jealousy of the Gods and Criminal Law at Athens: A Contribution to the Sociology of Moral Indignation* (Copenhagen, 1933-34), and *Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology* (New York, 1964).

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dark and unanswered question, Freud still accepts the throwing of stones. Punishment is rational in that it prevents the dissolution of the community. At the same time, by stressing that the "prohibited impulses are present alike in the criminal and in the avenging community," he dissolves the assumptions of virtue which stand in the face of reconciliation. Indeed, Freud suggests implicitly that the inability to accept the offender who has undergone punishment is an indication that we still view him as a source of contagion, that is, that we do not yet have our own criminal impulses under control.

Freud's view of punishment, of course, has not prevailed. Redemption through punishment is as far away as ever.

V

I have suggested that there are degrees of risk beyond which few persons will go, that man has a need for innocence, and that the modern world as a whole is nonredemptive. Given these conditions, it seems natural enough that modern man would engage in preventive innocence and thus reject personal responsibility for a common world. But he does more. He tends to go beyond his own personal reactions to give institutional expression to his quest for innocence; he shapes his institutions in his own image and as extensions of himself.[75] That this does not take place on a fully conscious level, by design, as it were, goes without saying, but institutions do, nevertheless, externalize all sorts of human needs, the metaphysical as well as the material. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the truly modern form of government

[75] I am not, of course, asserting a direct causal relationship between preventive innocence and the growth of bureaucracy—though, in my estimation, this is a question which merits examination. Rather, I am suggesting that institutions, in complex ways, are "projections" of human needs; that man externalizes himself in institutions; and that the model most useful for understanding projection is not that of fabrication—the conscious design of institutions—but that of growth—the largely unconscious, and precarious, development of institutions over time. Once the outlines of the institutions have become firm, of course, institutions in turn exert their own pressure. Hence the contemporary fascination with the socialization process. Even so, men maintain, and uphold, institutions, which is to say—with Hobbes—that all societies rest on opinion; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford, 1960), chap. 30.

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is "bureau-cracy," the rule of "nobody," whereas all previous forms of government were rule by persons—the one, the few, or the many. With the division of labor that limits one's responsibility to specific tasks and with the anonymity that pervades bureaucracy, personal guilt is neutralized organizationally.[76] Innocence, in other words, has now been institutionalized. Guilt, on the other hand, is, at most, a quality of the system, and the system is beyond the control of any single person or even group of persons.[77] Thus no one in particular can be blamed for not changing the system—anonymity emerges at a more general level. If the system does break down, though, one can simply renew the personal quest for innocence, this time by denying any responsibility for what the organization has done, for what the system has required.[78] Thus a paymaster in a concentration camp replies to the questions of an American correspondent as follows:

Q. Did you kill people in the camp?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you poison them with gas?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you bury them alive?
A. It sometimes happened.
Q. Were the victims picked from all over Europe?
A. I suppose so.
Q. Did you personally help kill people?
A. Absolutely not. I was only paymaster in the camp.
Q. What did you think of what was going on?
A. It was bad at first but we got used to it.
Q. Do you know the Russians will hang you?

[76] Moreover, as Weber points out, bureaucratic administration "always tends to be an administration of 'secret sessions': in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism"; *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1958), 233.

[77] An interesting analogue is Bernard Berelson's attempt to turn "political virtue" into a quality of the system, the human material, by his accounting, being generally defective; Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Practice and Democratic Theory" in Berelson *et al.*, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago, 1954), chap. 14.

[78] One's relationship to the organization thus mirrors one's relationship to the public order—responsibility is rejected in both instances.

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A. (Bursting into tears) Why should they? *What have I done?*[79]

The reply from a soldier at My Lai would not differ greatly. He too would deny any personal responsibility for what had happened; he too would play dumb before the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.[80] "What have I done?" is the question one asks when he becomes afraid—afraid, as Adam was, because of his nakedness.[81] Then, like Adam, he attempts to hide himself—with words, organization, and the entire paraphernalia of innocence.

VI

Is there, then, truly no way out of the dilemma of redemption and responsibility? Hannah Arendt refers to the courage that is necessary for one to leave the private realm ("one's private hiding place") and step onto the political stage ("showing who one is, . . . exposing one's self").[82] To accept this public exposure, this nakedness, is to become a political actor—a man who does not merely, or even necessarily, hold office, but who initiates, who creates as it were, something new in the political world. But the political actor inevitably incurs guilt and needs to be relieved of it. Paradoxically, the man who creates a new beginning for others must himself, through the process of redemption, be allowed a new beginning.

But how is political courage possible when redemption is no longer a genuine possibility for political man? Who now will be willing to leave his "private hiding place" to take on the risks of political responsibility? This courage is possible, these risks ac-

[79] From *PM*, Nov. 12, 1944, as quoted by Hannah Arendt, "Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility," *Jewish Frontier*, 12 (1945) 21-22.

[80] "To me," a company medic said, "it was just another day in Vietnam. Something like this is always happening. If you really wanted to find stories, you could find fifteen or twenty that could make this look like a nursery rhyme"; Seymour M. Hersh, *My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath* (New York, 1970), 184. Others claim that they were ordered to do what they did, and cannot understand what the fuss is about (41, 186-87). Still, it is true that several soldiers who participated in the killing at My Lai have now "talked." Significantly, though, the only ones to do so are those who have been discharged from the service and who, therefore, can no longer be prosecuted for war crimes (162).

[81] Gen. 3:10.

[82] *The Human Condition*, 33, 166.

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ceptable, to the man with "the gift of grace."[83] Such a man has the *courage to be* despite the anxiety of death, meaninglessness, and guilt. The man of grace, as Tillich describes him, has the power to accept acceptance: he knows that he is imperfect (this is anything but a doctrine of self-righteousness or moral obtuseness), that he is finite, and that he wrongs others, intentionally and unintentionally.[84] He can say with Paul that the good I would do, I do not, and the wrong I would not, I do. Yet he is able, nevertheless, to act, to innovate, to create in spite of all, a phenomenon which Tillich describes as the power of grace. Grace is a gift; a man cannot create it for himself, he cannot bestow it on others.[85] Yet now and then, there it is—all too rare to reckon on, it is said to be a gift of the gods. It "descends" upon man, but cannot be willed, cannot be enticed, cannot be scheduled. The man of grace exists politically but he is rare; he is the exception to the relationship between redemption and responsibility.

[83] I believe that both Weber and Camus understand the need for grace—in any case, "the gift of grace" occupies a significant place in the thought of each. Yet, to my knowledge, no one has ever done a study of how either writer uses the theme, to say nothing of a comparative analysis.

[84] Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, chap. 6 and pp. 163-71, 187, 189-90.

[85] Cf. C. L. Mitton, "Grace," *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, 2, pp. 463-68.

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Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence, 1937-1942*

WARREN F. KIMBALL
Newark College, Rutgers University

Although Great Britain usually stands condemned as an imperialist rather than as a victim of imperialism, historians have recently begun to examine the question of whether the economic imperialism of the United States challenged Britain and her empire, particularly during the era of World War II. Some dismiss the idea as relatively unimportant; others claim that primarily economic motivations determined American policy toward Great Britain before, during, and after the war.[1] William Appleman Williams has written that "the issue is not how bad or evil Americans were, but rather the far more profound and human

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[1] Historians have only begun to grapple with the intriguing questions posed by William Appleman Williams in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (rev. ed.; New York, 1962). His treatment of the late 1930s is quite brief, but he asserts that America entered World War II firmly believing that only continued expansion of its own economic system would guarantee prosperity and dem-

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theme of their tragic inability to realize their desire for peace and freedom so long as they declined to modify seriously the principles of possessive individualism that lie at the heart of capitalism."[2] Whether capitalism is the only contemporary economic and political system characterized by such principles is not the question; the problem is, was "possessive individualism" at the heart of America's policies toward Great Britain?

Few would quarrel with the claim of many historians that the expansion of foreign markets is and has been a basic policy of the United States government. Such agreement, however, does not eliminate arguments over the priorities, the means, and the degree of consistency of such policies. Often, the disagreement boils down to one question: did economic goals determine the government's assessment of national security or was economic welfare merely one of the many elements which policy makers considered in determining national goals?

Such a question becomes most difficult to answer during a time of great national crisis such as the one that faced the United States in the late 1930s. When a nation's national security is apparently threatened, short-term strategic considerations usually dominate policy. In fact, most students of American policies during the Second World War have criticized the Roosevelt administration for failing to develop realistic long-term postwar plans.

Up to now, my research has left me convinced that in the 1930s

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ocracy; see p. 200. That broad theme, with variations, has been taken up by Lloyd C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison, Wisc., 1964); Robert F. Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942" in Barton J. Bernstein (ed.), *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (New York, 1968), 232-62; and Gabriel Kolko, "American Business and Germany, 1930-1941," *Western Political Quarterly*, XV (1962), 713-28. Kolko has vigorously put forward the same thesis for the later war years in *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York, 1968). The more commonly accepted viewpoint which emphasizes power politics and Wilsonian idealism is the one presented in the two volumes by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York, 1952) and *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York, 1953). Their position is seconded by Robert A. Divine, *The Reluctant Belligerent* (New York, 1965), as well as by most of the current textbooks in American foreign policy and diplomatic history. None of these more traditional treatments really deal with the question of America's overall economic goals and their effect upon foreign policy.

[2] William A. Williams, *The Great Evasion* (Chicago, 1964), 47.

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American foreign policy toward Great Britain sprang from just such considerations of national security and a strong sense of the community of interest between the two countries. The Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 contained no provisions which could be termed "imperialistic"; rather President Franklin Roosevelt and the Treasury Department officials who wrote the bill left repayment clauses purposely vague in order to avoid the kind of war debts problem which occurred after World War I. A direct and unencumbered grant to an ally fighting America's war was politically unfeasible, although Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. proposed just that, but under lend-lease, repayment was left completely to the discretion of the president. Some American policy makers, particularly Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other top State Department personnel, demanded that Britain repay lend-lease aid and post collateral besides, but Roosevelt steadfastly refused to support such proposals before the passage of the Act. There is no doubt that the temptation arose to take advantage of Britain's wartime plight, but in the case of the Lend-Lease Act, American policy makers resisted that temptation. Instead, while presenting the bill to the public as a swap, the administration chose to extend an indirect subsidy, not out of any lofty altruism, but out of an awareness that Hitler was also America's enemy and that a happy ally is one who believes that the war will be worth winning.[3] The question remains, however, was the Lend-Lease Act typical of American economic foreign policy or an exception resulting from the intensity of the crisis in Europe?

I

The broad outlines of America's economic foreign policy in the late 1930s are well known. Secretary of State Cordell Hull dominated policy making in that sphere, with occasional excursions into the arena of international finance by Secretary Morgenthau and the Treasury Department—excursions which the State Department invariably resented. As a number of historians have demonstrated, Hull saw economic interdependence, as defined by

[3] See Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941* (Baltimore, Md., 1969).

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the United States, as the only sure way to peace.[4] Hull put it clearly in a speech in November 1938 to the National Foreign Trade Convention:

> I know that without expansion of international trade, based upon fair dealing and equal treatment for all, there can be no stability and security either within or among nations. . . . I know that the withdrawal by a nation from orderly trade relations with the rest of the world inevitably leads to regimentation of all phases of national life, to the suppression of human rights, and all too frequently to preparations for war and a provocative attitude toward other nations.[5]

Although he occasionally faced reversals from President Roosevelt and others, these were largely reversals in tactics rather than in broad policy. Not only did Roosevelt generally agree with Hull, but, as memoirs such as those by Frances Perkins and Robert Sherwood make clear, FDR disliked worrying about economic matters, being much more comfortable in the world of politics and power. Hull's long-term views were ably supported by his subordinates in the State Department; Francis B. Sayre, the assistant secretary for economic affairs, and his successor, Henry Grady, and Harry Hawkins, the head of the Division of Commercial Policy and Trade Agreements, echoed Hull's sentiments precisely, both in public and in private. Herbert Feis, the Department's special adviser for economic affairs, frequently chided the others for impractical proposals, but he strongly supported Hull's economic programs without completely succumbing to the secretary's simplistic faith in them as a cure-all for world problems.

[4] Hull's economic notions over the years have received considerable attention from historians. For example, see Richard N. Kottman, *Reciprocity and the North Atlantic Triangle, 1932-1938* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1968); Arthur W. Schatz, "The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull's Search for Peace, 1936-1938," *Journal of American History*, LVII (1970), 85-103; and William R. Allen, "The International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull, 1907-1933," *American Economic Review*, XLIII (1953), 101-16; and Allen, "Cordell Hull and the Defense of the Trade Agreements Program, 1934-1940" in Alexander DeConde (ed.), *Isolation and Security* (Durham, N.C., 1957). Most of the more general treatments of American diplomacy in the prewar period discuss Hull's obsession with what he called free trade.

[5] Cordell Hull, "The Outlook for the Trade-Agreements Program," Speech delivered before the Twenty-fifth National Foreign Trade Convention, New York City, Nov. 1, 1938, printed in U.S., Dept. of State, Commercial Policy Series 54, Publication No. 1261 (Washington, D.C., 1938).

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Hull's policies are comprehensible only if one understands his definitions of terms. Although he frequently spoke of freer trade and liberal economics, he really meant equal commercial opportunity—what Williams calls the Open Door. Hull was too shrewd a politician to propound true free trade, though he occasionally condemned the extreme protectionism of the Hawley-Smoot tariff. What some British historians have called "the imperialism of free trade" might better be labeled the "imperialism of equality," for to open certain previously closed doors would obviously mean American capital could dominate that marketplace, whether Hull realized it or not.[6] Hull favored primarily equality of opportunity and the elimination of discriminatory trade practices—equality of treatment being far more important to him than a mere lowering of trade barriers. Equal access for all to raw materials had similar importance for him. He repeatedly asserted that one of Hitler's original goals was to attain nondiscriminatory access to the raw materials necessary for Germany's economic prosperity, and Hull clearly believed that the raw materials of the colonial empires should be made available to the industrial nations of the world. That such access would provide a distinct economic advantage for a nation which could buy in large quantities was of no concern; the inequality of equal competition was a nicety either lost on Hull or ignored by him. His condemnation of economic nationalism extended also to the international money market; he advocated the elimination of any restrictions designed to limit the outflow of gold.[7]

[6] This concept of the "imperialism of equality" is challenged by those who argue along lines of neoclassical trade theory. They assume that the flow of foreign exchange to the United States which would follow American domination of foreign markets would force other nations to turn to the short-term solution of currency devaluation or the longer-range policy of trade and currency controls. Thus the United States could dominate British markets only so long as Britain accepted capital transfers. In other words, balance of payment factors can offset absolute trade advantages. Radical historians would argue that America was creating an informal, neomercantilist empire which essentially integrated the British economy under American domination, thus eliminating the equalizing forces operating within the classic free marketplace. Such mechanisms as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Redevelopment implicitly and explicitly regulate the fiscal and monetary policies of member countries, more often than not in ways beneficial to American economic expansion.

[7] Perhaps the most ludicrous example of Hull's obsession with economic solutions to problems occurred shortly before the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.

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Some basic notions held by the administration regarding Britain's economic wealth and her empire stand out clearly. Secretary of State Hull regularly denounced the preferential tariffs established by Great Britain and her empire in the 1932 Ottawa Agreements and sought their elimination.[8] But he had more in mind than that one limited objective. In February 1937, Hull protested with suspicious forcefulness to the Canadian minister in Washington that "neither I nor my country would . . . weaken a single link in the British Empire." With characteristic piety, he declaimed that "it was not for a moment in my mind or in the mind of my Government to bring the slightest pressure to bear on any portion of the British Empire with respect to the problem of Empire preference." Yet in a not-so-veiled threat, Hull asserted that progress toward peace would be determined by Britain's movement away from economic nationalism.[9] With England desperately trying to establish a political entente against Germany and with an Anglo-American trade agreement under negotiation, there was no mistaking the implication of Hull's remark. Nor was that an isolated instance. Hull had earlier told Walter Runciman, president of the British Board of Trade, that Britain's violations of the principle of commercial equality and her economic nationalism made "normal economic relations between nations" impossible. "It is utterly hopeless," he had warned, "to contemplate the restoration of the many normal and worthwhile international relationships, political, economic, moral or peace, unless the economic approach to existing problems and conditions is vigorously pursued under the leadership of our two countries."[10]

Hull's prime concern remained the threat of German expansion,

While American intelligence was warning of some sort of military action by Japan, Hull outlined the American peace program largely in terms of long-range economic concepts. Out of a total of nine general principles which would provide a basis for peace, six dealt with trade, particularly the elimination of discriminatory practices. U.S., Dept. of State, *The China White Paper* (Stanford, Calif., 1967), I, 464-65; see n. 4 above for references dealing with Hull's ideas.

[8] Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (exp. ed.; New York, 1969), 19.

[9] U.S., Dept. of State, Memo of conversation by Hull, Feb. 18, 1937, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937* (Washington, D.C., 1954), II, 14 (this series is hereafter cited as *FR*).

[10] Hull, reporting his talks with Runciman to the American chargé in the

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but he obviously was tempted to use the mounting crisis as a lever against British empire preference systems. In January 1937, he told Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British ambassador in Washington, that "the complete closing up of the Empire like an oyster shell" came at a most inopportune time, since Congress was deluged with demands for stronger neutrality laws.[11] Hiding behind alleged public sentiment was a device which Roosevelt and Hull used consistently during the prewar years to justify their own policies.

No American government official ever stood up and crassly proclaimed that a major goal of the nation's foreign policy should be the acquisition of Britain's empire. Such blatant colonialism did not tempt Americans in the 1930s. Yet to speak of healthy competition was to reaffirm an American tradition—if not a human instinct—even if the truth was that such competition would be healthiest for the United States. Not surprisingly, much attention focused on the biggest prizes, and in 1937 one seemed to be the British empire. The Department of Commerce reported that at the end of 1936, British overseas investments had a nominal value of over £3.75 billion and estimates were that Great Britain in some areas would attain new heights of prosperity unequalled since 1914. More impressive was the return from Britain's overseas investments, which came close to offsetting her unfavorable balance of trade.[12]

This image of British wealth, combined with an opportunity to drive a hard and profitable bargain, continually tempted the leaders of the American government.[13] Yet to present economic expansion as the key motive affecting Anglo-American affairs in the late 1930s would be patently absurd. The more emotional issues of the depression and the fear of war almost invariably took precedence. In 1937, however, when "cash and carry" knocked

U.K. (Atherton), Feb. 12, 1937, *ibid.*, 12. Hull also gives an account of his talks with Runciman in *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (London, 1948), I, 524-26.

[11] Memo of conversations by Hull, Jan. 18, 1937, *FR* (1937), II, 2-3.

[12] U.S., Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "Economic Review of Foreign Countries, 1937," Economic Series, No. 2 (1938), 1-17.

[13] Henry Morgenthau Jr., Diary, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter cited as Morgenthau Diary) is replete with examples. One such is the meeting of June 4, 1937, vol. 71, pp. 245-46, 251.

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the first hole in America's neutrality wall, economic needs played a role. Trade with belligerents was not provocative after all, so long as such trade did not include arms and was on a strictly cash basis. As the congressional debate and newspaper accounts show, the neutrality legislation of 1937 was prompted by a wish to maintain or increase trade with Britain as well as by considerations of national security. The British had proven most reluctant to negotiate any Anglo-American trade agreement based on a diminishing of the imperial preference system since, from their point of view, such a trade treaty would be primarily aimed at creating a political entente; and most of the British Cabinet did not believe such a pact would bind the United States to assist politically.[14] Given that political situation and the firm American belief that economic nationalism would prevent the establishment of world peace, it is easier to understand why the Americans began to raise the ante in 1937. By the close of that year political events in Europe and Asia had made Britain far more dependent upon American support. "Cash and carry" was a public announcement that the United States planned to capitalize on that dependence. Promoting peace and profit simultaneously was an appealing policy.

As the political situation in Europe deteriorated, American leaders spoke more frequently about providing England with war materials, and, with increasing regularity, the terms for such aid included settlements which would effect permanent changes in Anglo-American economic relations. During the height of the 1938 Czechoslovakian crisis, Roosevelt told his cabinet that the United States would prosper economically even if Europe went to war. Gold from the European nations had already begun to arrive in America for probable use in purchasing war goods (even before the 1939 revision of the neutrality legislation permitting the sale of war goods to belligerents). The president expected Britain and France to confiscate American securities owned by their nationals as exchange for war materials. Yet Roosevelt also claimed that the ability of the British and French to purchase munitions in large amounts had been severely underestimated. A few days later the president told the cabinet that British private invest-

[14] Kottman, 183-85. See Robert A. Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality* (Chicago, 1962), for a treatment of the motives behind the "cash and carry" concept.

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ments in the United States probably totaled nearly $7 billion and again referred to Britain's plan to sell her American investments. While the Department of Commerce and the Federal Reserve Board estimated British investments at less than one-third of FDR's figure, the image of British opulence persisted.[15]

II

The outbreak of war in September 1939 quickly complicated British-American economic relations. Although the British immediately instituted wartime restrictions on dollar expenditures, with the German occupation of Western Europe guns became more important than bank balances. Neutrality legislation and the Johnson Debt-Default Act limited British purchases to a cash basis, and a financial crisis quickly developed. Ultimately, that crisis was resolved, in a spirit of mutual friendship and self-interest, by the Lend-Lease Act, but not without numerous references to the more mundane matters of British wealth and American economic interests.

The most sensible suggested solution to Britain's dollar shortage in the pre-Pearl Harbor period was that American firms, or the government, accept sterling in lieu of dollars, an arrangement which the Canadians had made and generally referred to as the "sterling overdraft." The idea was never seriously discussed within the Roosevelt administration, and though there is no evidence to demonstrate why it was so casually rejected, the effect was to guarantee Britain's indebtedness to the United States.[16]

As the intensity of the war increased, so did American pressure on the United Kingdom to force the sale of privately owned British investments in the United States. Henry Morgenthau, with ardent support from Hull and other cabinet members, advised English officials to sell such direct investments in America as

[15] Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes* (New York, 1953-54), II, 470, 474. U.S., Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "Foreign Long-Term Investments in the United States 1937-39," Economic Series, No. 11 (1940), 10, table 3. U.S., Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H.R. 1776: A Bill Further to Promote the Defense of the United States, and for Other Purposes*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, p. 81.

[16] Kimball, *Unsordid Act*, 74.

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Shell Oil, Lever Brothers, and Brown & Williamson Tobacco in order to gain both dollar assets and American good will. The Treasury secretary said that 1940 was no time to worry about postwar economic problems, although he deemed it his responsibility to see that England fulfilled her contracts. This rhetoric continued until after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act and portended a classic example of economic imperialism. Yet in fact, only one major British-owned direct investment in the United States, the American Viscose Company, was sold under pressure, and that was clearly part of the legislative strategy surrounding the congressional fight over lend-lease. The potential economic benefits intrigued the American government, but such gains were put aside for the time being in favor of the more immediate requirements of American national security.[17]

Once the Lend-Lease Act became law, the temptation to use it as a means of obtaining economic concessions from Britain— concessions which would promote economic multilateralism as well as directly and indirectly benefit American economic expansion— became too great to resist. Harry Hopkins had assured Churchill in February 1941 that American demands for data on British financial sacrifices were not part of a general government attitude, but necessary because of the ignorance of the American public.[18] The American refusal, however, to help Btitain pay for the war materials she had ordered during the first three months of 1941— just before lend-lease took effect—belied Hopkins's assurances. In fact, the dispute over those so-called "old commitments" acted as a strong warning to the British that America would continue to insist on the artificial separation between political alliance and profit-motivated economic policy.

In what proved to be the key theme of later negotiations over the Lend-Lease Master Agreement, British officials in March 1941 predicted that their nation might have to restrict its postwar import surplus because of a fall-off in foreign earnings and would then have to establish controls over exports and foreign exchange.

[17] *Ibid.*, 64, 74, 116, 159-60, 222-26, and Warren F. Kimball, "'Beggar My Neighbor': America and the British Interim Finance Crisis, 1940-1941," *The Journal of Economic History*, XXIX (1969), 758-72.

[18] Harry Hopkins to Churchill, Feb. 17, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library, President's Personal File (hereafter PPF), 4096.

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The State Department condemned the suggestion as an "artificial" diversion of trade which struck at the heart of Hull's program. But for all Britain's complaints and gentle threats, they would not be able to say no to the United States.[19]

Fortunately for the British, Morgenthau and the Treasury Department dealt with the financial problems connected with lend-lease. Although they invariably drove a hard bargain, Morgenthau and his staff were clearly far more interested in combatting Hitler's Germany than in using American aid as a knife to open that oyster shell, the empire. Not so for Cordell Hull and the State Department policy makers.[20]

Hull never accepted the fact that Britain could be short of dollars while still operating a vast colonial and economic empire. Throughout 1941 he and his staff sought the joint goals of security against Nazism and access to Britain's opulent empire. Although he failed to convince the president that Britain should post $2 or $3 billion of collateral in conjunction with the lend-lease program, he continued to work on the assumption that Britain possessed $18 billion in imperial wealth.[21] The concept of using lend-lease as a lever to force Britain to eliminate the imperial preference system and extend the Open Door to America throughout the empire was not openly discussed in the State Department before the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, but the Department quickly made up for lost time afterward.

III

In a book published shortly before the negotiation of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, economist William S. Culbertson, an ar-

[19] Memo from Joel Pinsent, British financial counselor, to Acheson, Mar. 27, 1941, U.S., Dept. of State, Official Archives, Decimal File 841.24/48-1/2 (hereafter referred to as State Dept. followed by the file number). The problem of the "old commitments" is treated in Kimball, "'Beggar My Neighbor'." Lloyd C. Gardner briefly discusses the negotiation of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement with Britain in *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago, 1970), 113-19; his view of American goals during those negotiations corresponds to mine.

[20] Kimball, *Unsordid Act*, *passim*, esp. 105-09, 143, 157-58, 159-60, 222-226, 231-32, 237-38. See also John M. Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries* (Boston, 1959-67), II.

[21] Roosevelt to Hull, Jan. 11, 1941, in *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-*

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dent and unabashed booster of Hull's economic policies, wrote: "Since the accounts under the lend-lease acts can never be balanced by shipments in kind or in gold, it seems to me that the British Empire should, at the very least, extend to American trade and finance the equality to which they are entitled under the basic principles of sound commercial policy."[22] That statement might just as well have been written by Hull himself.

Roosevelt initially assigned Morgenthau and the Treasury Department the task of expeditiously negotiating a *quid pro quo* with Britain for immediate transfers of war materials, and he also instructed Morgenthau to work on a general agreement to cover lend-lease.[23] The choice of the phrase "*quid pro quo*" could have been mere chance, but, intended or not, it set the tone for the negotiations. Many Americans, including Henry Morgenthau, saw Britain's fight against Hitler as just compensation for lend-lease. Even FDR had officially labeled it America's last chance to avoid war. Nevertheless, the pressure of the largely Republican opposition, the promises made before Congress during the lend-lease hearings, the belief that world peace and liberal economics were inseparable, and, one suspects, the ever-present American desire to make a good deal, all combined to set the stage for a series of protracted and bitter negotiations. Instead of an honest subsidy for an ally admittedly fighting America's war, the Roosevelt administration continually asked the question, "What have you done for me—lately?" Like most governments, the Roosevelt administration seems to have followed policies which, if not precisely contradictory, were mutually incompatible. At one and the same time the American government tried with material aid to buoy up an ally's spirit and will to resist, used that same aid as a means of coercing that ally into long-term economic concessions which would hopefully promote peace, and also tried to obtain immediate economic benefits for the United States. One diplomatic

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1945, ed. Elliott Roosevelt (New York, 1950), II, 1103-05. Kimball, *Unsordid Act*, 143-44.

[23] William S. Culbertson, "Introduction" to Hugh O. Davis, *America's Trade Equality Policy* (Washington, D.C., 1942), x.

[23] Memorandum from Roosevelt to Morgenthau, Mar. 13, 1941, FDR Papers, President's Secretary's File (hereafter PSF): Department Correspondence-Treasury Dept., Henry Morgenthau, 1941-42.

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historian recently suggested that instead of "what have you done for me lately?" a better way to phrase the Roosevelt administration's question would be "what have you been planning for the more liberal postwar world which this war is, ultimately, all about?" That was the broad issue as Cordell Hull saw it, but the *quid pro quo* discussed by Congress and Roosevelt referred to far more immediate and tangible matters.[24]

Though Roosevelt indicated he did not want any specific mention of money, the Treasury Department showed a remarkable lack of imagination in drafting the lend-lease agreement. Treating the agreement as a contract, Treasury officials thought in terms of balance sheets and running accounts. Since the president had cautioned against allowing Hull to "get his nose out of joint," Morgenthau instructed his staff to discuss the various proposed drafts with the State Department, mainly with Dean Acheson, who had joined the department as assistant secretary in February 1941.[25] The difference in approach between the two departments was striking. Late in April, Morgenthau sent Hull the latest Treasury proposal for a lend-lease agreement. Reflecting Morgenthau's belief in a strong executive and more specifically his admiration for Roosevelt, the draft left the basic settlement to the discretion of the president. As one Treasury official put it: it was unlikely that another Coolidge would come along. Nevertheless, the draft did call for replacement of defense articles with an equivalent amount of similar items and established the guideline that such American aid to Britain as agricultural goods, services, and defense information, should be compensated for by equivalent amounts of tin, rubber, jute, and other empire products. Postwar economic relationships received no mention, despite the prevailing State Department views. As of mid-May the Treasury draft was still under discussion, but Hull and his cohorts had different plans well underway.[26]

[24] The suggestion is that of Professor Gaddis Smith, who commented on this paper at the OAH meeting in April 1970.

[25] Blum, II, 242-43.

[26] Memorandum from Cox to Harry Hopkins, June 6, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/593-1/2. Memorandum from Morgenthau to Hull, Apr. 25, 1941, *ibid.*, 841.24/531-1/2. Memorandum from Hull to Morgenthau, May 14, 1941, *ibid.*, 841.24/601-1/2. The Treasury approach is fully illustrated in the Cox Papers, FDR Library, particularly in materials in "Lend-Lease Files (Aid to Britain,

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As soon as the question of negotiating an overall lend-lease settlement came up in mid-March, advocates of economic liberalism saw their golden opportunity. J. Pierrepont Moffat, always eager to be in on the action, returned to Washington in late March from his ambassadorial post at Ottawa "to preach the gospel that unless we availed ourselves of the present situation to obtain a commitment from the members of the British Empire to modify the Ottawa Agreements after the war, we would ultimately be virtually shut out of our Dominion markets," but, he continued in his diary, "much to my delight I found that people had begun to think along these lines." His simultaneous urging that as compensation for lend-lease aid, the United States accept British assets in Latin America and receive clear title to some Pacific islands jointly claimed by Britain and America indicates a strong concern for more immediate economic benefits as well.[27] That Roosevelt never accepted such a narrow definition of *quid pro quo* only demonstrates his broader and more mature sense of what was best for America's economic future.

In addition to the discussion over lend-lease, growing Anglo-American cooperation had created a number of troublesome economic problems. In hopes of negotiating an amicable settlement of these questions, the British government dispatched John Maynard Keynes in May 1941 to the United States as a representative of the British Treasury.[28] Although from the outset Keynes angered American officials with his talk of Britain's having to resort to postwar economic and monetary controls, American planners were already working on the assumption that Britain's postwar economic position would force her to adopt currency controls and discriminatory trade systems. As early as April 8, 1941, a State Department draft of a lend-lease agreement had called for "the abolition of Imperial preferences on specified products of interest to the United States." Unlike the Treasury Department

Vol. VI)," Box 62, File V. See, especially, the memorandum from Cox to Edward Foley, "Financial Terms of Disposition to Britain Under H.R. 1776," Feb. 27, 1941 and memorandum from H. D. White to Morgenthau, "Possible Sources of Payment for Materials sent to England under the Lease-Lend Act," Mar. 14, 1941, both in that file.

[27] J. P. Moffat, *The Moffat Papers*, ed. Nancy H. Hooker (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 352-53.

[28] Roy F. Harrod, *The Life of John Maynard Keynes* (New York, 1951), 504.

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drafts, the State Department version dealt with postwar economic policy and dismissed compensation in kind for the actual lend-lease materials.[29] They also expressed concern about American access to empire raw materials.[30] Keynes may have induced the State Department drafters to be more specific, for on May 22, less than two weeks after he arrived, another draft agreement appeared —this time calling for specific promises by Britain to eliminate any special trade agreements which limited American trade.[31] In essence, Keynes forced the Americans to show their hand. Even more important was Roosevelt's decision on May 16 to give the State Department the assignment of working out the overall lend-lease arrangement with Great Britain. Although the Treasury Department still acted as a consultant, the initiative now lay with State. Morgenthau soon lost interest in playing second fiddle, telling his staff to "let the damn thing go." This assured victory for the State Department approach, that the United States should write off virtually all lend-lease to Britain in return for a broad economic commitment.[32]

Keynes's goals were quite simple. Foreseeing an economically

[29] Draft of Lend-Lease Agreement, Apr. 8, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/587.

[30] "Notes on the Conversation of May 3rd," May 31, 1941, (author unknown), FDR Papers, PPF, 1820. L. C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects*, 276, and Theodore A. Wilson, *The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941* (Boston, 1969), 180, state, without details, that using the lend-lease agreement as a means of breaking the imperial preference system had been discussed well before Keynes arrived in the United States on May 10, 1941. Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, 678-79, claim that Keynes galvanized the State Department into action, and R. N. Gardner, 41-42, accepts that interpretation.

[31] Only the day before, a State Department draft had still retained the vague and ambiguous language of the early drafts when it merely called for discussions designed to revise existing trade agreements. See Draft of Lend-Lease Agreement, May 21, 1941, State Dept., *FW* 841.24/603-1/5 and Draft of Lend-Lease Agreement, May 22, 1941, *ibid.* The Leo Pasvolsky file in the Dept. of State archives contains a number of earlier drafts in Box 2, all of which lack any specific demand for an end to discriminatory agreements, even though officials agreed that such was their goal.

[32] Morgenthau Diary, June 9, 1941, vol. 406, p. 160. Roosevelt to Hull, May 16, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 5-6. Morgenthau to Roosevelt, May 20, 1941, FDR Papers, PSF: Departmental Correspondence-Treasury Dept., Henry Morgenthau, 1941-42. Morgenthau Diary, June 4, 1941, Vol. 404, pp. 269-339, contains a transcript of a long discussion between Morgenthau, his staff, and Dean Acheson, in which the overall views of Treasury and State are fully argued.

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prostrate England after the war, he advocated monetary controls, imperial preferences, and other forms of economic nationalism as temporary but necessary means of maintaining any real degree of economic independence for Britain. Americans, used to careful deference and fulsome praise of their benevolence and altruism, reacted in a predictable fashion; Morgenthau and Harry Hopkins thought Keynes should go back to England before he did some real harm, and the anger he stimulated in the Department of State was only thinly disguised.[33]

The State Department's position was not consciously cynical, but rather was based on a fervent belief in the justness and efficacy of the American form of economic liberalism. A small but typical example of the administration's inability to perceive its own double standard was the reaction of Navy Secretary Frank Knox and Morgenthau to a rumor—later proved false—that Britain was keeping books on any defense information it gave to the United States with the aim of settling accounts after the war. Morgenthau called such actions "bad bull" and claimed that keeping accounts on information would only cause the two countries to withhold such data; yet at the same time the Treasury Department draft of a master lend-lease agreement called for Britain to repay the

[33] This overview of Keynes's position generally follows that presented in all the sources and secondary works which deal with this subject. Among the more informative are Blum, II, 244-48; Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, 679, 681; Harrod, 505-16. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), 29-32, refers to Keynes as "delightful," "engaging," and "brilliant" and claims that the Englishman did not put him off as Keynes did so many others in the American government. Acheson's description of the talks with Keynes, however, leaves the distinct impression that the assistant secretary was also annoyed by Keynes's lack of deference. For those who like their information straight from the primary sources, Morgenthau's diary is the best source; see in particular, Morgenthau Diary, May 13, 1941, vol. 397, pp. 221-24, memo of a talk between Morgenthau, Keynes, and Merle Cochran, and similar conversations in vol. 411, pp. 89-90, and vol. 414, pp. 132-38. There is also a substantial amount of material in the State Dept. archives, some of which is printed in *FR (1941)*, III, esp. pp. 6-7, 9-15, 19-22. As usual, Hull's memoirs are useless if not downright misleading and do not even mention Keynes at any point. Hull claims that the Master Lend-Lease Agreement was held up "largely because a few Tory members of the British Cabinet objected" to any interference with the empire preference system, which is just not so; Hull, *Memoirs*, II, 1151-53. See R. S. Sayers, *Financial Policy, 1939-1945*, History of the Second World War, U.K. Civil Series (London, 1956), 405-13.

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United States for defense information with raw materials.[34]

By the end of May, Acheson had worked out a detailed draft agreement embodying the two major State Department goals. First, British payment of a *quid pro quo* should not curtail the supply of dollars Britain had available to purchase American exports; second, the master agreement would be used as a means of gaining active British support for certain basic American economic and political policies. In return for an English commitment to drop discriminatory economic systems, the United States would cancel the major portion of the lend-lease debt.[35]

The Treasury Department, and even a few people in the State Department like Herbert Feis, opposed such openly coercive use of the agreement. They protested what one critic termed the State Department's "millenial blueprint," but Morgenthau refused to carry the fight any further. Though he labeled the State Department draft a "Hermaphrodite," he felt surgery was useless:

> As far as I am concerned, I am licked in the State Department. . . . Every time the President asks me to do something, Mr. Hull goes into a sulk and gets mad. . . . I am through being the President's whipping boy on the foreign affairs stuff. . . . Let the President of the United States tell Mr. Hull what kind of a document he wants. . . .[36]

During June and July, the State Department drew up numerous drafts and redrafts, incorporating the demand that Britain eliminate her discriminatory trade practices in return for lend-lease. In numerous talks with Lord Halifax, the British ambassador, and with Keynes, Roosevelt remained vague and seemingly sympathetic to the British arguments. His occasional memos to the

[34] Morgenthau Diary, May 6, 1941, vol. 395, pp. 148-51; May 13, 1941, vol. 397, p. 225; May 15, 1941, vol. 399, p. 143. Defense information was defined in the Lend-Lease Act as "any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article"; Kimball, *Unsordid Act*, 243.

[35] Draft of Lend-Lease Agreement, May 23, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/636-1/2. Memorandum for the President, May 29, 1941, *ibid.* Memorandum, "Possible Types of Payment by the British of their Lend-Lease Obligations," *ibid.*

[36] Morgenthau Diary, June 4, 1941, vol. 404, pp. 240, 246. The "millenial blueprint" comment is from *ibid.*, 276. Feis's objections are in a memorandum he wrote to Acheson, July 28, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/643-1/2. A similar objection came from James C. Dunn in a memorandum to Acheson, May 19, 1941, *ibid.*, FW 841.24/601-1/2. A comparative analysis of the State and Treasury Department drafts is in Morgenthau Diary, vol. 404, pp. 264-66.

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State Department characteristically expressed a willingness to postpone forcing such concessions out of the United Kingdom; but he never disagreed with the State Department's basic goal.[37] What little guidance Keynes received from Churchill was ambiguous; while ostensibly supporting "broad economic collaboration," the prime minister rejected the creation of any machinery which could achieve that end. Keynes complained about "the lunatic proposals of Mr. Hull," but he was powerless to alter them.[38]

By the end of July, Keynes had accomplished most of his assignments. After long and occasionally heated bargaining, he and the Treasury officials completed an arrangement which permitted Britain to build up her dollar and gold balances to $600 million, the figure agreed upon as the minimum needed for Britain to service various empire dollar requirements.[39] But Keynes left the United States without any real accord on a lend-lease master agreement. The real stumbling block continued to be article VII of the American draft. Though this was to be only a temporary agreement, since the final terms could not be determined until the end of the war, it set certain basic conditions as part of the final agreement. The specific phrase the British balked at read: "The terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives defense aid . . . shall provide against discrimination in either the United States or the United Kingdom against the importation of any product originating in the other country."[40] The clause struck directly at the imperial preference system, a fact Acheson acknowledged. Keynes protested that England could not sign such a pact without a full-fledged imperial conference, since the dominions

[37] Sayers, 406-07. The details of the redrafting process can be found in the various primary sources used in this study. The following documents are of particular interest: memorandum from Cox to Harry Hopkins, June 6, 1941, Cox Papers, Box 74, File "V. Lend-Lease files: Lend-Lease, May-June, 1941"; memorandum from Welles to Roosevelt, June 9, 1941, FDR Papers, PSF: State Dept., 1941; Keynes to Acheson, June 17, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/603-3/5; memorandum of conversation between Acheson and Keynes, July 15, 1941, FDR Papers, PSF: Welles, 1941-43; memorandum from Roosevelt to Welles and Acheson, July 18, 1941, *ibid.*

[38] Memorandum of conversation between Keynes and Acheson, June 20, 1941, FDR Papers, PSF: Lend-Lease, Box 55. Harrod, 512.

[39] Blum, II, 245-48. Sayers, 390-94.

[40] "Draft Proposal," July 28, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 15.

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were not bound by British decisions. In addition, the banning of monetary controls—which the article apparently accomplished—envisaged a return to a gold-exchange standard for international trade, a move which would obviously work to Britain's disadvantage in a postwar world where America had all the gold. Keynes was careful not to charge the United States with exploiting Britain's crisis, although he evidently believed it.[41] While Keynes fully realized that England's postwar economic and political future lay in cooperation with the United States, he wanted partnership, not colonial status for the British.

IV

For the remainder of the summer of 1941, economic relations between the two countries centered on the Atlantic Conference and the issuance by Britain of a White Paper dealing with the use of lend-lease goods. The United States tried to write a nondiscrimination clause into the Atlantic Charter, but Roosevelt's desire for a speedy and public Anglo-American accord prompted him to acquiesce to Churchill's insertion of the phrase "with due respect for our existing obligations," which preserved imperial preference. Hull feared that the British would interpret this as a surrender but he could not obtain a clarifying statement from Roosevelt to refute either that impression or the views that Keynes had presented during his Washington visit.[42]

The appearance of the British White Paper of September 10, 1941 provided another instance of American inability or refusal to understand British problems. Issued under intense American pressure, the document was primarily aimed at convincing the Congress and the American public that lend-lease aid was not being used to help Britain to compete with the United States in world markets. The American negotiators, however, particularly Hull and the ambassador in London, John Winant, took the White

[41] Memorandum of conversation by Acheson, July 28, 1941, *ibid.*, 10-13. Keynes to Acheson, July 29, 1941, *ibid.*, 16-17. For his reaction in hindsight, see Acheson, 29-30. Sayers, 411.

[42] Wilson, esp. 188, 190-202, 205, 208-09, 247-49, provides an excellent treatment of the Atlantic Conference. Langer and Gleason, *Undeclared War*, 688-89.

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Paper most seriously. The State Department repeatedly referred to various complaints from American business firms about the reexporting of lend-lease goods by Britain and simultaneously displayed very real concern for protecting American markets, particularly those in the dominions and areas where Britain had dominated trade before the war. As one official British historian characterized the White Paper: "Taken literally its provisions would have constituted an outrageously rigid control of British exports." Once again the United Kingdom had to swallow its pride and trust in American good will, for immediate political necessity outweighed long-term economic considerations.[43]

Hull, obviously eager to seize upon this small victory, cabled Winant instructions to prod some sort of response out of the British regarding the lend-lease master agreement draft which Keynes had brought to London in late July.[44] Apparently on the recommendation of Herbert Feis, the economic adviser in the State Department, Hull had refrained from instructing Winant to get the British government to publicly assure the world that point four of the Atlantic Charter (the one referring to postwar economic affairs) was "more than an empty promise."[45] Now a lend-lease master agreement offered a promising vehicle for that same goal. The relationship between the White Paper and the negotiation of a master agreement is even more clearly seen in the minutes of the Committee on Foreign Trade Problems with the British Empire Arising out of Lend-Lease. That hybrid mouthful, composed of representatives from the Tariff Commission, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury, plus the OPM and the OEM, which administered lend-lease, met in September and concluded that "the Lend-Lease Act was destined to become an increasingly dominant factor in our trade relations with the British Empire." It saw a need to protect the American export trade into that empire. It recommended that the White Paper be officially extended

[43] The American view of the White Paper negotiations is sketched in *FR* (1941), III, 22-36. The British version—which leaves an entirely different impression—is well presented in Sayers, 398-405. There is additional data in State Dept. 841.24 and 740.0011 Eur. War 1939.

[44] Hull to Winant, Sept. 27, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 36-37.

[45] Hull to Winant, Sept. 26, 1941 (not sent), State Dept. 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/14570. Memo from Feis to Hull, Sept. 27, 1941, *ibid.*

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to all the British dominions plus India and the colonial empire as necessary. In short, via the White Paper's restrictions on exporting, American trade would be protected—and expanded. The State Department concurred, and ultimately such agreements were made.[46]

On September 30, Winant cabled Hull personally to recommend strongly that the United States insist on the nondiscrimination clauses which were in the American draft of July 28. He told Hull that he believed such concessions would be supported by a majority in Parliament and that there would probably be no better opportunity to press the issue.[47] British Ambassador Lord Halifax told Acheson that Britain hoped to substitute more general terminology for the American language, which called for the elimination of preferential and discriminatory systems. Acheson warned that the United States would not support such a change and clearly feared the English were procrastinating. Since various members of Congress had expressed impatience at the failure of the administration to negotiate a *quid pro quó* for lend-lease, the need to turn to Congress for frequent lend-lease appropriations made delay out of the question.[48] Halifax told Welles that the British government was split on the question of article VII, and he passed on the intriguing, if highly doubtful, information that Churchill supported the American position.[49]

While impatiently awaiting the promised British redraft of the lend-lease master, Harry Hawkins, chief of the State Department's Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements, sent Acheson a new proposal for rewording article VII. Hawkins, whose position made him the "careerist" with whom Acheson had to work, emphasized the need to get quick tentative approval from some British representative in Washington so that the British would not think of again sending Keynes to continue the negotiations.

[46] Stettinius to Hull, Oct. 1, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/956; Acheson to Stettinius, Oct. 30, 1941, *ibid.* Minutes of the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Trade Problems, Sept. 26, 1941, State Dept., Pasvolsky File, Box 2.

[47] Winant to Hull, Sept. 30, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 37-38.

[48] Memo of conversation by Acheson, Oct. 3, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 38-40. One example of congressional pressure is found in a letter from Roosevelt to Sen. Arthur Vandenberg, Oct. 4, 1941, State Dept., 841.24/893B.

[49] Memo of conversation between Halifax and Welles, Oct. 9, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 40.

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Keynes's "well-known obstinacy" would, according to Hawkins, make any agreement on article VII unlikely. He too wanted to revise article VII, but unlike the British, Hawkins recommended making it even more specific, particularly in view of the principles espoused in the Atlantic Charter. As he bluntly put it: "Our object should be to use the lend-lease agreement to obtain commitments of real value to us [both]." For the United States, since compensation was required by law, the halting of empire preferences would settle accounts. He casually dismissed British arguments that American preferential arrangements, such as those with Cuba, should also be outlawed by noting that British agreements of that type were far bigger and more important than those of the United States. He was willing to promise lower tariffs on British goods, but advised that the American negotiators hold out for mutual renunciation of bilateral trade agreements and a promise from Britain to abolish the Ottawa system.[50]

The long-promised British redraft finally arrived on October 17. Halifax explained that British reluctance to agree to the American draft stemmed from political opposition within the Conservative party plus the unwillingness to accept a unilateral obligation which Britain might not be able to carry out. As expected, the British version contained a weak and ambiguous commitment to avoid discrimination and generally to work to achieve the economic principles of the Atlantic Charter. In short, it promised good will and further discussions, but no concrete concessions.[51]

Halifax's plea for understanding concerning Britain's political problem evoked some sympathy within the State Department. Essentially, the Americans refused substantive modifications but were willing to accept procedural changes dictated by British political needs. The result was a new American draft which committed both nations to the "elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers."[52] The difference in language changed nothing. Britain had to promise to "eliminate" discrimi-

[50] Hawkins to Acheson, Oct. 10, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/902-1/2.

[51] Memorandum of conversation by Acheson, Oct. 17, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 40-43. See also Acheson, 31.

[52] Memorandum, Hawkins to Acheson, Oct. 20, 1941, State Dept. 841.24/921-1/2; memorandum, Feis to Acheson, Oct. 23, 1941, *ibid.*, 841.24/922

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nation, while the State Department merely genuflected toward tariff reduction, certain that Congress would have the last say.

One of the drafters of the original American proposal, John Hickerson, the assistant chief of the European Division in the State Department, typified the prevailing distrust of British motives and promises when he wrote Acheson that "now is the time to obtain commitments from the British Government in regard to postwar policy." Though willing to leave out any specific mention of eliminating the preference system and any payments or monetary clearing agreements, he warned that he would not approve the draft unless an oral statement— reduced to writing to avoid mistakes—to that effect were attached.[53] A ludicrous example of diplomatic motion without movement.

Convinced that Britain had no choice but to accept and heartened by the erroneous belief that the British Treasury alone insisted on an independent British economic policy, the United States presented by early December a version acceptable to the president and the State Department; it was not at all new. Halifax responded with a notable lack of enthusiasm, but Acheson warned that with a new lend-lease appropriation request about to go to the Congress, Roosevelt needed concrete action as soon as possible. Hull, reaffirming the need for haste, insisted his demand for economic cooperation on America's terms was proper, rational, and just. Blithely he claimed that America imposed the same obligation on itself as on Great Britain. The proposed agreement promised to provide the best method for solving Britain's postwar economic problems. Hull's overview received a strong second from his special assistant and chief speechwriter, Leo Pasvolsky. As Acheson later put it: "He wrote Hull's principal speech," for regardless of the subject or purpose, any speech by the secretary of state usually turned into a plea for economic liberalism. In a 57-page memo sent to Hull in mid-December, Pasvolsky captured the emotion and conviction of the State Department viewpoint—an attitude which the entire Roosevelt administration echoed, though with somewhat less passion. Convinced that Britain's reluctance to ac-

-1/2; memorandum, Acheson to Hull and Welles, Oct. 28, 1941, *ibid.*, 841. 24/942-1/2.

[53] Memo from Hickerson to Acheson, Nov. 4, 1941, State Dept. FW 841. 24/942-1/2. Ray Atherton and James Dunn indicated their agreement with Hickerson's point of view.

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cept article VII indicated "a definite antagonism" toward the policies which the United States regarded "as indispensable to economic progress," Pasvolsky prescribed the standard American cure for economic problems—increase foreign trade. Bilateral balancing of funds, imperial preference systems, and other forms of economic nationalism would be only short-term palliatives. Unconsciously viewing Britain as an integrated element within the American economy, Hull and most American policy makers assumed that what had worked for the United States would work for the United Kingdom.[54]

V

After Pearl Harbor the military crisis both nations faced in Asia as well as wrangling over domestic policies in England combined to suspend negotiations on the master lend-lease agreement during most of December. While the American government awaited the British response, an amusing and instructive incident occurred in Washington. Late in November, Dean Acheson had received an invitation to a black-tie dinner of the Business Advisory Council for the Department of Commerce. Included was a copy of a paper to be read by a member of the Council, Professor William Y. Elliott. Elliott viewed lend-lease as a means of underwriting the colonial empires of Europe and asserted that in doing so the United States should insure that the assets of those empires accrued to America as payment for such assistance. He demanded the United States "get the British and their allies 'hooked' securely to an agreement before we have . . . given away all our bargaining counters. . . . Only sentimentality would prevent our . . . demanding a fair return for the enormous sacrifices which we will have undertaken to save these empires." Inconceivable as such words were after the Battle of Britain and the course of events in Europe, they had a broad appeal in the United States.

Acheson handled the incident with a combination of patrician and Machiavellian styles. He arranged for the Council to obtain

[54] Memorandum, Hull to Roosevelt, Nov. 19, 1941, *ibid.*, 841.24/1073B. Hull to Winant, Dec. 3, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 45-46. Hull to Winant, Dec. 9, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 46-47. Memorandum, Pasvolsky to Hull, Dec. 12, 1941, "Possibilities of Conflict of British and American Officials Views on Postwar Economic Policy," State Dept., Paslovsky File, Box 2. For Acheson's comment about Hull and Pasvolsky, see Acheson, 55.

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a distinguished speaker who would be available only on the night of the dinner. A few days later the Business Advisory Council informed him that the previous program had been cancelled so that Lord Halifax could address the group. Yet in the resulting correspondence between Feis, Stettinius, and Acheson, none ever criticized the substance of the Elliott paper—only its timing.[55]

Churchill's aid was needed to get the lend-lease agreement moving off dead center. A British official suggested that Roosevelt bring up the subject in talks then being held with the prime minister in Washington, but Churchill proved unwilling to discuss it. Roosevelt supported Hull's contention that it would be better to strike out article VII entirely rather than accept any further dilution of the prohibition against discriminatory trade practices and passed this information on to the British government. On February 3, 1942, the State Department learned that the British continued to delay settlement because they assumed the president and Morgenthau were indifferent to the proposed agreement and that it was merely Hull's personal fetish. Within 24 hours Roosevelt cabled a personal message to Churchill in which he expressed his strong support for the existing draft and warned that further delay would only harm British as well as American interests.[56]

This brought on one last British attempt to avoid having to "barter Empire preference in exchange for money and goods." British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden suggested a series of notes to accompany the lend-lease agreement. Essentially the British objected to the American use of the term "discrimination" and warned that any changes in economic relations between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would require Commonwealth

[55] The invitation and Elliott's paper are in State Dept. 841.24/1125-1/12. The various calls and conferences concerning the Elliott talk are in *ibid.*, 841.24/-2/12, -3/12, -4/12.

[56] Memorandum of conversation by Hull, Dec. 29, 1941, *FR* (1941), III, 53. Memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt, Dec. 30, 1941, FDR Papers, PSF: Safe File, Box 1, "Great Britain." Memorandum by Acheson of conversation with Roosevelt, Jan. 29, 1942, State Dept. 841.24/1224. Winant to Hull for Roosevelt, Jan. 4, 1942, *ibid.*, 740.0011 Eur. War 1939/18151, outlines the British problems, as does a memorandum by Acheson of a conversation with Lord Halifax, Jan. 30, 1942, *ibid.*, 841.24/1238. The British delaying tactics and the American response are in Hull to Winant, Jan. 30, 1942, *FR* (1942), I, 525-27; Winant to Hull, Feb. 3, 1942, *ibid.*, 527-29; Roosevelt to Churchill, Feb. 4, 1942, *ibid.*, 529.

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approval. The notes cautioned that Great Britain could not commit herself to abstaining from economic and monetary controls until her postwar situation was known. The British were pleading domestic political necessity, which should have been a familiar refrain to the American policy makers, but in reality the English were understandably reluctant to open the empire door.[57]

The State Department refused to back down. Acheson and Feis told Halifax that although the United States did not believe article VII committed the British to a unilateral abrogation of the Ottawa Agreements and similar arrangements, the elimination of such discriminatory practices was to be a key item for discussion during the talks provided for in that article. Churchill tried a political ploy with Ambassador Winant when, on February 9, he remarked that even though he did not believe imperial preferences were of any real value, three-fourths of the Cabinet opposed making the elimination of such preferences part of the lend-lease settlement. The last word went to Roosevelt. In an overly solicitous cable the president assured Churchill that the United States had never even considered swapping imperial preference for lend-lease. Roosevelt commented that the proposed notes which the British wanted to accompany the interim master agreement gave the impression that discussion of imperial preference was to be specifically excluded from talks on postwar economic policy. FDR self-righteously claimed that all the United States wanted was "a bold, forthright, and comprehensive discussion" so as to create a "world where men shall really be free economically as well as politically." Given such a grand view, Roosevelt's conviction "that nothing should now be excluded from those discussions" was completely logical. With the exception of perfunctory approval from the dominions, nothing remained but formal British acquiescence to the agreement and its call for "the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce."[58]

[57] *Winant to Hull*, Feb. 6, 1942, *FR* (1942), 529-32. This document includes the proposed explanatory notes as well as Eden's remarks. For additional information on the British position, see memorandum of conversation between Welles, Acheson, and Halifax, Feb. 7, 1942, *ibid.*, 532-33. A harsh response from within the State Dept. is Hawkins's to Acheson, Feb. 4, 1942, State Dept. 841.24/1125-8/12.

[58] Memorandum of conversation by Acheson, Feb. 7, 1942, *FR* (1942), I,

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VI

Although American leaders grasped the potential leverage created by British dependence upon the United States, they did not consistently use that leverage between 1937 and March 1941. Before the actual outbreak of war, the American government could not resort to obvious coercion, fearing that the Chamberlain ministry would seek a *modus vivendi* with Germany. Between 1939 and 1941, the formulation of American economic policy rested primarily with Morgenthau and the Treasury Department, which thought essentially about restraining Nazism and pacifying public opinion. After June 1941, however, once Hull and the State Department took over American policy, Great Britain had to stand and deliver. Like most Americans, Roosevelt unquestioningly agreed with the expansionist goals of Hull's economic program. Yet whether he fully realized what methods he endorsed when he assigned the State Department the task of working out the master lend-lease agreement is highly debatable, though he gave Hull support when the negotiations stalled. Still, the impression left by the documents is that in this case Franklin Roosevelt did not lead, but followed.

That Hull and other American leaders vastly exaggerated the importance of Britain's imperial preference systems is obvious, but it is not the key point. The fact was that the determinants of American policy during the negotiation of the Lend-Lease Master Agreement were the American vision of British opulence, the persistence of the Wilsonian concept of the interdependence of peace and liberal economic systems, and the political necessity of striking a good bargain—all in sharp contrast to the factors which stimulated the passage of the Lend-Lease Act itself. Even assuming the best of motives—the creation of a peaceful, prosper-

533-34. Winant to Hull, Feb. 9, 1942, *ibid.*, 534-35. Roosevelt to Churchill, Feb. 11, 1942, *ibid.*, 535-37. The background to Roosevelt's cable to Churchill is in State Dept. 841.24/1125-9/12b, -10/12. The cable was drafted by Hopkins, Acheson, and Welles. See *ibid.*, 841.24/1208A and /1209, for data on the submission of the draft to the dominions. The text of the statement issued by the United States on the announcement of the signing is in *ibid.*, 841.24/1240A. See Acheson, 32-33, for additional details. The final text of the interim Master Lend-Lease Agreement, which was finally signed on Feb. 23, 1942, is in Dept. of State, *Bulletin*, Feb. 28, 1942, p. 190.

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ous world—the negotiation of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement found the United States remarkably willing and even eager to destroy what it believed to be a cornerstone of Great Britain's empire, the empire of an ally. Granted, imperial preference systems were an anachronism which did not deserve the attention they got. Granted, no conspiracy to exploit Britain existed. Rather the Roosevelt administration, fearing the English would renew the policies which had supposedly led to depression and war, saw its proposals as a means of saving Great Britain from herself. Nevertheless, American leaders were perfectly willing in this case to use economic and political pressure to obtain British compliance with their view of how the world's economy should be structured. The negotiations surrounding the Lend-Lease Act indicated a basic American respect for the sovereignty and national pride of the British, while those leading to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement found United States officials far more eager to remake other nations in the American image. Clearly Hull's displacing Morgenthau as the prime formulator of economic foreign policy played a key role in this change, but that leaves unanswered the broader question—how great a role did world economic reform play in the formulation of America's postwar planning during the Second World War? One thing is certain, historians can no longer dismiss that question as irrelevant.

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The United States and British Bankruptcy, 1944-1945: Responsibilities Deferred*

GEORGE C. HERRING JR.
University of Kentucky

At the Quebec Conference in September 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt promised Winston Churchill $6 billion in lend-lease aid for the first year of Phase II—the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan—to assist the reconstruction of the war-shattered British economy. But Roosevelt did not live to implement his Quebec promises, and less than one year later, on August 21, 1945, his successor, Harry S. Truman, suddenly ordered the immediate termination of lend-lease. Britain was left with staggering debts, without means of external assistance, facing what Lord Keynes called an "economic Dunkirk." The breakdown of the Phase II agreement and America's desertion of her wartime ally on the day of victory form a significant, though little known, chapter in the history of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War.

I

Officials of the British Treasury first requested American aid for reconstruction in mid-1944 when they began to appreciate the

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magnitude of the economic crisis that lay ahead. Since 1940, the United Kingdom had abandoned prudence to mobilize all resources against Germany. By 1944, she had accumulated external liabilities almost five times her prewar totals. The liquidation of most of her foreign assets and the loss of her export trade left her without means to service her debts and to pay for the imports upon which the British Isles depended. Economists estimated in late 1944 that Britain would enter the peace with her liabilities fifteen times greater than her available reserves and would incur an annual deficit of £1 billion in the first three years after the war.[1]

Britain's special economic relationship with the United States further complicated her future. Since 1941, American lend-lease aid had sustained the British war economy and had contributed to the closest coordination of logistics yet achieved by two allies. But the determination of some U.S. officials to attach conditions to lend-lease, the tightening of American policies in 1943 and 1944, and the uncertain duration of the wartime aid program aroused grave concerns in the United Kingdom.

Neophytes to the complexities of international economics, Americans had not perceived the extent to which the war had weakened British power. They continued to regard their ally as a dangerous competitor for postwar influence and markets and a likely obstacle to the liberalization of world trade, a war aim which had top priority in the State Department. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had attempted to use lend-lease to force the British to end discriminatory trading practices, especially the imperial preference system of tariffs. The United States had imposed tight restrictions to prevent the British from reexporting lend-lease supplies in competition with American manufacturers.

The Roosevelt administration was also accountable to a Congress that had only recently emerged from isolationism, that considered foreign aid an expensive novelty, and whose members were increasingly sensitive to constituents' complaints about domestic shortages. Since 1941, the administration had gone out of its way to prevent any abuses in the aid program that might provoke political opposition. The British had been required to submit elaborate data proving that each item requested was essential for the war ef-

[1] W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, *British War Economy*, History of the Second World War, U.K. Civil Series (London, 1949), 518-24.

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fort and could be put to effective use. In 1943, the administration eliminated from lend-lease eligibility industrial equipment that might not be operational before the war ended and controversial items such as tobacco for civilian consumption. At the same time, the British were required to expand shipments of reverse lend-lease to the United States to counter charges that the allies were waxing rich while American resources were being scattered across the globe.[2]

Even before D-Day, the United States Army began to reduce the volume of munitions shipments to the United Kingdom. Army officers also were sensitive to congressional opinion. They were determined now that their forces were playing a major role in the war to give top priority to their own needs. At least some of them were looking toward the peace. "We must be strong enough militarily at the peace table to cause our demands to be respected," General Thomas T. Handy advised Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in March 1943. "With this in view," he continued, "we should give only such equipment to our allies that they can put to better and quicker use than we can."[3]

The British naturally resented American policies. They felt that their valiant, singlehanded stand against Hitler in 1940 and the total commitment of their resources to the war entitled them to better treatment; they objected that the United States had not imposed similar restrictions on aid to the Soviet Union. Most important,

[2] American wartime lend-lease policies are discussed in Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (rev. ed.; New York, 1969), 165-87; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York, 1968), 490-93; George C. Herring Jr., "Experiment in Foreign Aid: Lend-Lease, 1941-1945" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Virginia, 1965), 178-231; John M. Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries* (Boston, 1959-67), III, 122-39; H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply*, History of the Second World War: U.K. Civil Series (London, 1955), *passim.*; and R. S. Sayers, *Financial Policy, 1939-1945*. History of the Second World War, U.K. Civil Series (London, 1956), 375-437.

[3] The military's handling of lend-lease is discussed in Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943* (Washington, D.C., 1955), and in Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945* (Washington, D.C., 1969), both volumes in the series United States Army in World War II. Handy's memorandum to Marshall, Mar. 8, 1943, is quoted in Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1944*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1959), 282.

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they feared the obstacles American handling of lend-lease posed to their postwar recovery. The Churchill government was inclined toward internationalism in foreign trade, but it wanted to retain freedom of action to adopt the postwar policies best tailored to Britain's needs. The Treasury and Foreign Offices had managed up to 1944 to evade binding commitments, but they realized that their growing weakness would leave them more vulnerable to American pressure. The restrictions on reexport blocked the essential task of recovering lost markets, and the reduction of lend-lease and the expansion of British shipments to the United States threatened to deplete already meager dollar balances. In addition, American Under-secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. had warned in April 1944, that lend-lease would have to end with the war.[4]

Thus in the summer of 1944, the British set out to convince their allies of the gravity of Britain's economic problems and of her need for some form of assistance. During a visit to the United States in July, Richard Law of the Foreign Office stressed that Britain would not be able to handle postwar loans or credits even at very low interest rates. Instead, he suggested at least a brief extension of lend-lease to provide part of Britain's import needs without exhausting her supply of dollars and to facilitate her recovery of the export trade.[5]

The United States did not seriously consider Law's request. Indeed, most Americans reacted with surprise and skepticism. Stettinius, to whom the proposal was addressed, felt that the British had exaggerated their difficulties and found it incomprehensible that with the resources of the empire they would be unable to service loans. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. and President Roosevelt could not believe that England was "broke."[6]

American plans for reconstruction were based on the presumed lessons of the past—the experience of World War I—rather than

[4] British reaction to American policies can be seen in Blum, III, 122-39, and Sayers, 375-437. Stettinius's statement on the end of lend-lease can be found in Edward R. Stettinius Jr., London Mission Diary, Apr. 18, 1944, Edward R. Stettinius Jr. Papers, Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville.

[5] Stettinius's memorandum to Cordell Hull, June 27, 1944; Stettinius's notes on his conversation with Richard Law, July 18, 1944; transcript of conversation, Stettinius and Leo Pasvolsky, July 19, 1944, all in the Stettinius Papers.

[6] *Ibid.*; Blum, III, 306-09.

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the still dimly perceived realities of the present. Lend-lease obligations would be written off and substantial funds allocated for relief in liberated areas. The State Department's Postwar Programs Committee admitted that additional needs for reconstruction of war damage would be "large," but concluded that "loans with some provision for repayment will be sufficient for most areas and will be the best way to do the job."[7]

The Roosevelt administration thus saw no need for postwar lend-lease, and in any event felt certain that Congress would not approve it. By mid-1944, businessmen and foreign traders were lobbying vigorously for the return of trade to normal commercial channels.[8] Conservatives, concerned by the vast expenditures of the war and the mounting national debt, insisted, as Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan put it, that American participation in reconstruction should be on a "strictly business basis."[9] Democratic and Republican congressmen agreed that lend-lease was exclusively an instrument of war and must not be extended afterward, a position the administration never challenged.[10]

The White House and State Department doubted whether they could sell even their modest postwar program to the American people and Congress. Roosevelt had refused to commit himself unequivocally to cancel lend-lease debts, and a public opinion analyst in the State Department warned in August 1944 that unless the

[7] Postwar Programs Committee, Dept. of State, Document No. 19, copy in the Stettinius Papers.

[8] See "The Editor Thinks Out Loud," *American Exporter*, XXXII (Feb. 1943), 23, and "Private Enterprise," *American Exporter*, XXXIII (Dec. 1943), 34; Edna Lonigan, "Lend-Lease—A Tool for Planners," *Barrons*, Mar. 20, 1944; "The Coming Battle on Lend-Lease," *Business Week*, Nov. 18, 1944, p. 15; statement of the Foreign Commerce Department of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, reported in the New York *Times*, Nov. 20, 1944. A poll of businessmen conducted by *Modern Industry* in early 1944 showed that 78.4 per cent favored ending lend-lease with the war; see "Readers Vote to End Lend-Lease with War," *Modern Industry*, VII, Mar. 15, 1944, p. 10.

[9] Arthur H. Vandenberg to Allen Schoenfield, July 3, 1944, Arthur H. Vandenberg Papers, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor. See also speeches by Senators Allan Ellender, Millard Tydings, and C. Wayland Brooks in the *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., May 8, 1944, pp. 4092-105.

[10] Statements of Vandenberg, Tom Connally, Edwin Johnson, Kenneth McKellar, Robert A. Taft, and Tydings in the *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., May 8, 1944, pp. 4092-105, and statements by McKellar in the New York *Times*, Aug. 8, 1944, and by Connally and Walter George in *ibid*, Aug. 25, 1944.

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administration undertook a massive effort to educate the American public, "There is very grave danger that the settlement of lend-lease will entangle us in another international war debts mess."[11]

Stettinius therefore advised Law that after spending $12 billion to "see Britain through the war" the American people would not accept treating her as a "pensioner for an indefinite period." At a press conference in early August, the under-secretary vigorously denied press reports that current Anglo-American talks involved postwar lend-lease, and "unofficial sources" in the State Department indicated that the aid program would end with the war.[12]

The British then turned to the immediate and pressing problems of Phase II in the hope of easing their transition into the peace. In August 1944, strategists estimated that Germany might be defeated as early as December and that the war against Japan would last another eighteen months to two years. If the United States continued to reduce lend-lease during Phase II, the British economy would have to remain fully mobilized for war, dollar balances would be depleted further, and no effort could be made to build up exports. If the reductions could be held at an acceptable level, however, Britain could at least begin the task of reconstruction. The shipment of non-munitions in volumes above essential military requirements would provide some of her import needs. The provision of substantial quantities of lend-lease munitions would free some British industries to begin reconversion to civilian production. These measures, coupled with a release from reexport restrictions, would make possible a massive attempt to recapture lost markets. All of the assistance would be used directly or indirectly in the war against Japan and would therefore come within the scope of the Lend-Lease Act.[13]

[11] Wilder Foote to Stettinius, Aug. 2, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

[12] Stettinius's notes on his conversation with Richard Law, July 18, 1944, and transcript of the conversation with Pasvolsky, July 19, 1944, Stettinius Papers; the report on Anglo-American negotiations first appeared in the *NAM News*, XI, Aug. 5, 1944, p. 3, and was widely reprinted. For reaction in the State Department see the Stettinius memorandum to James Dunn, Aug. 7, 1944, Stettinius Papers, and New York *Times*, Aug. 13, 1944. Stettinius's denial that the talks involved lend-lease is in *ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1944.

[13] Hancock and Gowing, 515-27, and Sayers, 465-69. See also the memorandum by William Batt, June 24, 1944, and Robert Brand's memorandum to Harry Hopkins, Aug. 7, 1944, Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Box 323.

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Top American officials responded cautiously to the Phase II idea. Only Morgenthau, probably influenced by a desire to gain British endorsement of his punitive plans for Germany, accepted the proposal without qualification, arguing that the United States was morally obligated to assist Britain and had a vital stake in her recovery.[14] Secretary Hull approved continuing lend-lease on a "reasonable scale" during Phase II to help Britain "regain as sound an economic foundation as possible" provided only that in return she made definite commitments on postwar trade policies.[15] Roosevelt's adviser and confidant, Harry Hopkins, strongly supported Hull's position.[16]

The president refused to commit himself, warning Hopkins on August 18 that with the defeat of Germany, Japan might collapse and that would change the "lend-lease picture drastically." He did agree to discuss the problem with Churchill at their upcoming meeting in Quebec. And to insure himself freedom of action, he issued a strong public statement that lend-lease must be continued until the defeat of Japan and countermanded orders issued by the Army requiring a drastic cutback of all lend-lease shipments after the defeat of Germany.[17]

At the Quebec Conference, Churchill pressed for Roosevelt's approval. When the president at first remained noncommittal, the prime minister became emotional. "What do you want me to do," he is said to have asked, "stand up and beg like Fala?" FDR, appar-

[14] Blum, II, 309-10. Morgenthau would later deny any connection between his plan for Germany and his support for aid to Britain. It is true that he promised the British as early as November 1943, to do anything he could to help them get postwar assistance and that he continued his efforts long after Roosevelt and Churchill had dropped his plan for Germany. Nor was there any direct *quid pro quo* involved between the two issues at Quebec. Still it seems unlikely that Morgenthau's ardent support for aid to Britain in the late summer and early fall of 1944 was not influenced at least in part by his desire to secure Churchill's approval of the plan for Germany.

[15] Hull to FDR, Sept. 8, 1944, *Foreign Relations of the United States—Diplomatic Papers, 1944* (Washington, D.C., 1966-1967), III, 53-56 (the series is hereafter cited as *FR*).

[16] Hopkins to FDR, Sept. 8, 1944, *ibid.*, 56-57.

[17] Hopkins's memorandum of his conversation with FDR, Aug. 18, 1944, Hopkins Papers, Box, 323. For FDR's statement on the importance of continuing lend-lease until the end of the war with Japan, see New York *Times*, Aug. 23, 1944. His order cancelling Army orders for post-V-E Day lend-lease is dated Sept. 9, 1944 and printed in *FR* (1944), III, 57.

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ently without giving the matter deep thought, acquiesced, agreeing to provide an estimated $3.5 billion in munitions and $3 billion in non-munitions during the first year of Phase II and to drop restrictions on reexport. The details were to be worked out in subsequent negotiations, but Roosevelt's commitment seemed clear. The United States, he later confided to Stettinius, would have to see Britain through into the postwar world. With tears in his eyes, Churchill thanked the president for his assistance.[18]

If followed to the letter, the Quebec agreement would have eased considerably Britain's economic problems. But the discussions with Churchill and the formal proposals brought to Washington by Keynes in October set off a storm of opposition that would force the president to retreat. The State and War Departments keenly resented Morgenthau's presence at Quebec and his apparent deal, giving Britain aid in return for her endorsement of his proposals for Germany.[19] The lend-lease agreement especially outraged Hull. He protested that by promising to help the British without requiring trade concessions in return, Roosevelt had "given away the bait" and destroyed Hull's life-long hopes of liberalizing trade. After firing off three angry letters of protest, Hull retreated to his Washington apartment, then to Bethesda Naval Hospital from where he sent his resignation on November 19.[20]

Many of Roosevelt's leading advisers agreed that the Phase II proposal was political dynamite. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal warned that, if made known, it would "blow the roof off."[21] Stettinius advised the president that permitting the British to export in competition with Americans would "bring about an

[18] The British side of the Quebec Conference is discussed in Hancock and Gowing, 527-28, and in Sayers, 469-70; the American side in Blum, III, 313, 373, and Hull to John G. Winant, Sept. 19, 1944, *FR* (1944), III, 58-59. Roosevelt's comment to Stettinius is recorded in Stettinius's notes on the conversation with FDR, Sept. 21, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

[19] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), II, 1612-22, memorandum by H. Freeman Matthews, Sept. 20, 1944, *FR-Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Malta and Yalta* (Washington, D.C., 1956), 134-35; memorandum by Harry Dexter White, Sept. 20, 1944, *ibid.*, 136-38.

[20] Fred Israel (ed.), *The War Diary of Breckinridge Long* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1966), 382, 383, 386; Hull's memorandum to FDR are dated Sept. 17, Sept. 30, and Oct. 2, 1944 and are in *FR* (1944), III, 59-60, 61-66.

[21] Stettinius's memorandum to Dean Acheson, Oct. 27, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

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explosion on the Hill."[22] Admiral William D. Leahy questioned the legality of providing any supplies that were not essential for the war and predicted that Congress would react with "violent disfavor" to the British proposals.[23] Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson warmly endorsed maximum postwar aid to Britain, but opposed using lend-lease, even indirectly, without first consulting Congress.[24] These warnings were underscored when just three days before the presidential election, Arthur Krock published in the New York *Times* a detailed, though quite misleading, account of the Quebec discussions and the Phase II proposals.[25]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army and Navy also strenuously objected to providing Britain with substantial lend-lease during the war against Japan. For reasons of prestige, they were determined that the war should be an "American show" and that Britain should play only a minor role. Facing at the time serious supply shortages, they insisted that Britain should be given only equipment that was essential for military operations and that it could not produce. "It is unthinkable," Under-secretary of War Robert Patterson advised, "that commitments already assumed by our own forces . . . should be subordinated to satisfy British requirements."[26]

In the face of this opposition, Roosevelt backed down, and the program finally emerging from the Anglo-American negotiations in late November bore only slight resemblance to the Quebec promises. The United States insisted that reexport restrictions re-

[22] Stettinius's notes on his conversation with FDR, Sept. 21, 1944, *ibid.*

[23] William D. Leahy Diary, Nov. 18, 1944, William D. Leahy Papers, MS Div., Library of Congress.

[24] Henry L. Stimson Diary, Oct. 13, 1944, Henry L. Stimson Papers, Yale Univ.

[25] New York *Times*, Nov. 3, 1944. Campaigning in New England, the president evaded reporters' questions concerning the Krock story "with a sharp declaration that he had never heard of it"; *ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1944. For reaction in the State and Treasury Departments, see Stettinius's calendar notes, Nov. 3, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

[26] William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York, 1950), 279-80; Robert Patterson memo to Henry Morgenthau, Oct. 19, 1944, copy in Henry H. Arnold Papers, MS Div., Library of Congress. For the War Department's concern about shortages, see Patterson to FDR, July 27, 1944 and Patterson to Maurice H. Karker, Nov. 19, 1944, Robert P. Patterson Papers, MS Div., Library of Congress.

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main in effect, but did agree to relax their enforcement. A lend-lease program was established for the first year of Phase II consisting of $2.8 billion in munitions and $2.6 billion in non-munitions. Significantly, however, the president decided that this program would not constitute a binding commitment. The British had hoped to secure an agreement like the Russian supply protocols, committing the United States to provide a specific volume of supplies within a fixed time period. The Quebec discussions had implied such a commitment, but by late November, Roosevelt had grown cautious. Morgenthau speculated that his change had been provoked by Churchill's policies in Eastern Europe, especially his October sphere of influence deal with Stalin. But FDR stressed domestic politics. Leahy and others had convinced him that it would be legally questionable and politically dangerous to approve lend-lease shipments that were not essential for the war. The president advised Morgenthau and Stettinius at a meeting on November 21 that if the British were promised $6 billion of lend-lease, it would create a "very serious political problem." The president did not wish to make commitments. He did not even wish to receive a written report of the negotiations. When Morgenthau protested that this would violate the "spirit of Quebec," Roosevelt responded simply that the British would have to rely upon "American good will."[27]

Despite this major setback, the British seemed satisfied with the results of the discussions.[28] They did not regard the reductions in Phase II figures as disastrous. The easing of export restrictions enabled Churchill to defend the government against charges that Brit-

[27] The Phase II negotiations are discussed in Hancock and Gowing, 528-33, and Sayers, 470-74. For the American side see Blum, III, 316-22; "Report to the President from the Committee on Lend-Lease," Nov. 13, 1944, and the report from Morgenthau to FDR, Nov. 21, 1944, Confidential File—Lend-Lease, FDR Papers, FDR Library. Also the Foreign Economic Administration report to the president, Nov. 22, 1944, Records of the Foreign Economic Administration [FEA], National Archives, Box 822. The important discussions on commitments are recorded in Blum, 319-20; Leahy Diary, Nov. 21, 1944, Leahy Papers; Leahy, *I Was There*, 279-80; and Stettinius's notes on the conference with FDR and Morgenthau, Nov. 21, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

[28] Stettinius's notes on the conversation with Keynes, Nov. 26, 1944, Stettinius Papers; Sir Roy Harrod, *The Life of John Maynard Keynes* (New York, 1951), 591.

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ish export interests had been sold out to the United States.[29] Keynes argued that the failure to get commitments was not crippling. The Americans' word, he observed, was "as good as if not better than their bond." Besides any formal agreement would have been "stuffed with jokers" so that the United States could have escaped whenever it wished.[30]

II

With the conclusion of the negotiations on Phase II, the British ceased their efforts to secure postwar aid from the United States. They feared that further talks might publicize their weakness and lead to unfortunate political repercussions in Britain and in the commonwealth nations. Anxious to regain their economic independence as soon as possible, they were happy to escape the talks without making any commitments; and they feared that pressing their case further might encourage those Americans who wished to drive a hard bargain. Confident that top American officials now understood their needs, they counted on implementation of the Phase II program to ease their recovery. Both Keynes and Churchill felt certain that if the program were not enough, Roosevelt would rescue them with another "brain-wave" as he had with lend-lease in 1941.[31] The British assumed, A. J. P. Taylor has written, that "American generosity would continue indefinitely."[32]

British optimism proved to be naive. The president's refusal to approve commitments or to give the Phase II program the status of an agreement left it an exceedingly unreliable instrument. Its fulfillment would depend, as Roosevelt had indicated, upon American good will and also upon the administration's willingness and capacity to interpret loosely the Lend-Lease Act as well as upon the Pacific war's continuing the estimated eighteen months.

None of these conditions came about. The final year of the war opened in an atmosphere of deepening suspicion and antagonism between the two Atlantic allies. Churchill's suppression of the Greek uprising in December shocked and outraged American opinion. Liberals and conservatives alike denounced Britain's cyn-

[29] R. N. Gardner, 180; Sayers, 472.
[30] Quoted in Sayers, 470n.
[31] *Ibid.*, 475-76.
[32] A. J. P. Taylor, *English History, 1914-1945* (New York, 1965), 585.

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ical reversion to power politics as a betrayal of allied war aims. Stettinius recorded in his diary angry demands by the U.S. military that we "withdraw from Europe and 'go to the Pacific now and win the war there.' " Pollster Hadley Cantril reported to the State Department a massive rise of Anglophobia among the American people, and Senator Vandenberg predicted a repetition of the tragic aftermath of World War I unless the administration forcefully stood up to the British. FDR himself reflected the prevailing mood, lamenting to Joseph Davies in January that he could not understand Churchill, who seemed to be growing more and more "mid-Victorian" with his "imperialistic obsessions."[33]

In the aftermath of the Greek crisis, American good will was in short supply. For this reason and many others, U.S. officials were not inclined to interpret lend-lease flexibly in early 1945. Roosevelt had never advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army of the final results of the Phase II discussions, and from January on they proceeded as though nothing had happened. Military planners concentrated all available resources on ending the war in Europe and preparing for the campaigns against Japan and they gave slight attention to British requests. Their plans assigned British units a limited and peripheral role in the Pacific war and approved release of only those supplies that the British could not produce themselves deemed essential for British operations.[34]

In addition, in March Congress wrote into law a highly restrictive interpretation of lend-lease. The administration had repeatedly announced its determination to end the aid program when hostilities ceased. But Republicans in Congress profoundly distrusted Roosevelt, and they were determined, in Vandenberg's words, to hold the fourth term to "strict accountability for its acts." Reports in the press that the administration was negotiating lend-lease

[33] For general discussions of the climate of early 1945, see Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York, 1969), 258-60, and Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago, 1970), 46-47. Cantril to Oscar Cox, Dec. 29, 1944, Stettinius Papers; Vandenberg to Henry D. Hatfield, Dec. 29, 1944, Vandenberg Papers; Joseph Davies Journal, Jan. 10, 1945, Joseph E. Davies Papers, MS Div., Library of Congress.

[34] International Division, Army Service Forces [ID, ASF], "Lend-Lease as of September 30, 1945" (unpublished ms. in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C.), I 302; Coakley and Leighton, *1943-1945*, 662-63.

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agreements with Britain, France, and Russia, involving billions of dollars and much of it apparently intended for reconstruction fed congressional fears. When the Lend-Lease Act came up for renewal in February, concerned congressmen set out to plug up loopholes that might permit its use for other than war purposes. House Republicans forced the administration to accept an amendment explicitly limiting lend-lease to military operations and requiring that any supplies shipped after the war ended or that did not contribute directly to operations must be paid for in cash. An even more restrictive amendment proposed in the Senate by Robert A. Taft of Ohio was defeated by the narrowest of margins—a tie vote.[35]

From a strictly legal standpoint, the House amendment did not affect the Phase II program since all shipments were intended for use against Japan. But the program relied upon providing supplies at levels well above Britain's minimum requirements, and the debates in Congress impressed upon administration officials the danger of such a broad interpretation. The Foreign Economic Administrator, Leo T. Crowley, who had presented the administration's case to Congress and was responsible for handling civilian supplies, stressed to his aides in March that lend-lease must henceforth be handled with "great care and in a businesslike manner."[36]

The sudden death of Franklin Roosevelt on April 12 further affected Phase II lend-lease. A change in administrations at such a critical point would under any circumstances have produced confusion and uncertainty. But Roosevelt's failure to advise Truman on key policy matters and the vagueness of Roosevelt's plans on many issues greatly complicated the transition. The new president lacked knowledge of the precarious state of the British economy and had not been informed of the details of the November negotiations.

[35] I have discussed the 1945 hearings and debates on lend-lease at greater length in "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945," *Journal of American History*, LVI (1969), 93-114. The Vandenberg quotation is from a letter to James V. Oxtoley, Nov. 15, 1944, Vandenberg Papers. Representative John M. Vorys of Ohio, leader of the House Republicans in the lend-lease fight, discussed his motives for amending the Act in a letter to Geoffrey Parsons, Mar. 16, 1945, John M. Vorys Papers, Ohio State Historical Society, Columbus, O. The debate on the Taft amendment is in the *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., April 10, 1945, pp. 3232-46.

[36] Notes on Executive Policy meetings, FEA, Mar. 1 and 22, 1945, FEA Records, Box 3174.

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Morgenthau, who had been present at Quebec and had played a key role in formulating the Phase II program, might have provided some continuity between the two administrations. But the secretary of the Treasury never gained Truman's confidence, and in any event by May 1945, his zeal for aid to Britain had waned.[37]

Most of the reports received by the White House in the first months of the new administration minimized Britain's problems and her need for U.S. aid. Returning to Washington on April 20 after a visit to London, Bernard Baruch informed the new president that British officials were deeply pessimistic about the future and searching for some form of "peace lend-lease." The financier found this gloom to be unwarranted, "unrealistic and dangerous." It would, he warned, "rob Britons of their native self-reliance" and leave them clinging to the United States. And America could not afford the type of aid they wanted. If the United States gave Britain a large gift, it would have to do the same for other nations, and U.S. wealth did not come from a "bottomless pit." Baruch predicted a bright future for Britain if her people would only rely on their own resources and ingenuity and if the United States would furnish a small "cylinder head loan" to start the British "economic machine" on the road to recovery.[38]

Truman therefore had no sense of urgency about aid to Britain. His policies on lend-lease reflected primarily the demands of domestic politics. He had presided over the spring debates in the Senate, cast the tie-breaking vote against the Taft amendment, and signed the amended bill into law on April 17. He had been deeply impressed by congressional views on lend-lease, and like many other observers he had interpreted the vote on the Taft amendment as a portent of resurgent isolationism. On April 26 he expressed to his budget director a fear that the "isolationist spirit" might at any time "break out into the open." Inexperienced in his new post, now responsible for driving Roosevelt's internationalist peace program through Congress, he was certain that if he attempted to stretch his

[37] Blum, III, 448-49.

[38] Baruch to Truman, Apr. 20, 1945, Stettinius Papers. For Baruch's account of his trip to London and his report to Truman, see Bernard M. Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years* (New York, 1960), 347-49, 357-58. A report from Lauchlin Currie dated Apr. 24, 1945, *FR—Diplomatic Papers, 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1967-69), VI, 36-40, confirmed Baruch's generally optimistic impressions of Britain's economic conditions.

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authority under the Lend-Lease Act he would be letting himself in for a "lot of trouble."[39]

III

As the end of the war in Europe approached, the administration began to adjust the Phase II program to the political realities. In April, Crowley scaled down British non-munitions requirements for the first year of the Pacific war by one-third. Dean Acheson of the State Department protested that the reductions would jeopardize the maintenance of stability in postwar Europe but reluctantly agreed that they were politically necessary.[40]

The cutbacks in civilian supplies disturbed the British but the military's handling of lend-lease munitions alarmed them much more. By May the United States had shipped only about one-sixth of the military supplies programmed for 1945, and on V-E Day the army repossessed most of the equipment awaiting shipment to Britain for use in Europe. Plans for Phase II continued to ignore the principles of the November discussions. In mid-May, British representatives in Washington protested that a "wave of economy" had swept over the capital. "De facto and de jure," one official warned London, "we are where we were before the Keynes discussions."[41]

On May 28, Churchill dispatched an urgent cable to Truman appealing for fulfillment of the Phase II program.[42] The prime minister's plea opened a brief but vigorous debate on the future of lend-lease to Britain. Dean Acheson and Will Clayton of the State Department and Director of Reconversion, Fred Vinson, viewed Churchill's request sympathetically. Agreeing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's policy on military supplies was inconsistent with the November negotiations, they proposed that the original program

[39] Record of conference, Truman and Harold Smith, Apr. 26, 1945, Harold Smith Papers, FDR Library. Also Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (Garden City, N.Y., 1955-56), I, 46, 97-98.

[40] Minutes, Secretary of State's Staff Committee, May 9, 1945, Stettinius Papers.

[41] ID, ASF, "Lend-Lease as of September 30, 1945," I, 302-07; Hall, 454-55.

[42] The Churchill cable is quoted in Truman, I, 230-31. For earlier British inquiries regarding the status of the Phase II program, see Robert Brand to Morgenthau, May 17, 1945, FEA Records, Box 795, and Joseph C. Grew to John G. Winant, June 4, 1945, *FR* (1945), VI, 51-53.

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be executed with a slight downward adjustment in volume.[43]

President Truman rejected the proposal. On May 31, he had received a stern warning from House Republicans that any attempts to use lend-lease for reconstruction might have "disastrous consequences."[44] Admiral Leahy and Crowley also advised against agreeing to Churchill's request. Leahy saw no military justification for most of the Phase II program and feared that efforts to execute it would waste shipping urgently needed in the Pacific.[45] Crowley insisted that the pledges made to Congress on lend-lease must not be broken. A conservative in domestic politics, Crowley also advised that it would be a mistake for the United States to assume too much responsibility for solving the problems of other nations. It would rob them of initiative and thwart the American goal of establishing a "peaceful, prosperous, democratic world."[46] At a conference on July 2, Crowley and Leahy advised the "lend-lease enthusiasts" that Churchill's request was a "plain violation of the letter and spirit of the lend-lease act."[47] Acting upon their advice, Truman three days later approved a directive limiting shipments of munitions to the essential military requirements of allied nations as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[48]

The president subsequently modified his July 5 order to permit lend-lease to British and French troops assisting the redeployment of American forces to the Pacific. But this was as far as he would go. When Churchill protested at Potsdam that Britain's munitions supplies had been reduced to the "vanishing point," Truman sympa-

[43] Minutes, Secretary's Staff Committee, May 31, 1945, and European Div., Dept. of State, "Summary of Current Foreign Developments," June 7, 1945, Stettinius Papers; ID, ASF, "Lend-Lease as of September 30, 1945," I, 308-10; Vinson to Stimson, June 13, 1945, ID, ASF, "Lend-Lease: Documentary Supplement" (unpublished ms. in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C.), IX.

[44] Reps. Robert B. Chiperfield, John M. Vorys, Karl E. Mundt, Bartel J. Jonkman, and Lawrence Smith to Truman, May 31, 1945, copy in Vorys Papers. Also Truman, I, 231.

[45] Leahy Diary, June 29 and July 2, 1945, Leahy Papers; Leahy, *I Was There*, 370, 372-73, 376-77.

[46] Leahy Diary, June 29, 1945, Leahy Papers; Crowley to Truman, July 6, 1945, FEA Records.

[47] Leahy Diary, July 2, 1945, Leahy Papers.

[48] Truman directive, July 5, 1945, *FR—Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin* (Washington, D.C., 1960), I, 818.

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thized but regretted that he must "abide strictly by the law." He refused even to permit the use of lend-lease to equip British occupation forces in Europe.[49]

Truman's narrow construction of the Lend-Lease Act all but destroyed the Phase II program. The sudden end of the war against Japan delivered the final blow. The British had counted upon the war lasting at least a year: "The Japanese will not let us down" was a common expression in Whitehall offices during 1945.[50] But the atomic bomb dashed these hopes. With the first signs of Japanese capitulation, the Truman administration began preparations to liquidate lend-lease. On August 13, without waiting for advice from the president, the Army terminated shipments of munitions to the United Kingdom. Four days later at a meeting of Truman's top advisers, only Vinson urged the extension of lend-lease, to prevent the spread of communism in Europe. Crowley, Leahy, and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes agreed that it must end. That same day, without first consulting the British, Truman ordered the termination of all lend-lease on V-J Day, "in order that the best faith may be observed toward Congress and the administration protect itself against any charge of misuse of Congressional authorization."[51] As the wartime aid program came to an end, the New York *Times* reported, there was "neither fanfare over its accomplishments nor official regret at its passing."[52]

The abrupt termination of lend-lease came as a rude shock to the infant Labour government. "After practically no time of trans-

[49] Stimson to Byrnes, July 11, 1945, *ibid.*, I, 818-19; Vinson to Byrnes, July 13, 1945, *ibid.*, I, 820; Churchill to Truman, July 24, 1945, *ibid.*, II, 1180-81; minutes of the JCS meeting, July 23, 1945, *ibid.*, II, 273; Truman to Churchill, July 25, 1945, *ibid.*, II, 1183; Truman to Clement Atlee, July 29, 1945, *ibid.*, II, 1184.

[50] Quoted in William C. Mallaleiu, *British Reconstruction and American Policy, 1945-1955* (New York, 1956), 22.

[51] For the steps leading up to liquidation of lend-lease, see Leahy Diary, Aug. 13 and 17, 1945, Leahy Papers; Byrnes to Winant, Aug. 18, 1945, *FR* (1945), VI, 102-03; Clayton to Byrnes and Acheson, Aug. 18, 1945, *ibid.*, 103-04. The administration was not unaware of the implications of its actions. Leahy dined with several cabinet members and with Senator Alben Barkley on August 21. It was agreed that there would probably be a very serious worldwide depression if the United States did not provide substantial postwar aid to the allies. It was also agreed that Congress would not approve such assistance. Leahy Diary, Aug. 21, 1945, Leahy Papers.

[52] New York *Times*, Aug. 23, 1945.

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ition," British historians have written, "no time to restore neglected plant or build up reserves or expand export production, the United Kingdom was plunged straight into the grim difficulties of Stage III."[53] Anglo-American relations dipped to their lowest point in years. The subsequent cancellation of lend-lease debts and the negotiation of a $3.75 billion loan, to which the United States attached severe conditions, only partially met Britain's needs for recovery and did little to repair the rupture in the alliance.[54]

President Truman later conceded that the cutoff of aid to Britain had been the greatest mistake of his presidency. But he argued at the time and in his memoirs that since the Lend-Lease Act was exclusively an instrument of war he had no choice but to stop shipments when the war ended.[55] Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on the other hand, contended that the president's interpretation of the Act was unnecessarily rigid and blamed "thoroughly bad advice from supposedly responsible officials."[56]

There is merit in each of these arguments. The insistence by Congress that lend-lease must not be extended into peacetime and the repeated pledges of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations to respect these wishes left the president little choice. Popular and congressional response to the decision reveals broad approval and suggests that an attempt to continue lend-lease for a long period would have provoked a political reaction.[57] Truman should have

[53] Hancock and Gowing, 533.

[54] The best discussion of the Anglo-American financial negotiations of 1945 is in R. N. Gardner, 188-254.

[55] Truman, I, 475-76.

[56] Dean G. Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York, 1969), 122.

[57] A large collection of clippings in FEA records shows 28 papers in favor of Truman's decision, 4 approving the termination of lend-lease but regretting that the president had not first consulted the British, and 2 opposed to termination, one of them because it felt the president had thrown away a powerful bargaining weapon. A *Fortune* poll taken in December 1945, indicates that 67.8 per cent of those questioned approved the termination of lend-lease at V-J Day and only 19 per cent thought it should have been extended for an additional year. Of 67 letters in FEA records commenting on the decision, 58 approved Truman's action. See Herbert Willet to Crowley, Sept. 7, 1945, FEA Records, Box 795. The correspondence in the Truman Papers is substantial and runs about two to one in favor of the decision; Official File, Lend-Lease, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. Both Democratic and Republican congressmen, liberal and conservative, expressed ap-

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consulted with the British before acting. He might have been able to justify at least a brief extension of lend-lease in view of the gravity of Britain's problems and the unexpectedly sudden end of the war with Japan. In this respect, he was the victim of bad advice. Both Clayton and Acheson, who viewed Britain's situation sympathetically, were out of Washington at the time, and the president's principal advisers, Leahy and Crowley, took an intensely nationalistic and narrowly legalistic approach toward lend-lease.[58]

Responsibility for this unfortunate conclusion to the wartime alliance must rest, however, as much with Franklin Roosevelt as with his successor. The Roosevelt administration had grossly underestimated the general needs for reconstruction and failed to provide adequate instruments for postwar assistance. Even after the British made clear their needs, FDR refused to act boldly. Instead of presenting the problem directly to Congress and asking for support, he attempted to use lend-lease as an expedient means of helping the British.[59] But when his advisers pointed to the doubtful legality and political dangers of using the wartime aid program, even indirectly, for reconstruction, the president backed down rather than risk his prestige at such a critical period in the war. He probably feared that approval of the British requests would bring similar pressure from Russia and France. Like the conservatives in Congress, he seems to have doubted that the United States could afford massive postwar aid programs. He told Stettinius on December 29, 1944 that although the allies thought the United Stated had unlimited wealth, in fact "we were getting at the bottom of our own well." It was time, he continued, "to get tough and not be so

proval of the termination of lend-lease and reacted with anger and dismay when the British protested; New York *Times*, Aug. 26, 1945.

[58] Acheson was on vacation in Canada and Clayton was in London for negotiations on UNRRA. When he heard of the order ending lend-lease, Clayton immediately telephoned Washington to try to moderate the order; see Harrod, 596.

[59] It is impossible to determine whether an appeal to Congress would have succeeded. Many congressmen who opposed the use of lend-lease for reconstruction indicated that they were quite willing to consider alternative measures for reconstruction if these measures were submitted separately and given serious study. In addition, several polls taken in the summer of 1945 suggest that the American public might have been willing to support large funds for postwar reconstruction. See "Does America's Best Chance of Prosperity Lie in Helping Other Countries After the War," *Free World*, IX (June 1945),

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liberal with our money."[60]

Whether Roosevelt would have implemented the Phase II program if he had lived cannot be known. But he left his successor in an impossible position. The American people and Congress remained uneducated about Britain's needs and their own responsibility for helping to promote postwar recovery. The initiative was left to the conservatives in Congress. Without clear guidelines from the top, the administration of lend-lease was left in the hands of the army and the Foreign Economic Administration, the former concerned primarily with its own needs, the latter especially sensitive to congressional pressures.

In his recent revisionist study, *The Politics of War*, Gabriel Kolko has argued that the decision to terminate lend-lease at V-J Day was a calculated act of pressure to force the British to request a loan for postwar reconstruction, which the United States could then make conditional upon British acceptance of the open door policy.[61] Kolko's argument is not supported by evidence and it ignores the importance of political pressures and the role of the military in shaping lend-lease policies in 1945. Roosevelt rejected Hull's proposals to link Phase II lend-lease to commercial concessions, and neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor Crowley, who administered the program, were involved in postwar commercial discussions with the British or attempted to relate lend-lease to them. Will Clayton, a staunch disciple of Hull, who assumed the leadership in trade negotiations with Britain after January 1945, advocated implementation of the Phase II program and moderation at V-J Day.

It would be a mistake, however, to deny any relationship between the two issues. The State Department's narrow concentration on postwar trade blinded it to the larger problems of recovery and inhibited effective planning for peace. Suspicions about British imperialism, political and economic, made many Americans unsympathetic to British appeals for help, and Britain's fears of being bound by commitments to the United States motivated her deci-

75; "Postwar Lend-Lease and Jobs; Results of the *Free World*'s American Opinion Poll," *Free World*, X (Aug. 1945), 62-64.

[60] Stettinius's notes on his conversation with FDR, Dec. 29, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

[61] Kolko, 490-93; see also, L. C. Gardner, 123.

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sion to accept the Phase II agreement at face value and to drop her attempts to secure postwar aid. Whether or not Americans intended to leave Britain bankrupt and impotent, the effect *was* the same. The termination of lend-lease left the Labour government little choice but to accept American demands in return for a loan. Thus what Churchill once called "the most unsordid act" became at least indirectly the means by which Britain was reduced to dependency upon her ally.

The Truman administration would in time rectify its mistake of 1945. The conditions attached to the loan were modified or dropped altogether when their disastrous effect on the British economy became apparent. And in the Marshall Plan the United States provided generous and effective aid to the United Kingdom. Still the American response to British bankruptcy in 1944 and 1945 offers a revealing commentary on the shortcomings of U.S. wartime diplomacy. The United States had an important political and economic stake in British recovery and a moral obligation to ease the plight of an ally who had sacrificed so greatly in the common cause. Lend-lease could not have been extended indefinitely or unconditionally. But Britain's crisis called for understanding and boldness, foresight and careful planning, flexibility and political acumen. These qualities were conspicuously absent in the last two years of the war. The handling of lend-lease and the related issue of aid for postwar reconstruction by both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations betrayed a timidity and lack of vision inappropriate to America's new role as world leader and a narrow nationalism quite out of step with her professed commitment to a new internationalism.

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Book Reviews

The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945-55 *by Athan G. Theoharis. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1970.—xii, 263 pp. $10.00.*

Yalta *by Diane Shaver Clemens. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970.—x, 356 pp. $8.50.*

From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 *by Herbert Feis. New York, W. W. Norton, & Co., Inc. 1970.—xx, 428 pp. $10.00.*

The Yalta conference of February 1945 was greeted at the time as a triumph of inter-Allied diplomacy. The three war leaders, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, met. They negotiated amicably. They reached agreements which seemed to settle all points of difference between them. Stalin was satisfied. Roosevelt was delighted. As Harry Hopkins said, "We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for." Only Churchill was discontented and called the final communiqué "this bloody thing." Two months later Roosevelt was dead. President Truman repudiated Yalta: "Our agreements with the Soviet Union have been a one-way street . . . it was now or never. . . . The Russians could go to Hell." The agreements of Yalta were never operated. Instead the conference became a reproach, a weapon which the Republicans used against the Democrats. Yalta was turned into an issue in American politics. This alone is its historical significance.

Professor Theoharis has analyzed the use made of Yalta by the Republicans in the ten years after the Second World War. He distinguishes three groups. The "extremists" were out to wreck the New Deal and all its

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works. They took up Yalta to reinforce their general line of anti-Communism and isolationism. The "moderates" wanted a bipartisan foreign policy and denounced Yalta only when the administration did so also. The "partisans" moved between the other two groups for party advantage, exploiting Yalta if this brought electoral advantages and yet conscious that one day there might be a Republican administration. Ultimately publication of the Yalta agreements showed that there was very little to fight over, and the controversy died away. It had never turned on the merits or otherwise of the specific agreements. It sprang from the dogma that agreements with Soviet Russia were neither possible nor desirable.

Professor Clemens provides a breath of cool fresh air after the stuffy rhetoric of the politicians. Her book is the first to analyze the negotiations at Yalta in a detached way and is an outstanding contribution to historical scholarship. She shows that Yalta was by no means an affair of the Soviet deceiver and the American deceived. It was a realistic diplomatic negotiation between three powers often with differing interests, but all of them resolved to reach agreement by compromise. Incidentally, this detailed narrative ends the myth that Roosevelt's political gifts were failing, whatever his physical decline may have been. His ingenuity was as great as ever and of the three participants he got most nearly what he wanted. Professor Clemens states firmly: "The decisions at Yalta involved compromise by each nation, probably more by the Soviets than by the Western nations." Cooperation was the keynote of Soviet policy. Yalta was ruined by what came afterward, not by its own defects: "By abandoning the Conference agreements after Yalta, America created a self-fulfilling prophecy." The Americans distrusted the Russians and so compelled them to justify this distrust. The Soviets "had to substitute unilateral action for a policy of cooperation which they had hoped for, but which had never emerged—except briefly, at Yalta." Professor Clemens concludes: "It is perhaps relevant to ask what the world would have been like if the spirit of Yalta had triumphed."

Herbert Feis shows what the world was like when the spirit of Yalta was repudiated. He traces in somewhat high-flown terms the course of American policy from 1945 to 1950. His book is vitiated by the outlook expressed in his title. There was no Trust on the American side from the moment Roosevelt died. There was Distrust which sometimes threatened Terror toward the Russians and sometimes put Terror into the Americans themselves. The moral of his book is that if you distrust someone, he will distrust you. The world will not enjoy a secure peace until the spirit of Yalta is restored and Great Powers recognize each other as

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equals. At any rate, Yalta was the greatest of Roosevelt's triumphs and his noblest legacy.

A. J. P. TAYLOR
Beaverbrook Library
London

The American Challenge *by J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, translated by Ronald Steel, foreword by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. New York, Atheneum, 1968.—xviii, 291 pp. $6.95.*

This enormously influential piece of politico-economic pamphleteering articulates and rationalizes a popular European mood of discontent and apprehension over the "technological gap" and the danger of American foreign investment, but it does so by combining valid insights and misunderstanding in about equal proportions.

The technological gap between Europe and the United States is revealed as largely a management gap and as resting mainly on the much stronger base of intermediate, technical, and advanced education as well as industrial research and development in the U.S. The very demanding requirements implied for Europe if it wishes to narrow the gap are spelled out. This covers what is by now pretty familiar ground. Even here, Servan-Schreiber exaggerates the benefits of being the technological leader and understates the solid compensations of being able to license relatively cheaply what it has cost the frontrunner an enormous investment to discover.

The book becomes much more controversial, however, when it proceeds to its other major theses: (1) that high technology and productivity can be achieved only by very large and heavily capitalized firms functioning in continent-sized markets; (2) that since big capital is predominantly available to big U.S. firms, such firms are in the process of taking over European industry through foreign investment and can be withstood only by the formation of giant mergers of European companies; and (3) that heavy U.S. direct foreign investment threatens U.S. political domination of Europe.

This reviewer, on the other hand, is impressed with: (1) the relatively poor record of such corporate giants as General Motors and U.S. Steel in technological innovation; (2) the remarkably high standard of living and rate of economic growth achieved by Sweden and Japan respectively, which do *not* have preferential access to very large markets; (3) the relatively subordinate role played by easy access to U.S. sources of capital in

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accounting for the big wave of U.S. direct investment in Europe in the last decade—which was in large part locally financed; (4) the considerable potential danger to European industrial vitality of a new era of giant cartels with essentially noncompetitive and restrictionist mentalities, no matter how heavily capitalized or subsidized; and (5) the unlikelihood that U.S. investment in Europe, even if greatly expanded from present levels, could significantly impair Europe's political independence any more than such investment has done in the case of Canada.

Space is lacking to argue the basis of these reservations here, but reference must be made to at least one basic misconception about the economics of foreign investment which underlies much of Servan-Schreiber's argument. U.S. foreign investment is interpreted as essentially an act whereby the investor appropriates a European property for the benefit of the United States. What this overlooks, of course, is that even if an existing European enterprise is acquired, such U.S. direct investment involves an *exchange* of assets, which provides Europeans with the purchasing power to acquire *another* investment (including one in the United States if desired), and the only reason for the U.S. company to buy a European asset (and for the Europeans to sell it) is the expectation that the American firm can manage it more efficiently and profitably than its previous owner. Failure to do so will result in the American investor losing his investment—a by no means unheard of contingency—whereas if the investment succeeds it will strengthen the general competitiveness of the economy in which the investment has been made. Moreover, the host government will receive through taxes a large fraction (around half in most cases) of the additional profits. In short, a successful foreign investment is mutually advantageous, and the assumption that the foreign investor can capture the lion's share of the benefits is entirely unrealistic. While foreign investment does increase interdependence and thereby exerts a political influence, this influence runs both ways—since the investor has given a hostage to fortune and needs to cultivate good relations with the host government and to help protect it against external aggression if his investment is not to be lost.

EMILE BENOIT
Columbia University

The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897-1912 *by Paul A. Varg. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1968.—184 pp. $6.00.*

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The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 *by Bradford Perkins. New York, Atheneum, 1968.—viii, 341 pp. $7.95.*

The two books under review consider aspects of the foreign policy of the United States at the turn of the century and for a decade or so thereafter and are a part of a rapidly increasing store of scholarly works on this important era. It is, of course, a fascinating period. For one thing, many of the troubles and arrangements of our present day date back to the *fin de siècle*, as Americans then liked to describe this time. For another, it is a richly nostalgic period, for it is within the memory of men still living, and yet if compared with the present day —when Americans have been to the moon and MIRV missiles are being emplaced—it seems light years away from today's concerns.

These books by Professors Varg and Perkins each make clear some of the forces which have produced our present international state of affairs. Varg points out that it was at the turn of the twentieth century that the United States government, and to a large extent the American people, began to take too much interest in China, seeing in the China trade a great assistance to the lagging American economy. As he relates, the China trade turned out to be a myth. The China market was "circumscribed by inaccessibility to the interior, by aversion to western style products, by poverty, and by an unfavorable [Chinese] balance of international payments." By 1914, American business interests in China amounted to $49,300,000, or 3.1 per cent of the total of foreign investment in China. This study of the making of a myth may depend a bit too much on a few magazines, their articles and editorials, but it makes its point clearly and irrefutably.

Bradford Perkins's Commonwealth Fund lectures of 1965, enlarged and embellished in this new volume which he felicitously entitles *The Great Rapprochement*, in distinction to an earlier book considering the period 1795-1805 which he entitled *The First Rapprochement*, deals with the time when the British realized the need for American friendship and, for the most part, astutely and carefully, with full understanding of what they were doing, proceeded to concede the hegemony of the United States in the Western hemisphere and sought elsewhere in the world, even in China, to avoid clashes or confrontations or uneasy situations which might look, ever so obliquely, toward war. The great *rapprochement* proved especially successful and easy during the period after 1905 when the Liberals were in power, with Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office and Lord Bryce as am-

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bassador in Washington. Grey, according to the American ambassador in London during the Wilson administration, Walter Hines Page, would have made a good American with the use of very little sandpaper. Despite bullying by the Americans, and an occasional American edginess over small matters which was explainable (so the British thought) because of the country's late rise to world prominence and its lack of familiarity with large diplomatic issues, by 1914, this most important British diplomacy of the era—virtually an Anglo-American entente—had been arranged. Perkins has written with admirable research and literary power. His newest book is a delight to read.

ROBERT H. FERRELL
Indiana University

Hawaii: Reciprocity or Annexation *by Merze Tate. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1968.—xiv, 303 pp. $8.50.*

This book is mainly about the U.S.-Hawaii Reciprocity Treaty (convention) of 1875. As Tate clearly shows, the treaty was largely responsible for the late nineteenth-century economic development of Hawaii and for binding Hawaii closely to the United States to pave the way for annexation in 1898.

In the last few years two of the best studies of the treaty ever made have appeared, both comprehensive and fully documented. One is the present study by Tate. The other is in the third volume of Ralph S. Kuykendall's monumental *Hawaiian Kingdom* (Honolulu, 1967). In his well-balanced general history, Kuykendall devotes over two hundred pages (almost a third of the last volume) to the reciprocity treaty. Both studies agree on the economic importance of the treaty to Hawaii and on its political importance to the United States. Together, these studies give us the clearest picture yet of this remarkable treaty.

Tate sets the stage by tracing the rise of U.S. influence in Hawaii during the nineteenth century. First came Yankee traders and Boston missionaries. Americans dominated the Pacific whaling trade centered in Hawaii as a provisioning station. As sugar replaced whaling after the mid-nineteenth century, that, too, was dominated by Americans. They solved most of the problems of the sugar industry except that of a market. The United States seemed to be the best market, but a high tariff wall sealed it off. Throughout the third quarter of the century Hawaiian sugar interests tried to solve this problem by a reciprocity treaty.

In 1875, partly as a result of Hawaiian King Kalakaua's visit to

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the United States, the long sought treaty was obtained. It went into effect the next year and produced a most spectacular economic boom. Hawaiian planters got two cents a pound more for their sugar, almost the entire benefit of the tariff remission, because the price of sugar was determined by the world market.

After some delay, the treaty was renewed in 1887 with a highly controversial amendment giving the United States the right to develop Pearl Harbor (a right not exercised until after annexation). In 1890 the McKinley Tariff nullified the effect of reciprocity by restoring the tariff on sugar and giving U.S. growers a bounty of two cents a pound. This was an economic disaster to Hawaii. The resulting depression accelerated an annexation movement in the islands and was partly responsible for the revolution of 1893, which put the Hawaiian government firmly in the hands of annexationists, although annexation was not achieved until 1898. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 restored the benefits of reciprocity to Hawaii and continued them until annexation.

Tate points out that in the United States both negotiation and renewal of the reciprocity treaty were dictated by political rather than commerical considerations. The United States appreciated the importance of the islands as a hub of Pacific transport and trade, but also felt they were important for strategic reasons including protection of the West Coast. The treaty, says Tate (p. 117), "prevented any European power from gaining a political foothold in Hawaii, and—from the commercial point of view—rendered the archipelago a significant appendage of the United States."

JACOB ADLER
University of Hawaii

Heard Round the World: The Impact Abroad of the Civil War *edited by Harold Hyman. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. —xv, 326, vi pp. $7.95.*

In *Heard Round the World*, six seasoned historians discuss the "impact" of the American Civil War upon Great Britain (H. C. Allen), France (David Pinkney), the Germanic states of Central Europe (John Hawgood), Russia (Hans Rogger), Canada (John A. Williams), and Latin America (Harry Bernstein). Altogether the various essays maintain a superior standard. All of them offer vigorous, expert, and effective portrayals of the diverse contexts which conditioned the reactions in six different societies to the war in America.

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Overall, however, it is striking that only H. C. Allen discusses the theory involved in any attempt to analyze the impact of a given factor in one country (the Civil War in America) upon the thought, the life, or the public policy of another country. Glib assumptions are easy, such as John Lothrop Motley's rhetorical query in 1868, "Who can doubt that the English household suffrage bill [the Reform Bill of 1867] is the fruit of the Appomattox appletree?" The answer, as Allen shows, would seem to be: almost anyone who investigates. But even Allen does more to call attention to the methodological problem than to solve it, and one might easily generalize the observation quoted by Williams from D. G. Creighton, that the relationship between the Civil War in the United States and the process of confederation in Canada is "important, complex, imprecise, and ambiguous."

Much of the ambiguity, as each essayist shows in his own way, arises from the fact that men in various countries tended to treat the war in America as a kind of screen on which they could project the internal issues which concerned them. Thus David McRae could affirm in 1870 that "on those battlefields of Virginia British conservatism and British liberalism fought by proxy." David Pinkney can say that in France, "praise of Lincoln often veiled an attack on the Emperor"; Hans Rogger can observe that, in Russia, discussion of the war was often "but a pretext for the discussion of Russian issues by circumspection and indirection."

These impulses of people overseas to see the war as a mirror for the reflection of their own struggles complicates the whole question of influence. What, to begin with, does one mean by the impact of the Civil War? Does it include, for instance, all the immeasurable, long-range consequences of the fact that the United States became a consolidated nation and the potential colossus of the twentieth century? Or does it mean the opinions which the war evoked from the intelligentsia? Or something in between? Does the "impact of the war" mean the effect of the whole sectional struggle or only of the four years of combat? The essayists in this volume share no common criterion, and perhaps there is no reason why they should. In dealing with specific matters, it is easy for them to show specific results, such as the effect of the war upon the French textile industry or, as Williams brilliantly demonstrates, upon the process of confederation in Canada. But the larger question of impact is more difficult partly because historians look to contemporary observers to provide their evidence; yet the onlookers could not evaluate the impact because all major wars have consequences that are unforeseen and unperceived by the participants and the onlookers. For this reason, *Heard Round*

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the World contributes many brilliant insights, such as Rogger's remarkable demonstration of the Russians' prescient recognition of the futility of emancipation without equality and Allen's careful analysis of the influence of American developments upon the Reform Bill of 1867. But the six essays, between them, do more to illustrate the problem of evaluating the effects of a major war than to achieve any systematic means for solving the problem.

DAVID M. POTTER
Stanford University

Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom *by James MacGregor Burns. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970.—xiv, 722 pp. $10.00.*

This long-awaited sequel to *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York, 1956) lives up fully to our expectations. With the same fine combination of compelling narrative and incisive analysis, James MacGregor Burns provides a detailed, sophisticated, and generally convincing portrait of FDR as war leader. Burns deals with both domestic and foreign affairs, ranging from such sensitive topics as the relocation of Japanese-Americans to the intricacies of coalition diplomacy. He always keeps Roosevelt in sharp focus, showing him dealing with the rebellious leaders of Congress, smoothing over the ruffled feelings of Churchill or Chiang Kai-shek, and carrying out his duties as commander-in-chief with zest and enthusiasm, despite growing fatigue and dangerous hypertension.

In his earlier book, Burns pictured Roosevelt more as a fox than a lion, a skillful politician who seized upon the opportunities provided by the depression to carry out a bold program of recovery and reform without making any fundamental changes in political or social institutions. The result, he concluded, was short-term success for the New Deal but long-term failure for the reform impulse in America. Burns offers a variation of this judgment in his analysis of Roosevelt's wartime leadership. In the short-run, FDR performed brilliantly. He gave wise guidance to the military, notably in authorizing the North African campaign and in pursuing an Atlantic First strategy; he unified the nation by proclaiming a policy of unconditional surrender; and he gave life to a wartime coalition that stretched from Stalin's nearly paranoid suspicions to Chiang Kai-shek's proud but feeble claims to great-power status for China. As a war leader, Roosevelt was a superb soldier of freedom. But Burns maintains that Roosevelt paid a tragic price for these successes. His neglect of prob-

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lems raised by the wartime migrations of American Negroes contributed to the burning ghettoes of the 1960s; his glib promises of a Second Front in 1942 and his refusal to share the atomic secret with Stalin confirmed Russian suspicions about the West and thus made the Cold War inevitable. Like the New Left revisionists, whom he largely ignores, Burns judges Roosevelt by the standards of 1970 and finds him wanting.

Although Burns seems unfair in demanding too much of Roosevelt, he does acknowledge his many positive contributions, such as his sincere and farsighted anticolonialism, his jaunty optimism which helped buoy up the nation in the dark days of 1942, and his call for an economic bill of rights in 1944 which anticipated virtually all postwar reform programs, from Harry Truman's Fair Deal down through Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. Perhaps most importantly, Burns rescues Roosevelt from the simplistic charge of being a political pragmatist who operated solely on the basis of expediency. Burns affirms the fundamental idealism which underlay all that Roosevelt did. According to Burns, the trouble was not that Roosevelt was insincere, but rather that he never succeeded in aligning his lofty ends with the limited means he felt compelled to pursue. The gap between dream and reality, between aspiration and achievement, remained his ultimate failing. Yet as Burns makes clear, it was a magnificent performance despite its flaws and one that establishes the greatness of Roosevelt's leadership in war as well as in peace.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas, Austin

Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism *by J. Joseph Huthmacher. New York, Atheneum, 1968.—xi, 362 pp. $10.00.*

Professor Huthmacher's book is a carefully researched and heavily documented biography of the political career of Robert F. Wagner, from its beginnings in the progressive era as a Tammany protege in the New York state legislature to its culmination in two decades of service between 1927 and 1947 in the United States Senate. Huthmacher's chief sources are the *Congressional Record*, newspapers, and periodicals. These are supplemented with material from Wagner's personal papers, from interviews with a variety of individuals who had known and worked with Wagner, and from oral history transcripts of reminiscences by other Wagner acquaintances collected by the Columbia oral history project. Although not

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an "authorized" biography, this is clearly an admiring one: the Senator is referred to throughout the book as "Bob," for, as a journalist is quoted, "those who know and admire him refer to him in this manner."

During the late 1920s and the 1930s, Robert Wagner was the chief northern liberal, Democratic member of the U.S. Senate. It is difficult to overestimate the powerful role Wagner played in transforming into specific legislation the ideas and principles that have come to be looked upon as the central core of the New Deal—sometimes with only lukewarm support or with indifference from the leading New Dealer, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Wagner was sponsor or primary moving force in the Senate of legislation that established major programs of public works construction, unemployment insurance, social security, and low-cost public housing and that guaranteed, first in Section 7(a) of the National Recovery Act and then in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the right of industrial workers to organize their own unions without hindrance from their employers and to bargain collectively for improvement of their conditions of work.

Wagner was never a colorful politician like his friend Alfred E. Smith or his Senate colleague Huey Long. The personal qualities that accounted for the success of Wagner's legislative career were his "patience and tenacity"; his "willingness to compromise, to take half a loaf rather than nothing, and just to 'get the camel's nose under the tent' as a beginning"; his ability to recruit first-rate men to do his detail work; and his readiness to stick by his basic convictions even when the costs were high.

Apparently because of the current interest in things urban, Huthmacher selected a title implying that he would discuss Wagner's career in the context of the rise of urban liberalism. In point of fact, almost no attempt is made to analyze urbanism *per se* or to explain what was distinctive in how "urban liberalism" in general or Robert Wagner in particular responded to the problems generated by big-city living. Wagner admittedly was one of the first senators raised in a late nineteenth-century big city (the Yorkville section of Manhattan in New York City). And the problems of industrial unemployment which were constantly at or near the focus of his attention were experienced primarily by persons who lived in cities.

But Wagner's chief interest was not urbanism as such. It was how to use legislative action to bring greater job opportunities and economic security, higher wages, and improved working conditions to workers and eventually to secure for them the same kind of acceptance and respectability as part of American society already enjoyed in the 1920s by businessmen and farmers. He considered his greatest achievement to have been helping to "enlarge the frontiers of social responsibility" so as to

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obligate the federal government to deal with those defects of the economy that led to cyclical unemployment and to insufficient purchasing power in the hands of workers to buy the products the American industrial plant was capable of producing.

Whatever its quality as descriptive biography, this is a disappointing book for the political scientist: it contains almost entirely straight chronological reporting, with little or no reflection on the data for what they say either about Congress as a policy-making body or about the course of American politics in general. Nevertheless, it is worth reading, given the paucity of existing legislative biographies of any quality.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College

The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century. *New York, International Publishers, 1968.—448 pp. $10.00.*

Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois was the first American Negro scholar to achieve international recognition. When he died, during the summer of 1963 on the day before the March on Washington, thousands of people respected him as the pioneer leader of black protest in America and the founder of the pan-African movement. Most white Americans who knew anything about him, however, were critical of what they considered to be the unpatriotic behavior of his old age. He had joined the Communist party in 1961, just before expatriating himself to Ghana in West Africa where he renounced his United States citizenship.

Du Bois knew that his own uniquely personal inner experiences, not a purely rational decision, shaped his political convictions and raised a query, "What has been my life and work and of what meaning to mankind?" Although he said that "time and posterity" must give the final answer, Du Bois also felt that "perhaps it is my duty to contribute whatever enlightenment I can," and admitted "this is the excuse for this writing which I call a Soliloquy." He warns that selective memory and strong convictions make objectivity impossible, but he pledges frankness and "honesty." However, his admiration for the USSR and China, leads to a kind of selective perception that a less sympathetic reviewer would assess as deliberate "dishonesty."

Fourteen of the twenty-three chapters provide fact, interpretation,

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and evaluative comment on the first eighty years of Du Bois's life —from 1868 to 1948. He discusses four career crises with a surprising degree of objectivity and charitableness toward people who frustrated his plans: (1) the termination of his professorship at Atlanta University in 1908 under pressure from Booker T. Washington's "Tuskegee Machine"; (2) his resignation from the board of the NAACP in 1934 when it objected to his espousal of what, today, we would call "Black Power" ideology; (3) his forced retirement in 1944 from Atlanta University to which he had returned—punishment this time for trying to blend Marxism and Black Nationalism in an action-research program; and, finally, (4) his dismissal from the NAACP, which had taken him back, when he supported Henry Wallace in the 1948 presidential campaign. Among these chapters is a frank and perceptive self-appraisal, "My Character" (chap. XVI).

There is no "charitableness," however, in the last four chapters which document a ten-year process of escalating alienation from the land of his birth. Here, Du Bois is bitter and indignant and heaps scorn and contempt upon what he conceived of, after he passed the age of eighty, as a corrupt, money-mad culture with a "war-mongering," arrogant, governmental elite in control of the society. When he chose to become chairman of the Peace Information Center in 1950 he was arrested and prosecuted as an "agent of a foreign principal."

Joining the United States Communist party was only a minor initiation rite in his "new birth." At heart Du Bois was pan-African —the final *rite de passage* was presided over by Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Du Bois's body lies buried there by the Gulf of Guinea among his new *black* friends.

This autobiography documents the devastating impact of the "Cold War" upon one sensitive black intellectual who always strove to participate in the mainstream as well as behind "The Veil" (his favorite symbol of the caste line). Du Bois drew so close to the Old Left that all of his basic criteria of relevance were shaped by it. Martin Luther King's movement is not even mentioned in the book. He did not live to evaluate Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael or to pass judgment upon Black Power. The New Left and the black militants (African or American) admire the pre-World War DuBois, but unlike the work of Frantz Fanon this book does not speak to their condition. The intellectual and personal crises faced by all black intellectuals, however, are highlighted in Du Bois's *apologia pro vita sua*. I suspect there is no American black man who has not, at some time, had fantasies about shaking the dust of racist America from his feet, and

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even the black bourgeoisie secretly admire Paul Robeson, Rap Brown, and the Black Muslims. Du Bois acted out in one long lifetime moods that most Negroes feel sometimes.

ST. CLAIR DRAKE
Stanford University

The Otis Family in Provincial and Revolutionary Massachusetts *by John J. Waters Jr. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virgina, 1968.—xi, 221 pp. $6.95.*

Political scientists concerned with processes of social and political development and change in underdeveloped or nonindustrialized societies in the contemporary world should find that John Waters's study of the Otis family in preindustrial colonial Massachusetts provides a stimulating and suggestive basis for comparisons with present-day societies. They will also find that Waters's reconstruction and analysis of the lives and careers of five successive generations of Otis men, beginning with John Otis I, born in England in 1581, and ending with Samuel Allyne Otis, who died in New England in 1814, is an outstanding example of the sophisticated and probing history being written today. This study of the Otises is designed "as an exploration in familial formation, influence, and power in provincial Massachusetts" and seeks to discover the central characteristics of "the Otises' life pattern" and to relate their particular patterns to the broader developments within New England political and social development. Through the study of a single family over time, Waters illuminates a remarkable range of issues which have immense importance for any study of social and political processes, past or present—the influence of demographic factors upon the growth and influence of families, the relationship of geographical and social mobility to the fortunes and the influence of individuals and of families, the impact of family structure and kinship connections upon the emergence and functioning of political leaders and of commercial entrepreneurs, the interactions between local and provincial politics and the methods whereby political influence and power are transmitted from generation to generation or fail to be transmitted successfully, the nature of factional politics and the methods by which power is achieved

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in such a political system, and the interrelationship between economic and political achievements of a family and the crises of politics and war. These themes, which form the complex picture which Waters has so perceptively drawn from a great variety of sources—both literary and nonliterary—are traced through the details of the lives and the actions of the Otises for more than a century and a half, thus providing a fascinating portrait of familial and political change as the local and provincial societies of colonial Massachusetts developed and altered during the course of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

Overall, the Otises are an outstanding example of a family which rose to prominence in Massachusetts over three generations, formed part of a complicated and powerful local and provincial political elite for two generations, and then, through the exigencies of revolution and war, lost the influence and power which had been achieved and nurtured so carefully during the colonial era. The early generations of Otises, both in England and in New England, were remarkable for their geographical mobility and their economic achievements, willing to move to new places to add to their land or their wealth, conscientiously accumulating the resources which later would provide the basis for the wealth and power of their children and grandchildren. The early generations thus conform to the pattern of fluidity and upward mobility characteristic of many New England families in the seventeenth century. Yet the experiences of the third and fourth generations, which settled and remained rooted to a particular locality, demonstrate the significance of immobility for men who achieved influence and power. In large measure, their influence rested upon the stability, the close integration, and the homogeneity of the local community for which they provided leadership. The generations of Otises which were to form "a most remarkable political dynasty" in the colony drew strength from their close connections with a town and a county, connections cemented by marriage and kinship and extending outward from these localities to include much of New England. As Waters notes, "If the study of the political structure of Barnstable County reveals anything it is a way of life, a set of values, a pattern of interests which connected father, son, and family." His probing analysis of the functioning of the extended family system—a system which bound the Otises as individuals into a self-conscious group of men who acted together for the interests of the larger Otis family whatever their individual occupations might be and which

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fostered the deference of sons to sustained paternal authority and control over their lives well into their years of adulthood, with profoundly important effects upon their political behavior and beliefs —constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of politics and the family in colonial Massachusetts. Indeed, the profound influence of the family upon the nature and the functioning of colonial politics has never been more forcefully or convincingly demonstrated. Equally impressive is John Waters's perceptive analysis of the personal and the psychological elements which lay beneath and gave shape to the political activities of some of the Otises (especially James Otis Jr.) during the revolutionary period. Waters's sensitivity to the varied elements of character and individual behavior, coupled with his acute understanding of the powerful influence of the extended family, combine to make his study of the Otises one of the most penetrating, and intriguing, studies which we have of families, politics, and social experience in early America.

PHILIP J. GREVEN JR.
Rutgers University

Congregational Commonwealth: Connecticut, 1636-1662 *by Mary Jeanne Anderson Jones. Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1968.—xiii, 233 pp. $7.95.*

Congregational Commonwealth is best compared to George Lee Haskins's *Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts.* Both books forgo a year-by-year-narrative of events in favor of an analysis of the structure of government. In the first chapter, Mary Jeanne Anderson Jones does recount the story of the move from England to Massachusetts Bay to Connecticut and in the last chapter talks about conflicts with Indians and with the Dutch and the campaign for a royal charter, but the heart of the book and the most valuable part in my estimation is the description of ecclesiastical and civil government and of the court system. Besides outlining the formal distribution of power, she illustrates how each branch of government worked and indicates its lines of growth. Her chapter on civil government, for example, shows the requirements for political participation tightening after 1640 and the authorities at the top assuming more power. Life in the wilderness seemingly required somewhat stricter controls than the founders initially anticipated. All this makes the work a useful book indeed.

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The title, *Congregational Commonwealth,* hints at the theme which ties the detailed analysis together. Following the lead of Perry Miller, she depicts Connecticut as a covenanted society whose religious convictions determined the form and purpose of its government. The commonwealth was Congregational in various ways. Its primary aim was to shelter the little churches where Puritans worshipped. It consciously slighted the king in legitimizing its authority, deriving its power from God. And it modeled its civil government after the pattern of the churches. In both, a limited electorate consented to the government and selected the rulers while a small aristocratic group held most of the power. Thinking of the common purposes of civil and religious leaders, Mrs. Jones says that "church and state were virtually synonymous."

Granted that the civil leaders were church members and genuinely devoted to the establishment of purified worship on the Connecticut, the thesis implied in the title can be overdrawn. Certainly it is an exaggeration to say church and state were synonymous. The Fundamental Orders did not require freemen or magistrates or town inhabitants to be church members, and the Connecticut clergy had less civil power, in church courts, for example, than their English counterparts. I am even doubtful that Congregational government was the pattern for the Fundamental Orders. Ideas of consent, contract, and of mingling democratic and aristocratic elements were commonplaces of English political thought. The founders of Connecticut moved confidently in erecting a state not because new forms of church government spurred them to innovate but because they followed familiar secular patterns. English manors and towns, Parliament, and above all the trading companies were ready-made models. It is just as likely that congregational government on its political side was an idealized version of civil government as that the influence went the other way. Without depreciating the faith of Connecticut's founders, more credit must be given to the totality of their English background than the idea of a Congregational commonwealth grants.

RICHARD L. BUSHMAN
Boston University

Participation and Democratic Theory *by Carole Pateman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.—122 pp. $4.95.*

After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society *by Robert A.*

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Dahl. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1970.—171 pp. $8.50.

Democracy in a Revolutionary Era: The Political Order Today *by Harvey Wheeler. Santa Barbara, Calif., The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1970.—viii, 216 pp. $2.25.*

If our human adventure ends with a thermonuclear bang, it may well be over the meaning of a word. Portions of the human race have been wiped out in the past over a fine semantic distinction. Now the whole human race may commit suicide over a word.

The word is *democracy*. We Americans have already been dying by the thousands, and killing by the hundreds of thousands, to make the world safe for our American concept of democracy. Our enemies seem no less committed to dying and killing for what they call *people's democracy*. If mutual crusades don't bring us all to doomsday, loss of faith in established democratic institutions, particularly if the greening young see no hope of participating in anything but anarchy or tribal communes, may do as well.

Yet as these three slim books make plain, there is no reason to despair. All of them in one fashion or another cut through the semantic confusion to show how individual freedom can meet the requirements of social order, however vast and complex and seemingly intractable are its new technological imperatives. Their answer holds regardless of prevailing *isms*—capitalism, socialism, communism. And they are neither more soft-headed nor more hard-nosed than James Madison when he argued that, with the federal principle, there need be no limit to "the capacity of mankind for self-government."

In *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Mrs. Pateman argues that it is through participation that such capacity can be realized. She chides a number of contemporary political theorists—Schumpeter, Berelson, Sartori, and Eckstein among others—for sneering at the "classical" theory of government by the people and for limiting democracy to freedom of choice among governing elites.

Mrs. Pateman does not say so, but this view, prevailing not only in academia but in Washington and in a thousand bureaucracies, is a major cause of contemporary revolt against the Establishment.

She denies that early democratic theorists were ever so naive as to believe that a nation could be governed by direct participation of all the people. A delegation of sovereignty to representatives is always assumed. But what Rousseau and John Stuart Mill were concerned with was not only government by consent but a participatory society, not only freedom

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from arbitrary power but enrichment of life. The fullest development of the participatory theory of democracy the author finds in the Guild Socialism of G.D.H. Cole.

She advances the useful notion that only as people share in decision making in their daily lives, particularly where they live and where they work, can they gain the self-confidence—she calls it the "sense of political efficacy"—to participate fully as citizens. And in the "workers' self-management" of Yugoslav enterprises she finds ground for a healthy optimism. Whatever the challenges of new technologies, men do have the capacity to govern themselves, given the opportunity through appropriate institutional devices.

Yale Professor Dahl was among the contemporary political theorists criticized by Mrs. Pateman for holding up our present imperfect representative democracies as the best we can expect. But in *After the Revolution?* he is no defender of the status quo. True, he does not admire Rousseau or the SDS. He sees little scope for participation in the vast complexities of the real world, where technical competence, administrative expertise, and executive decisiveness are needed. As his subtitle would indicate, he thinks of government as authority, rules, power of some over others. The essence of democracy, then, is political equality, that is, equality of opportunity to be part of the majority that makes the rules and selects the rulers.

Yet his lucid and witty analysis of the democratic dilemma—how to combine political equality with effective leadership—is far from an endorsement of the pluralistic "polyarchy" we now have. He sees inherited wealth and racial bias as denying the basic premise. He sees corporate bureaucracy, whether "private" or "public," as a mindless monster. He views megalopolis with horror.

His main title suggests that he has been stung by a student generation of infantile leftists who see nothing good in the present system and speak vaguely of revolution. Yet it may be that he has missed the substance of their complaint. His earlier analysis of the power structure of New Haven, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Conn., 1961), as the interplay of multiple individual and group interests, left little room for such simplistic concepts as "the Establishment" or "the System." But he may not appreciate how much tyranny lies in what many young people today consider the "rat race."

The world's daily work is little concerned with making rules or deciding who shall govern. If the appeal of democracy is to be not merely as a form of government but a "participatory society," then the young will not be satisfied with his slighting of the menace of managerial bureaucracy as a "crashing bore." He sees the administrative process as mere

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"delegated authority," necessarily hierarchical, necessarily "nondemocratic."

Yet, like Mrs. Pateman, he admires the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management of economic enterprises. And when he comes to an analysis of bigness, in a section called "The Democratic Leviathan," he introduces the concept of multiple federalism—"democratic systems constructed like Chinese boxes, the smaller nested in the larger"—as a means of preserving the direct democracy that is possible only in small groups. He proposes to break down the monstrous overgrown city into manageable units in which "Town Meeting democracy" and even "committee democracy"—the most participatory of all forms of democracy—can once more find expression. If this is possible in the running of a city, is it not applicable to the administrative process generally?

The urban crisis is, of course, of prime concern. If our big cities have become ungovernable, then our urban civilization needs no thermonuclear war to finish it off. And if democracy cannot make the leap from the New England village to megalopolis then it is already an anachronism.

Future historians may see the turbulence in the ghettos and on university campuses during the 1960s as indeed the beginning of a new democratic revolution. Because it is a revolt of the weak against centralized power, it cannot succeed by violent confrontation, but succeed it will because it must.

A city like New York is a crumbling empire, no longer governable, democratically or otherwise, from one City Hall. But "Town Meeting democracy" is not dead even there. In June 1970, Mayor Lindsay published "A Plan For Neighborhood Government For New York City," which aimed at decentralizing municipal administration into 62 "community planning districts"; six months later his office announced that representatives of "several thousand community organizations" had attended "hundreds" of meetings throughout the city to discuss the plan. If Mrs. Pateman and Professor Dahl are right, the way to save the big city may be to transform it into a federation of self-governing village communities.

Harvey Wheeler's concern is broader, but his conclusion is the same. It is not only the city that must be saved from choking to death, but the world that must be saved from blowing itself up, and in both cases the hope lies in new applications of the federal principle: the coordination of small units, functioning on a human scale, into a larger whole.

Professor Wheeler is one of the original senior fellows of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. He was co-author of *Fail Safe*, the story of the H-bomb that ran amok. His imagination is wide-ranging. His language is heavy but exciting: "Cybernation permits us to centralize

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and decentralize simultaneously," he says. "We are led to visualize the possibility of completely reorganizing the social order on the basis of the optimum unit of human culture rather than allowing life to be determined by the mindless forces of technology and industrialization."

He sees democracy, whether capitalist or socialist, as required by the new technology. But its past forms cannot cope with our new world community. National states, however refined their systems of representative democracy, cannot control the forces unleashed by science. Yet the new world order Wheeler sees as essential is suggested in only the most general terms, as are the new forms of democracy he anticipates in this turning point of human history. He calls for a spiritual and ideological federalism of multiple allegiances. But more significantly he calls for "a type of federalism based upon principles of association rather than upon principles of territorial autonomy." He refers, if only in passing, to the functional federalism of the Guild Socialists.

Wheeler is perhaps too much of a Technocrat and too much of an Olympian. But his book reinforces the optimism of the others here reviewed. The human species has almost infinite adaptability. Mankind assuredly does have the capacity for self-government. But learning is often a painful process. And there are no guarantees.

ALFRED M. BINGHAM
Salem, Connecticut

Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics *by Robert G. Dixon Jr. New York, Oxford University Press, 1968.—xviii, 654 pp. $12.50.*

Subtitles often convey more than titles, and this one is no exception. This book, which received the Woodrow Wilson Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published in 1968 on government, politics, or international affairs," is an exhaustive and excellent study of reapportionment in American law and politics in the 1960s.

Briefly, the main structure of the book grows out of the reapportionment cases and the legal issues they raise. In this sense the subtitle correctly puts "law" before "politics." After introductory chapters on the American philosophy and practice of representation, the author takes up the breakthrough in *Baker* v *Carr,* its immediate impact on lower courts and litigation in progress, the subsequent cases in 1963 and 1964 which spelled out the doctrine of numerical

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equality, the states' attempts to reapportion according to the new criteria, the major unresolved legal issues (e. g., questions of gerrymandering and weighted voting), and then the radiation of the doctrines outward to local government representation and to nonlegislative bodies.

If the adjective "solid" were not so tainted with connotations of plodding competence, one would use it here. The scholarship is thorough, complete, and well rounded; there is everywhere the aura of authority. The book will be a handbook for lawyers and litigants in the field, and it will tell scholars at least as much as they want to know of the legal and constitutional politics of reapportionment. The arguments and issues, the strategies in litigation, and the options open to the courts are analyzed and evaluated fully. No slippery assumptions, simplistic logic, or careless definitions pass the author's scrutiny. He does not hesitate to judge the judges, but his standards are fair and scholarly, and they reveal a healthy mix of legal and political sophistication.

And what of "politics"? It is represented here by the best of traditional political analysis. The litigation is set in a context of the philosophic issues of representation and democracy that underlie all the legal issues. Similarly, the grasp of political institutions and electoral and representation systems is also secure; for example, the treatment of what gerrymandering is and is not is one of the finest I have ever seen. If there is any disappointment in the book for the political scientist, it will very likely be in the scant treatment of reapportionment as a nonlegal issue. There is, for instance, little on the impact of reapportionment on legislatures, politics, or, public policy; there is also little on the political genesis of demands for reapportionment. One can only say that the book does not claim to deal with these questions. Its political analysis is of the politics of the reapportionment cases; its concern is to place the emergence of law into a political context.

In short, this book is a scholar's book in an era of non-books and pseudo-books. It will serve as a firm guide to the recent past and to the future development (especially the post-1970 development) of the law of reapportionment. It offers, too, a fine case study of constitution-making by the American judiciary. Finally, it offers an unobtrusive scholarly impatience with constitutional simplisms and intellectual untidyness—even in the highest judicial places.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

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The Influence of Federal Grants *by Martha Derthick. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.—vii, 285 pp. $8.50.*

"My central purpose is to analyze the grant-in-aid system as an instrument of federal influence": Martha Derthick's objective is unambiguously stated and clearly followed—a mark of first-class scholarly research that is often more clearly thought out than well expressed. She demonstrates her thesis with hard facts and easy prose, basing her observations on a series of five studies of the exercise of federal influence in the Massachusetts public assistance program. This program, however, does not illustrate federal influence as well as another might. The actual and potential constraints of federal grants are less visible in public assistance than in, for example, education, and intergovernmental impositions can be more readily identified from federal-city than federal-state programs because the political repercussions of any program are much greater within a city. Derthick herself recognizes the greater possibilities for exerting federal influence through the grant system in federal-urban programs when she notes that grants to local governments usually are allocated on the merits of an application, are of limited duration, and are distributed selectively. In contrast, grants to states are usually allocated by less specific, but fixed criteria (area, population), are continuous, and are distributed generally (that is, to all states). Caveats aside, the real point to be made is that federal grants do exert a major influence on the politics and policy of the political subsystems in which they operate. This point has often been categorically stated; Derthick, the first to take on the extremely intricate task of analyzing in depth the specific nature of this influence, thus presents a pioneering study of significant dimensions.

The main premise of *The Influence of Federal Grants* is that the grant system "entails the achievement of federal purposes by proxy"—that is, that the state becomes an agent of the federal government or, conversely, the federal government becomes an actor directly involved in state politics. To some extent, this has always been true by virtue of the specifically "enumerated" powers delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. It has also been increasingly the case because of liberal judicial interpretations of federal powers, as those held to be implied in the interstate commerce clause or in the Fourteenth Amendment. But what is seldom pointed out is that the grant system, while avoiding constitutional issues, similarly allows the federal government entree into a state's domain and permits it to set policy guidelines in subject areas ordinarily "reserved to the States."

Although all grants must be used for federally approved purposes, Derthick acutely points out that often the stipulations are so (intentional-

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ly) vague that federal approval is a minimal requirement, and federal "influence" therefore lessened. Compliance must be verifiable, which in many instances simply means a program cannot run directly *counter* to federal suggestions as these are interpreted by the states. Politically, if not legally, enforcement is a tricky matter. As Derthick says so well, conformance, while difficult to prove, is equally difficult to disprove. But there is perhaps a single more important consideration that controls for federal influence—"federal purposes" as reflected in grant policies are themselves influenced and shaped by skillful state and urban interest groups which lobby to represent the purposes of *their* governmental units in the initial federal legislation. The grant system thus reflects a mixture of purposes and preferences at the outset, rather than purely federal priorities.

The grant system also obscures the ultimate location of responsibility—whether the state or the federal government should be praised or blamed. Financial or political action or inaction can therefore be attributed to either "failing to take advantage of federal funds" or "failing to meet federal standards," depending on one's vantage point.

Without question, the federal government has come to have an increasingly great and more direct influence on state and local government, but how great is difficult to measure. Some changes of the past thirty years would probably have come about without federal intervention (the professionalization of the Massachusetts bureaucracy, for instance); others perhaps not. The most interesting influence of the federal grant system, however, lies in its testing of the adaptability and flexibility of "constitutional federalism" to changing relationships among city, state, and national levels of government and to the growth of vertical "relations of mutual support" between federal and state agencies administering the same program. Professor Derthick's analysis is comprehensive, skillful, and insightful. It should be only the beginning of a series of appraisals of the many and varied federal grant programs, especially since Congress is now considering a revenue-sharing program which would replace some of them. We need to know much more about the specific consequences of the present grant system before we embark on still another one.

SUZANNE FARKAS
New York University

The Enemies of the Poor *by James Graham. New York, Random House, 1970.—x, 308 pp. $7.95.*

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Rural Poverty and the Urban Crisis: A Strategy for Regional Development *by Niles M. Hansen. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1970.—xv, 352 pp. $12.50.*

The Poor Ye Need Not Have With You: Lessons from the War on Poverty *by Robert A. Levine. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1970.—viii, 262 pp. $7.95.*

Here are three quite different books about poverty, each illuminating separate aspects of a complex social problem. James Graham, a former member of Columbia's Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, has written a personal memoir of his legal and political struggles for and with the poor in New York, emphasizing how the churches and the unions, the lawyers and the social workers have failed the poor. Niles Hansen is concerned with how the economy and the government are failing the rural poor, and Robert Levine also draws on his experience as a top OEO official during the Johnson years to evaluate how OEO has failed (and helped) the poor nationally.

It is fitting to begin with the Hansen study, for the largest proportion of the poor are rural, and many urban poor are of rural origin, having been forced off the land by the industrialization of agriculture. The difficulties and pathologies they have encountered in the large cities—as well as the pastoral romanticism that remains strong among too many policy makers—have recently led to proposals for rural redevelopment to halt further emigration to the cities and perhaps to bring back some of the unwilling urbanites. Professor Hansen debunks this proposal, for good jobs are never going to be generated in these areas, and proposes instead the relocation of the poor to "medium-size growth centers," cities of 200,000 to 500,000 population which are economically more vital than the large cities to which the poor have been going.

Levine writes from a national perspective and proposes a tripartite program: a negative income tax for those who cannot work, a combination of job training and job creation for those who can, and community action to enable the poor to build institutions and political coalitions. Essentially, he calls for improving existing OEO programs, although he is, at times, quite critical of the present accomplishments of OEO. In a fascinating informal history of that agency, he points out, however, that OEO was never really intended to fight poverty except on a minimal scale and that, from the beginning, it was caught between two objectives—the reduction of poverty and the creation of more equal opportunity, particularly for racial minorities.

Graham's book is anecdotal and offers no explicit program for change.

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Like others who have worked with and on behalf of the poor, he is outraged by the unwillingness to act of professions and institutions supposedly concerned with the struggle against poverty; and like others who have worked at the grass-roots level, he sees how perfectly useful programs of the kind proposed by Hansen and Levine are aborted or sabotaged at the local level, as they are refracted through local power structures on their way down to the intended clients. And like most others in his role, he is therefore much impressed with community control and political organization by the poor.

All three books were published in 1970; presumably then, they were written in 1968 and 1969, and what strikes this reviewer, writing in 1971, is their optimistic tone about the future and their reluctance to see the powerful political obstacles to change. Hansen, an economist, has faith that the economic rationality of his proposals will be recognized; Levine, a planner, has his profession's faith that government programs will eventually get better, and even an epilogue on the Nixon administration's efforts to dismantle OEO ends on a hopeful note. Graham's faith is built on moral outrage; although *his* epilogue, like the rest of his book, is pessimistic, he does not really emphasize the structural factors that impel the professions and institutions he criticizes to act as they do.

The fact is, however, that the American economy works relatively well for about 75 per cent of the people (and really well for a quarter of them) but it does so by excluding or underpaying the remaining quarter in the various ways reported by all three authors, and the political institutions are sufficiently dependent on and responsive to the economy to prevent the excluded quarter from obtaining a larger share of the total pie. Hansen's criticism that existing programs serve places rather than people, though accurate, fails to note that the people who control these places have the power to attract government aid and to keep it away from the rest. Similarly, Levine's belief that once government arrives at the correct programs, progress is sure to come fails to recall that federal schemes for the poor which are good in principle are usually underfunded in practice. The Nixon Family Assistance Plan which evoked his optimism was killed by the conservatives in the last Congress and if passed by the new one, may saddle us with a yet lower poverty line for years to come. Only James Graham's book reports on the unwillingness of the affluent to let the poor into the system, but perhaps because he has spent so much time amidst the trees, even he does not see the forest in which the war against poverty and inequality is being lost.

HERBERT J. GANS
Joint Center for Urban Studies
Cambridge, Mass.

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The Service Economy *by Victor R. Fuchs assisted by Irving F. Leveson. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968. —xxviii, 280 pp. $10.00.*

The service sector of the economy is perhaps the most neglected of its major components. Yet, if the future is a mirror of the past, before long this sector may threaten to swallow the bulk of our labor force. Between 1947 and 1967, the total level of employment in the United States rose some 30 per cent. Virtually the entire net increase took place in the service sector of the economy. This is a continuation of a trend that has characterized our productive system for at least half a century. By 1967 over 55 per cent of the nation's labor force was employed in the service sector.

These facts and other fascinating materials are reported in detail in Professor Fuchs's careful and workmanlike little volume. He describes with great thoroughness the growth of the service sector, the record of its performance in productivity, the patterns of inter- and intrasectional wage differences, and the cyclical behavior of this portion of the economy. In many of these characteristics the services differ widely from the remainder of the economy, though dispersion within the sector is also sometimes very wide.

For example, hourly earnings in industry are some 17 per cent higher than in the services. Moreover, hourly earnings in well over half the service activities studied were below what might have been "expected" after standardization for age, sex, color, and education. Yet brokers, physicians, and lawyers "all have high expected earnings but actual earnings far exceed expected" (p. 139).

The basic difficulty in gathering data about the service sector is the fact that its product is, by definition, intangible. For that reason it is all too easy to measure its output by means of the quantity of labor it utilizes. But that assumes away any possibility of an increase in the productivity of labor in terms of the quantity or the quality of its products. The fact is, however, that almost everywhere we are able to measure the output of a service industry directly, labor productivity turns out to have grown, albeit more slowly than it did in manufacturing.

Moreover, while relative employment in the services has risen dramatically, as has just been noted, the share of service output, whether measured in current or in constant dollars, has remained virtually unchanged in the postwar period. Thus the transfer of labor from manufacturing to the services is apparently not a consequence of shifting final demands, but of sectoral differences in productivity growth.

The author documents and describes these developments with care. He is aware of the pitfalls in the estimation of his figures and in general goes

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as far as can reasonably be expected in avoiding them. He has brought together a body of fascinating and important materials and has emphasized the most significant among them. If any criticism is to be raised against the author it relates to his unwillingness, following the tradition of the National Bureau of Economic Research, to undertake a theoretical analysis of the facts he has assembled. A bit of model building would have pulled his observations together, showed their interrelation, and indicated that they are all to a considerable extent continuing manifestations of the services' underlying technology, rather than a set of fortuitous developments which would seem as likely as not to reverse themselves in the future.

WILLIAM J. BAUMOL
Princeton University

The Academic Revolution *by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968.—xvii, 580 pp. $10.00.*

Jencks and Riesman title their book *The Academic Revolution*. Why? They suggest that higher education has been taken over by the academicians. The standards and expectations of the graduate school departments of liberal arts are now *the* criteria of academic respectability as well as the goals for most colleges. The academic revolution is further defined by or related to concepts and terms like professionalism, academic excellence, specialization, universalism, meritocracy, egalitarianism, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, secularism, modernism, and research-ism. The book makes a detailed, at times tedious, but always searching historical-sociological critique of how the academic revolution has evolved and how it is homogeneizing our formerly pluralistic educational system. In their analysis, the authors patiently and dispassionately examine many of the traditional myths that abound in education. For example, they debunk the myth that our educational system really provides unlimited opportunities for social mobility, that it produces a more egalitarian society, that family income has been a singularly important limitation to higher education for many, that any significant university reform will be mounted by academicians themselves, that community colleges are providing a different or effective education for the non-four-year-college-bound student, and so on.

In several polemical and blunt chapters, the authors evaluate the effectiveness of sex-segregated, Protestant, Catholic, and Negro colleges.

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Their assessments generally are very dismal and, in the case of Negro colleges, devastating. Their prognoses are gloomy. They find few reasons to justify the continuation of these colleges. The academic revolution has so pervaded their ethos that few of them now provide any meaningfully vigorous alternative vision to a narrowly defined academic excellence, a goal these colleges are not now and will not be able to achieve in the future. Somewhat plaintively, they urge such schools to redefine their goals—for example, the Catholic colleges might seek to synthesize academic professionalism with a concern "for questions of ultimate social and moral importance" (p. 405)—but such pallid suggestions are not very convincing compared to the realities of professionalism and secularization that apparently now describe such schools.

What stance do the authors take toward the academic revolution? Although accepting the gains the revolution brought—like more knowledgeable students, the increased quality of faculty, the "triumph of academic ideals" (p. 512), and the dominance of American graduate schools among the world's universities—the authors remain troubled by the monolithic, commanding narrowness of the academician's standards and way of life. Implied in their strictures about departmental rigidities, a professionalization that isolates a person's work from his personal life, the devaluation of experience to emphasize only one "single mode of learning and knowing" (p. 521), the usurpation of a problem by a discipline-oriented attitude, the separation of the academic from moral and political choices, among other criticisms, is the concern that the academician is not an appropriate "exemplar of satisfying life and work" (p. 541) for most students and that the academic environment is not a humane or integrative human world in which to be.

The authors are unable to discover any potential significant counter force that might challenge or moderate the direction of the academic revolution. Although they make suggestions about how to reform graduate education, they remain basically (realistically?) pessimistic that any significant change is likely.

The power of the book is its scholarly mastery of the enormously complex, seemingly inexhaustible chaos that has been and is the American educational scene. The authors have judiciously abstracted out of such detail meaningful and general trends and provided an incomparable overview of the many different facets of higher education. In view of the prodigious effort that so obviously marks the book, it may be uncharitable to query the authors about other issues. For example, to what extent is the academic revolution responsible for the growing student revolt, anti-intellectualism, and drug use? To what extent has the supplantation of human by academic excellence in our secondary schools alienated in-

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creasing numbers of students from the educational system? Have not the authors underestimated the "security" of the academician, given increasing student attacks on "departmentalism," objectivity, and impersonalism and sterility? Does the growing keen interest by leading educators in humanistic education and growth centers like Esalen as well as in certain aspects of the underground suggest the beginning of a counterrevolution to the excesses of the academic revolution? To what extent is the psychology of most men congruent with the model of "academic" man? As the outline of the Orwellian world of 1984 emerges more clearly, what kind of education will a youth need to keep him in touch with his own humanity? The book is long on acute historical description and analysis—short on vision and, hence, inspiration.

DOUGLAS HEATH
Haverford College

Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Professor Michael Oakeshott on the Occasion of His Retirement *edited by Preston King and B. C. Parekh. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968. —vii, 424 pp. $11.50.*

Oakeshott's own remark, about his theory of historical understanding, that it achieves, at best, "a peculiarly tentative and intermediate kind of intelligibility" might not unjustly be extended by a critic to apply to Oakeshott's work as a whole. It could also be extended to cover a good many of the essays in this collection, though not all of them, for not all of them are Oakeshottian in tone. It does not apply to those essays which are directly or indirectly *about* some part of Oakeshott's work, e.g. Walsh's and Dray's, which, although sympathetic, are sharp and exact criticisms of Oakeshott's theory of history, or Pocock's on "Time, Institutions and Understanding," which, starting from Oakeshott's concept of a tradition, goes so far beyond it as to show incidentally how inadequate it is. Nor does it apply to Wolin's "Paradigms and Political Theories," which will almost certainly turn out to be the most influential essay in the whole book (and which has virtually no relation to Oakeshott), or to Goldsmith's somewhat contrived critique of three interpretations of Hobbes (none of them Oakeshott's).

But most of the essays are, as is fitting, more or less Oakeshottian in temper. That means, among other things, that for the most part they move at a high level of generality and of abstraction and are built by making fine distinctions. However much the spirit of Burke may be thought to

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have descended on the Oakeshottians, they cannot be said to have inherited his distaste for metaphysical distinctions. The level of generality and abstraction is indicated by the sort of questions to which many of the essays address themselves. Thus, for instance, Greenleaf is concerned to show unsuspected similarities between philosophical idealism and modern linguistic philosophy as two manners of thinking about things political; Minogue explores the relation between revolution and tradition; Parekh comes at "the nature of political philosophy" by drawing distinctions between philosophical thinking about politics and (1) all other kinds of thinking about politics (theological, scientific, ideological, ethical, utopian, sociological, etc.) and (2) all other kinds of philosophical thinking; Coleman analyzes the relation between reason, tradition, and unintended consequences.

All of this is of value, although some readers will find so much abstraction indigestible. The editors pertinently remark that the essays "are not intended to be read in sequence, but according to the mood and inclination of the reader." They should be so read, not so much for the reason the editors give—"that this volume does not express a single coherent argument"—as for another reason—that any volume of essays in honor of Oakeshott would be out of character if most of the essays did not depend for their effectiveness on mood and inclination. A critic might add that no reader, whatever his inclination, should attempt to read the whole volume at once. It is a volume to be savored as much for its various authors' *obiter dicta* as for anything else. Its contributors comprise a galaxy of established and new scholars in political theory, from United States (four), United Kingdom (seven), and other (two) universities. What they have in common, beyond an appreciation of Oakeshott's contribution to political theory, is a conviction of the importance and the autonomy of nonbehavioral political theory. Between them, they make a very strong case: the weight of the evidence, and its various marshallings, are cumulatively most impressive.

C. B. Macpherson
University of Toronto

The Political Philosophy of Spinoza *by Robert J. McShea. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.—x, 214 pp. $7.50.*

Dr. McShea has produced another sound, Columbia-style study of a major political thinker. His analysis and commentary are spare, scrupulous, and occasionally ironical: he likes his subject and makes us like even the

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austere Spinoza. Recognizing Spinoza's extraordinary quality as a political thinker as well as the fact that Spinoza's political thought was in every sense dependent upon his metaphysics and ethics, Mr. McShea has nonetheless chosen to crack the hard, close-grained block of Spinoza's thought with the wedge of political philosophy. His instrument is very good indeed: by his stern concentration on things political, the author manages to say a great deal about Spinoza's metaphysics and (what he recognizes as still more important) his ethical system. Introductory chapters on Spinoza's life and works and the historical conditions under which Spinoza lived prepare readers for the short but acute chapters on "The Metaphysics," "Human Nature," "Man in Society," and "Subjects and Hero-founders." The next chapters, on constitutional proposals, on the state, on Spinoza's relation to Hobbes's thought, and on obligation, are the meat of the book; in a chapter called "Applications" and in the conclusion, McShea himself emerges to comment on dilemmas, cruxes, and the occasional inconsistencies in his subject's formulations.

People who write on this philosopher tend to revere him, for right and wrong reasons—and to praise him at the expense of Hobbes. McShea no less than others admires Spinoza and makes a case, particularly strong in his chapter on Hobbes, for the appeal of Spinoza's grim idealism and idiosyncratic realism. Devotees of Spinoza tend to shortchange Hobbes; even Mr. McShea, who grants Hobbes much, suggests that, next to the rigorous systematics of his hero, Hobbes is a fairly loose and incoherent thinker. In Spinoza's treatment of obligation, which McShea regards as the crucial concept in seventeenth-century political thought, he finds the only serious anomaly, or even lapse, in Spinoza's consistency (p. 189). In his last chapter, the author makes the extremely interesting point that in Spinoza's whole system—of ethics, psychology, politics, Uncle Tom Cobleigh and all—he offers a laicized, politicized Calvinism. Indeed, the Spinoza of this book is a major revisionist of traditions, a man writing from well within the idioms and commonly received notions of Western thought and expression, who managed to transcend—some might say, to subvert—them; a man who, in addition, offered in his philosophy the most important critiques up to then of Machiavelli, Descartes, and Hobbes—perhaps, indeed, the most important critiques of these figures ever written by anyone. Like Professor Goldsmith on Hobbes, Professor McShea on Spinoza cannot leave "science" alone; he attributes, I think, more system to seventeenth-century science than it actually had. Newton aside, it can be said that the greatest system builders in any field of learning in the seventeenth century are Hobbes and Spinoza and that their work offered "science" as valuable models of consistency as ever "science" offered them. McShea is quite right, however, in perceiving that

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Hobbes's human beings, more or less identical units in a chaotic natural world, have none of the altruistic drive, the "rational" social impetus, of Spinoza's human beings, bent upon the construction of some kind of mutually tolerable society. The radical individualism which, McShea argues, Spinoza attributes to each man argues also for man's power over himself, his autonomy over his irrational and therefore erroneous understanding. The anomalies of Spinoza's "freedom" are not shirked in this book; almost every chapter deals with some aspect of that crucial and (I think) unresolved problem.

The book is, like Spinoza's, clear but not easy. There are historical assumptions which seem to me glibly made and a familiar but annoying trust that there are radical differences between "medieval" and "modern" thoughts or even bodies of thought. To complain about such matters is to stress trivial points: the single important fact about this book is that it gives an analysis at once honest and sophisticated of a major political thinker usually scanted in our pedagogic tradition. The terms of this analysis require careful attention: perhaps Spinoza will not appear as modern, or as proof against error, to some readers as he seems to McShea, but he ought to seem just as important.

ROSALIE L. COLIE
Brown University

Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory *by Judith N. Shklar. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969.—viii, 245 pp. $8.50.*

While acknowledging debts to other studies, Dr. Shklar takes special note of the writings of Jouvenel and Starobinski: "To put these two together seemed in itself to justify a new book on Rousseau" (p. 231). Accordingly, we are shown that Rousseau's analyses of the incorrigible inequality, disorder, and hypocrisy of modern civilization are the denunciations of a helpless victim driven by "personal imagination and by a profound need for self-revelation and self-vindication" (p. 2). He offers two unavailable and fragile utopias to express this unmitigated contempt; both the Spartan city and the family of the Golden Age, because of their egalitarianism, portray whole men whose "psychic needs for inner unity and social simplicity" (p. 5) are fulfilled. The former embodies the citizen's self-repression: a stern military-civic ethos of virtue sustains a rule of impersonal law as the *moi humaine* is crushed by the *moi commun*. The competing utopia embodies man's self-expression: natural feelings of

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spontaneity and mutual affection are characteristic of rustic simplicity, in contrast to the Spartan city which is "built on the destruction of the family and of all its emotional and social gratifications" (p. 21).

The most interesting aspects of this study are the elaborations of Rousseau's utopianism, especially several tantalizing comparisons between the *Discourse on Inequality* and *Emile*, a brilliantly versatile analysis of Rousseau's moral psychology of oppressive inequality and distrust of romantic genius, and some original insights into the last three parts of *La Nouvelle Héloise*. The entire study, however, has a patchy quality, in spite of the assertion that Rousseau's writings constitute a profound and compact unity. Although familial and civic duties can conflict, the two utopias are not so sharply distinguishable. Rousseau insists that the good man alone makes a virtuous citizen, that those virtuous sentiments essential to the "great family" of the state must be cultivated first in the "small fatherland" of the family. And Rousseau's most extensive definition of civic virtue appears in *Emile*, where Rousseau also criticizes Plato for the civic promiscuity and the abolition of the family in his *Republic*. Perhaps, therefore, Rousseau's Corsican proposal is not torn between the ideas of a Swiss canton and a Spartan republic. A fitting place can be found for the village of united families and their common activities, and personal conscience is not an alternative to an equally self-fulfilling civic virtue: Rousseau does claim in a letter to his French publisher that the *Social Contract* is a "kind of appendix" to *Emile* and that the two writings "together form a single whole." Similarly, Rousseau's egalitarianism and apparent recourse to the despotic authority of god-like "soul-surgeons" like Wolmar (p. 134) remains puzzling. That personal rule by a father or legislator is temporary and curative or that authority is now somehow opposed only to equality and not to liberty begs the question. To add that Rousseau is "torn all his life between an urge for perfect freedom and a longing for submission" and "hated inequality [but] did not want equality either" (pp. 130, 131) further clouds difficult issues. Indeed, the assumption that Rousseau is "always . . . concerned with his own inner life, the needs of his own self" (p. 121) appears to impede presentation of his political thought. Are the ideas and often rigorous arguments of his political thought merely a series of unrelated metaphors in a continuous exercise of effusive self-portraiture, the organizing images in a "dramatic morality play" (p. 183) which results from carrying a personal moral psychology into politics? Do the concepts of popular sovereignty, body politic, general will, and public happiness personify inner rages? As Lord Eduard personifies English freedom?

Rousseau's letters and autobiographical writings undoubtedly shed light on his theory. However, a study that never loses sight of the vola-

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tile complexity of Rousseau's personality, even a study blessedly free of psychoanalytical jargon, is not apt to provide that sustained understanding of even single writings upon which the unity and disunity, and therefore the very meaning, of Rousseau's theory depend.

STEPHEN ELLENBURG
Mount Holyoke College

Rousseau's Social Contract *by Lester G. Crocker. Cleveland, O., Case Western Reserve University Press, 1968.—xiv, 212 pp. $6.95.*

In spite of its title, only one chapter of this book deals with Rousseau's most celebrated work and then only with its first two parts. Crocker's real concern is to demonstrate that Rousseau was generally a totalitarian thinker. The evidence for this in the *Social Contract* is its denial of the theory of natural rights as prior to society. To be sure, Rousseau did think that men's social rights and duties were created by positive law, but so did John Stuart Mill and many later thinkers of the liberal tradition. Again, the theory of sovereignty, whether popular or not, is not a totalitarian notion. It merely assumes that there must be a single ultimate source of legal validity in any political society. Crocker then turns to the general will as a "metaphysical intrusion" into politics. What is meant by metaphysical in this context is not clear, but it seems to refer to the general will as the "higher," rather than the actual, will of a people. It is not, however, this Kantian imputation, but the constricting civic education which generates this will that Crocker finds so objectionable. And, indeed, the Legislator, no less than Emile's tutor and M. Wolmar, all molders of men, are disturbing figures, who do reveal an authoritarian pessimism in Rousseau's thought. It is not true, however, that Rousseau saw his Plutarchian legislator-founder of republics as a magistrate, nor did he ever suggest that he be succeeded by a governing "elite," as Crocker claims. He specifically rejects these possibilities, and if Crocker had chosen to discuss the third part of the *Social Contract*, he might have recognized how deeply Rousseau feared all governments precisely because they tend to become oppressive elites.

Though there is no point in arguing away the manipulative rigors of Rousseau's scheme, one should, however, consider the arguments he presents in its favor. This Crocker never does. He simply insists that Rousseau shared Helvetius' extreme environmentalism and deduced

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from it a system of total social control. This ignores Rousseau's expressed rejection of Helvetius' materialist psychology and also the fact that the latter's *De l'homme*, with its famous "education can do everything," was a massive attack on *Emile*. What Rousseau did claim was that in *any* society men's opinions and institutions reflect their mores and that competitive and inegalitarian values are far more harmful to the majority of simple people than an egalitarian and static ethos. That this end, and the means to it, are incompatible with what Crocker calls an "open" and "pluralistic" society is true enough, but that does not render it totalitarian. Nor is it clear in what sense Rousseau's plan for keeping Corsica rustic can be termed "state capitalism." Indeed, Crocker recognizes all the differences between Rousseau and the totalitarians of our time, even when he exploits these analogies. For ultimately Rousseau's totalitarianism is not, for him, a matter of doctrine, but of personality. Rousseau is diagnosed as "obsessionist," "fanaticist," "paranoid," and generally "authoritarian." As such he is a "type," rather than a specific thinker. To illuminate this notion Crocker proceeds to a quick rehash of three modern "utopias," those by Huxley, Orwell, and Skinner, which are said to reveal social visions analogous to Rousseau's and, as such, are taken to be manifestations of this archetypal mentality. If this sort of treatment does not perhaps tell us much about Rousseau it is, nevertheless, a profound tribute to him. Few writers can arouse such intense feelings of animosity in their readers two hundred years after their death.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR
Harvard University

World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts *by Linda B. Miller. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967.—vii, 234 pp. $6.50.*

This is a timely study, coming when civil wars are increasingly engaging the attention of scholars. Traditional international law adopts an ambivalent approach: prohibiting outside intervention in civil wars but permitting it in a variety of other cases. In recent literature, doctrinally, collective intervention by international organizations is justified. In this book the author explores new ground by undertaking a detailed study of the experience of the United Nations with the various situations of local disorder brought before it during the past two decades in order

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to bring to light the complexities involved in the so-called "internal" conflicts and the possible and preferred responses of the organization to similar situations that might come before it during the next two or three decades. Three types of situations are studied: anticolonial conflicts (Indonesia, Algeria, and Angola), conflicts between rival factions within states on issues pertaining to nation building (the Congo, Cyprus, and the Dominican Republic), and conflicts in which an outside power is actually or allegedly a principal or significant participant (Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Lebanon, Yemen, Laos, and Vietnam). After analyzing the United Nations treatment of these situations, the author points out that the organization was called upon to deal with something more than a local disorder. Some situations caused turmoil having international ramifications and lasting for some time. Others demanded of the organization assistance in evolving political solutions to tangled issues. In some others, the organization was confronted with the task of containing internal violence and also preventing outside intervention. The response of the organization has been characterized by limited means and limited achievements. The members have been influenced more by political than by legal considerations in the choice of procedures to meet the situations. The chief functions performed by the organization were investigating, observing, and keeping the peace, and its role had not been the same throughout. When necessary support for a proposed set of measures was found among the members, the Charter served as a flexible instrument to supply a legal basis for them. The resolutions adopted were couched in ambiguous language, and they were deliberately worded in a manner that would avoid establishing precedents. The risks involved in peace-keeping operations in situations of internal violence are more than those in interstate disputes.

Some of Professor Miller's suggestions for the next two decades are as follows: during this period the organization will encounter either local disorders provoked by unresolved problems of nation building or disorders caused by outside intervention. The chief task of the organization will be to help the states deal with their problems of modernization in social, economic, and political fields, with minimum violence, and to safeguard peace and security in situations in which there is outside intervention or charges of intervention. Investigation and observation may be undertaken with far less risk than peace keeping, and a permanent corps of officials may be established to exercise these functions. Whether or not one agrees with Professor Miller's views on the desirability of regional organizations taking "enforcement actions" in civil war situations or on the desirability of the United Nations intervening to prevent abuse of human rights or to help the realization of the "preferences of the world

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community," the book is highly valuable for the new light it throws on local disorder problems as they come before international organizations.

B. S. MURTY
Andhra University

Economic Planning and Policies in Britain, France and Germany *by Malcolm MacLennan, Murray Forsyth, and Geoffrey Denton. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.—424 pp. $9.00.*

This book was written in Britain for Political and Economic Planning (PEP) and has a bias in favor of indicative planning along French lines. After a general chapter on planning versus the market, it reviews historically in successive chapters the counterpoint between planning and the market in Germany, France, and Britain before attempting a summary. Thereafter, sketchy chapters are devoted, in order, to monetary, fiscal, expenditure, incomes, and regional policies, plus the balance of payments, before a penultimate treatment of medium-term economic policy in the European Economic Community (EEC) and a conclusion.

The book is useful but not highly original or exciting. To this reviewer some of the most interesting material is the treatment of German attempts to build a propertied middle class and German banking concentration, which are not so fully outlined in the work of Wallich, Reuss, Boarman, and Roskamp. The summary chapter on indicative planning makes a beginning at exploring the differences between planning in an underemployed economy and planning in one which has idle resources or those which are highly mobile and readily transferable from low- to high-productivity occupations. In my judgment, planning was seriously overrated by French experience up to 1963 because of its relative ease when prices are stable and the problem is to forecast income elasticities. (This view differs from that of Balassa, who blames the failure of French planning after that date on the economy's increased openness.) But the difficulty of planning with full employment and immobile resources is well illustrated in the dismal account of the British National Economic Development Council's (NEDC) plan published in 1963. When price elasticities of supply and demand must be calculated along with income elasticities, there is an entirely new problem.

MacLennan, Forsyth, and Denton adopt an on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand attitude which is at the same time judicious and mildly frustrating. Flexibility is compatible with planning (p. 242) and so is competition (p. 407). The problem is to undertake collective action and to

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maintain individual liberty (p. 417). Regional policy in France is more rationally thought out and formally organized than anywhere else in the world, but still has to be proved (p. 331). There is something to be said for the productivity approach to incomes policy, but also for that based on comparable grades of work (pp. 267 ff.). They oppose subsidies designed to bolster noncompetitive industries, but favor those aimed at rationalization of industry—without making clear how the two sets of subsidies are to be distinguished (pp. 180, 225, 407). At one stage, on facing pages, they favor limiting entry (in some circumstances) and promoting competition (pp. 154, 155).

The move in France toward *déplanification* is referred to on the jacket of the American edition but is not treated in the book, which comes down only to 1967. By that time, however, the authors should have had a less favorable view of incomes policy. They refer several times to Dutch incomes policy, but do not discuss its collapse in 1963. At various points they mention policies which are swayed by "currently fashionable opinion" (p. 332) or policies which are overemphasized, as opposed to medium- and long-term problems, because of the "intellectual appeal and elegance of Keynesian . . . analysis." One detects in their enthusiasm for planning and incomes policy, however, something of the same response to the mode. It may be true that neoliberal and neocollectivist philosophies diverge more analytically than they do in practice (p. 400), but I should have thought that planning and incomes policy has been seriously set back by recent experience in France and Britain.

An aging reviewer may perhaps be forgiven mention of an eccentric dislike for the adjective *extreme* and the adverb *extremely* when rather more than a lot is meant and not necessarily a case fully three standard deviations from the mean of a normal distribution, or a boundary condition in a function which does not move out of a single quadrant. The authors use *extreme* and *extremely* perhaps no more than the world at large. I must take exception, however, to the suggestion that "imports are extremely difficult to forecast" and "exports are even more difficult" (pp. 87, 88).

C. P. KINDLEBERGER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Twenty Years of Nationalisation: The British Experience *by R. Kelf-Cohen. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1969.—339 pp. $9.50.*

This is a very British survey of the British nationalization experience

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by a former British civil servant. As such, it is accurate, readable, comprehensive, moderate in tone, and not very deep. In keeping with his professional background, Kelf-Cohen is not given to the uncritical enthusiasms of the Left or Right. (The Center presumably has no uncritical enthusiasms.) He regards as intellectually shoddy the arguments originally advanced to justify most of the nationalization programs, does not believe that nationalization ushered in a new age for anybody, and implies that it is unreasonable to expect that a nationalized industry with a protected monopoly will exhibit much managerial imagination. But there is no loud lamentation or prophecy of doom if the clock is not turned back. Nationalization is something a civil servant can live with.

One of the author's main policy judgments does appear to be very questionable. Kelf-Cohen believes that the nationalized corporation is a poor thing and argues that its operations ought to be more closely supervised by Parliament and the civil service. No doubt such a change might be calculated to make the policies of the nationalized industries more popular with the electorate. (The industries' attempts to close uneconomic coal mines and railway lines have been bitterly fought by many groups.) It is difficult to see how more control from the center would make the industries more enterprising. Although the empirical evidence is not entirely satisfactory, most economists now probably accept that, where economic performance alone is concerned, unregulated monopoly is preferable to regulated monopoly (and competition is preferable to either). Economic efficiency, of course, is not the only goal of economic policy. Indeed, one can argue that the richer an economy becomes, the more efficiency it can sacrifice to promote social equality, compassionate treatment of the unlucky, tolerance for the incompetent, and, in general, a world where the citizen has a reasonable idea of what to expect from one day to the next. Not many observers, East or West, would give the nationalized industries of Britain high marks for imagination or drive. Most would, I believe, rate them as decent employers and good citizens.

DONALD DEWEY
Columbia University

Rebels and Whips: An Analysis of Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties *by Robert J. Jackson. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1968.—xii, 346 pp. $10.00.*

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On its appearance in Britain, *Rebels and Whips* was quickly recognized for its realistic presentation of the facts concerning British parliamentary parties. Professor Jackson, a Canadian political scientist, seemed to have clarified, for the academic world, the actual behavior of M.P.s and their parties, notably by providing the evidence that parliamentary parties are not bound by an iron discipline. Rebellions, he shows, are both more frequent and less readily punished than the iron-discipline belief would indicate. For some students of British parties, Jackson may thus be attacking a straw man, since this is not the first study to point out the limitations of party discipline. But there can be little doubt that British parliamentary regularity has been exaggerated in certain conventional accounts, particularly in those comparing parties in the British House of Commons with parties in the American Congress. Even if this exaggeration has not been so conventional and even if some of us can claim to have known better all along, Jackson contributes substantially to our understanding by his very full documentation of the less-than-iron discipline that prevails.

The book's research is impressive. It includes not only the official records, showing voting behavior and dissident motions, plus relevant newspaper accounts, but also the material and insight gathered from over one hundred individual interviews with M.P.s and other politicians. The number of interviews is simply prodigious when, as is evidently the case, they were conducted by the author himself.

Jackson's evidence is used tellingly, if a little repetitiously, to support both of his two principal themes: that rebellions are more frequent and that formal disciplinary weapons are less often used (and less effectively used) than ordinarily supposed. The second theme is entirely persuasive, perhaps partly because already better known than the first. Jackson is on especially strong ground in rejecting the view that there was anything typical or precedent-setting about the drastic and effective punishment, in the late 1940s, of Labour's suspected crypto-Communist M.P.s. On the first theme, however, Jackson may seem to have overstated the number of rebellions, at least in the sense of seriously threatening rebellions, by including Early Day Motions (signed by M.P.s) when these motions criticized the policy of an M.P.'s own party leadership. The Early Day Motions represent some degree of open rebellion, it is true, but the degree may be considerably less significant than deviant parliamentary voting behavior. Even without the Early Day Motions, however, Jackson's evidence is sufficient to show fairly frequent rebellions. The Early Day Motions add some confirming

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support, but they are probably not crucial to his argument.

A more important question concerns the meaning of Jackson's finding of relatively frequent deviations from strict parliamentary party voting. Abstentions, if limited in number (even deliberately limited on occasion) so as to avoid destroying a governing party's majority, appear perfectly consistent with the assumption that a British party's M.P.s should not defeat the policies of their leaders. Even the less frequent cross-voting in the House of Commons is unlikely to be related to any defeat of a governing party since the cross-voting can take place without joining the opposition party's M.P.s (as when those M.P.s, as a party, do not vote against the government). Of course, the intraparty rebellion, whether its form is cross-voting, abstention, or Early Day Motion, is designed to show something. At the very least, it is a warning signal to the party leaders. Interestingly, the signal is set off more often in a governing party, as the author demonstrates, when that party has a large rather than a small majority. In this light, Jackson is surely correct and wise in stressing the useful function of rebellions in the party's two-way communications between leaders and whips, on the one hand, and their parliamentary followers, on the other. Rebellions, in other words, are part of the working system.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin

The Fall of the British Empire, 1918-1968 *by Colin Cross. New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1969.—359 pp. $8.95.*

As power dwindles and vanishes, the possibility increases that its history can be written with objectivity and perspective. Cross's book amply supports this historiographical truism. Already, in the immediate aftermath of the British empire's disappearance from the stage of world power politics, it is possible for Cross to remark in his introduction, "The striking thing about it [the empire], in my view, is that it ever existed at all," and then to write an urbane, witty, and evocative study that combines to a marked degree breadth of sympathy with coolness of judgment.

The author's skill is epitomized by his dissection of the argument that a costly and blatant show of imperial pomp was necessary in order to impress the colonial peoples and keep them in line. He quotes Sir Charles Johnston, a recent governor of Aden: "It is the

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British and not the Orientals who care most about these things, and for whom they must be maintained. . . . As a race we ourselves possess most of the characteristics which we ascribe to the peoples of the East" (p. 144). The element of self-delusion in the *tour-de-force* that was the British empire is a recurring theme here, but so is the capacity for self-criticism exemplified in Johnston's comment. Both were essential to the Britisher's relatively calm acceptance of his country's retreat from imperial glory. But for the self-criticism, retreat might have been resisted after the fashion of the French in Southeast Asia and Algeria; without the continuing illusion of worldwide influence through the evolving Commonwealth, the British might have suffered far greater trauma at so rapid a fall from the heights.

Nowhere is the rapidity better illustrated than in a remark made as recently as World War II by the deputy leader of the Labour party, Herbert Morrison: to set the black African colonies free would be "like giving a child of ten a latch-key, a bank account and a shot-gun" (p. 262). Indeed, Cross has understandable difficulty in treating the sudden collapse of that sort of blather and the speedy withdrawal from one colony after another without succumbing to a repetitive catalog rather than a sustained and coherent narrative. The strongest part of the book is the lively description of the far-flung empire at its zenith which occupies nearly half the volume under the heading, "High Noon." Keen insights and arresting comments abound, and while there are a few indications of haste or surrenders to oversimplification (the Malayan area and population statistics on pp. 136 and 137 are partly redundant, partly inconsistent; the pseudo-religious struggles in Buganda are somewhat misleadingly described on p. 79), this section provides a superbly readable introduction to a bafflingly complex subject.

But the later chapters are also eminently worthwhile and of course constitute a more pioneering effort at synthesis of very recent events. There are some surprising reminders, too. In 1959, the Macmillan government was under heavy attack for the murder of eleven prisoners at Hola Camp in Kenya. A Tory M. P., echoing (perhaps unconsciously) the denunciations of Warren Hastings by Edmund Burke in the 1780s, declared:

> We cannot say, 'We will have African standards in Africa, Asian standards in Asia and perhaps British standards here at home.' We have not that choice to make. We must be consistent with ourselves everywhere. . . . We cannot, we dare not, in Africa of all places, fall below our own highest standards.

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The speaker was Enoch Powell. When it comes to irony, Colin Cross misses few bets.

RICHARD W. LYMAN
Stanford University

Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895-1914 *by Bernard Porter. London, Macmillan Co., 1968. —xvi, 369 pp.*

The "New Imperialism," proudly announced and vigorously defended by the often discussed coterie of politicians, militarists, and nationalists forming the European establishment of the day, was harshly denounced and vigorously berated by a less discussed but most impressive band of critics. Bernard Porter in *Critics of Empire* now provides a meaningful and highly interpretative study of the British anti-imperialists, a study which will no doubt have the great benefit of making Morel, Shaw, and MacDonald more familiar to cursory students of imperialism and will guarantee less parochial treatment of J. A. Hobson by more serious students.

The book's originality lies in its perspective: a successful attempt to illustrate the place of anti-imperialist ideology in the thought and activity of the Radicals at the turn of the century. Their chief concern was with the effects of imperialism on policies and attitudes at home, not with its effects on the indigenous populations in the colonies. Social reformers who believed in the principle of enlightened self-interest, they were appalled by the jingoism of the new expansion and perhaps too frightened to recognize the disturbing truth that often emotional and not rational motives urged men on and abroad.

Hobson, who occupies the foremost position in this study, was most particularly perplexed by this problem of motivation. As Porter indicates, Hobson's naive rationalism, which permeates the pages of *Imperialism, A Study*, foreclosed the possibility of recognizing that men do not always act according to their own interests, whether noble or base. In treating this weakness as well as in tracing the development of Hobson's thought on imperialism, Porter exercises judicious authority.

Hobson, along with the other Radical anti-imperialists, tended to Eurocentric thought, weighted with the difficulties attending late nineteenth-century capitalism. As a result imperialism never sufficiently held their attention or mobilized their energies to allow them a considerable influence on colonial policy. Rather it was Morel and the "Liverpool School,"

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not so much anti-imperialist as anti-political expansionist, which focused on policy in Africa and aroused public interest in it. What the Liverpool people feared was the end of colonial free trade, in which the European and native negotiated as independent traders. Plantation or monopolist imperialism was their chief and nearly only concern. And so they were ideological comrades of the Radicals, all joined by a common anxiety over capitalist control of the colonial estate, by exploitation of the indigenous populations, and by the English interference with other cultures.

Porter's study makes a nice companion piece to Bernard Semmel's *Imperialism and Social Reform* (1960). Like it, *Critics of Empire* is well researched and well written. In tracing the motives and the arguments attending the anti-imperialism displayed in the halcyon days of the British empire, Porter has helped order our knowledge of a complex historical problem.

RAYMOND F. BETTS
Grinnell College

The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 *by Zara S. Steiner. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1969.—xii, 262 pp. $10.50.*

Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy *by Peter Lowe. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1969.—343 pp. $16.50.*

Many British patriots, David Lloyd George among them, who fought the First World War in order to make the world safe for democracy, had in mind specific Foreign Office practices and policies which, they alleged, had made for war. Left-wing opinion regarded the prewar Foreign Office as the natural ally of tsarist autocracy, the center of an inveterate (and economically ruinous) anti-Germanism, and, with the reform of the House of Lords, the last bastion of privilege and reaction. What better proof could there have been than the fact that Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary in a strong Liberal government, proved unable to reverse the trends initiated by his Tory predecessors?

Here are two illuminating appraisals of Edwardian foreign policy, both grounded upon extensive research in primary source materials, which indicate that radical suspicions, while far from groundless, were essentially misplaced. Dr. Steiner, who expertly links permuta-

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tions in policy with institutional developments during this period, portrays Grey as a masterful statesman, who bowed to his permanent officials only when he shared their concern and beliefs. She notes the irony, which was not lost upon his contemporaries, that Grey, by virtue of his strategic position within the Cabinet and the party, was in practice less accountable to his colleagues or to Parliament than Lord Salisbury, who kept his officials in check and his cards on the table. It was during Grey's foreign secretaryship that agreements hardened into alliances and, especially, that the Anglo-French entente negotiated by Lord Lansdowne in 1904 was interpreted to preclude an Anglo-German rapprochement. Sir Arthur Nicolson, the veteran diplomat who served as permanent under-secretary to Grey, had strenuously labored for such an interpretation and received congratulations for his "good work" when Anglo-German talks failed in 1912. Dr. Steiner has demonstrated that it was as much procedural factors as personality that allowed men like Nicolson and Sir Eyre Crowe, who scorned the Liberal government and deprecated its "socialist" programs, to accelerate the drift toward a war which neither Liberalism nor the Foreign Office mystique could survive.

Dr. Lowe, whose detailed study bears the marks of its origins as a doctoral dissertation, provides a useful complement to Dr. Steiner's more general interpretation. He focuses upon the four years during which the alliance between Great Britain and Japan originally made in 1902 altered in spirit and substance. Intended by its British authors to defend vital eastern interests from a Russian naval threat, it became successively a device to stabilize the Chinese situation and a weapon against Germany. The author displays an impressive command of Chinese, Japanese, and dominion politics, and offers a resourceful analysis of the loan negotiations with the Chinese government that were so embarrassing to Liberal free traders. Perhaps because he has consulted Cabinet papers as well as Foreign Office documents, Lowe speaks with greater authority then Dr. Steiner about individual politicians and ministerial alignments. Again Grey emerges as a purposeful and alert departmental chief, able to resist the anxious importunities of his Whitehall advisers and the carping attacks of Radical backbenchers. More than most of his subordinates and certainly more than the vast majority of his countrymen, he took a sympathetic view of Japanese commercial and territorial ambitions, and he braved official censure and popular displeasure by his willingness to compensate Japan for her cooperation in peacetime and her aid in time of war. One wonders what the result might have been had the Liberal foreign secretary proved as receptive to German claims and aspira-

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tions, many of which—as Sir Horace Rumbold, for one, astutely observed—were markedly similar in method and intent. Grey, who took few pains to make his policies intelligible, projected a willingness to conciliate Japan, even in the face of her Twenty-one Demands, which was conspicuously lacking in his relations with Imperial Germany.

STEPHEN E. KOSS
Barnard College

Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party: Conservative Leadership and Organization after the Second Reform Bill *by E. J. Feuchtwanger. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968.—xiv, 268 pp. $5.95.*

As his subtitle makes clear, the author is concerned with a subject increasingly written on since R. T. McKenzie's study, *British Political Parties* (1955), and, since he follows the same chronology, he is much indebted to H. J. Hanham's work, *Elections and Party Management* (1959). There is no revolutionary thesis here, but a meticulous study (with the advantage of the Cairns, Harrowby, and Richmond papers, not used by others in the field) of the Tory parliamentary party and its response to organizational needs from 1867 to 1885.

The first part deals with Disraeli as leader, the front bench, whips and backbenchers, and the party's appeal to voters. In fact there is little information about the "duumvirate" of leadership after Disraeli's death in 1881 or about Salisbury or Northcote as leaders of the respective Houses. We move quickly from 1881 to 1884 (pp. 168-69). Nor does the appeal to voters include any connection between particular "pressure groups" or blocs in the parliamentary party and the actual votes on division lists. The emphasis falls on a discussion of the character of the constituencies where Tories were strongest: the rural counties and (outside Lancashire and Cheshire) the more populous English boroughs.

The discussion of "the New Social Movement" and its impact on the party in 1871 (pp. 91-94) is piquant, as is the reminder that the Conservative M.P. for Canterbury (Butler-Johnstone) was a later associate of Hyndman in founding British socialism. But most of the issues referred to are familiar ones like the regulation of merchant shipping and public worship, education, the Eastern question, fair trade.

Just as it is no part of the author's purpose to test which issues were most divisive for the parliamentary party, whether in office or

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in opposition, by study of division lists, so too he avoids any economic or social analysis of party members, after the manner of W. O. Aydelotte. There are no statistical tables to show the degree of overlap between landed gentry and business interests. But there is a glossary of names of M.P.s defined as "secondary personalities" (pp. 227-44), where economic interests, as well as ages and titles, are listed.

The author reaffirms an accepted generalization: the Tory parliamentary party remained far more homogeneous than the Liberal party, even after the second Reform Act, and despite the growing concern of men like Gorst with the need to broaden the voting base in urban constituencies.

Part II deals with national organization in two chapters (1867-74 and 1874-85), the National Union in the Randolph Churchill days (1880-85), and, in a final chapter, with organization and party cohesion. The roles of lesser figures, like Maclean, Mitford, and Howarth, are clearer here than elsewhere. There is a correction of W. Churchill (and of R. R. James following Churchill) on Salisbury's position (p. 184) and one of R. R. James on the significance of Randolph Churchill's achievement in the National Union struggle (p. 187).

A few minor criticisms may be offered. There is more about the Burghley House talk of deposing Disraeli as leader in A. E. Gathorne Hardy, *Hardy* (I, 304-05) than in Monypenny and Buckle. Why have the Disraeli papers been rechristened "Hughenden Papers"? On p. 59, "1886" should read "1866." But taken as a whole this is a useful monograph, succinct where it synthesizes and written in a lucid, graceful style.

BARRY MCGILL
Oberlin College

The Handloom Weavers: A Study in the English Cotton Industry during the Industrial Revolution *by Duncan Bythell. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969.—xiii, 302 pp. $12.50.*

The handloom weavers of England in the early years of the nineteenth century, when power weaving was coming in, form a classic example of the social costs of industrial growth. Their fate as a group was to become extinct through technological unemployment, without anyone's hand to help them except their own. They play a role in all the histories of the time. But how far was their case classic and what exactly was

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their role? Is there no element of myth in the accepted story? Were they a body of skilled men whose job was increasingly handed over to machines operated by women and children? Were their incomes relatively good before machines came in, worse and worse after that? Did they become fit material in the Chartist age for riot and revolution in a changing society? These are questions well worth asking, difficult to answer from historical evidence.

Mr. Bythell has the advantage of knowing something of the cotton industry and of Lancashire. One result is that he is thoroughly alive to the local character of the events he is dealing with. These took place before modern communications grew up, when surroundings of land and water were still formidable barriers. What appears from the complex story he has to tell is that the handloom cotton weavers were themselves a relatively new social group brought into existence as an occupational class by the technical changes in the cotton industry before power weaving came in; that theirs was not a highly skilled craft and that, as often happened in the early days of industrialism, greater output was secured by the use of much relatively inefficient labor, including from an early date women and children; that these people suffered severely and from the first because of fluctuations of trade and earnings and because of the lack of alternative employments; that power weaving, with all its disadvantages, offered for many of them a slight improvement in income and conditions, which they were prepared to take. But there were many variations on this general theme. These arose not least out of the important fact that the distribution geographically of the new powerloom weaving was by no means the same as that of the older handloom weaving. The fate of families could vary widely, according to local conditions. The weavers were not blind to the part which public policy might play in determining their fate. Many were prepared to put pressure on political authority. Sometimes they agitated constitutionally for a change in the law; sometimes they smashed machinery; some became physical-force Chartists, others moral-force Chartists. Many others pinned no faith on politics and an indifferent public opinion. They took their own way out into new jobs and homes. The "problem of the handloom weavers" was debated publicly; it was never solved, except by the weavers themselves, under the pressure of what must often have been profound misery. As Mr. Bythell tells it, this is not an heroic story, but it is human, all too human.

W. H. B. COURT
University of Birmingham

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Revolution Politicks: The Career of Daniel Finch, Second Earl of Nottingham, 1647-1730 *by Henry Horwitz. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1968.—xxii, 306 pp. $10.50.*

The first detailed life of a statesman whose career extended from the troubled seventies of Charles II's reign to the early years of George I draws on extensive manuscript sources (listed on pp. 275-79) as well as on printed works and monographs (pp. 280-87). A valuable appendix to Chapter I, "The Apprentice Parliamentarian, 1673-79," notes surviving copies of Finch's speeches in that period. Horwitz concentrates on biography, but from the study emerges an analysis of a kind of Toryism more widely representative than commonly realized and essential to the understanding of a very English type of conservatism.

Finch's father, Heneage, later first Earl of Nottingham, a royalist lawyer who pursued his vocation during the Civil War and Interregnum, served as solicitor-general, attorney general, lord keeper, and chancellor between the Restoration and his death in 1682. Daniel served in Parliament, at the Admiralty Board, and, after the Revolution of 1688, as secretary of state to William III. After some time in the wilderness, he held office for two years under Anne, going into opposition as Tory churchman while Whig counsels gained the upper hand. His constant support of the Protestant succession and opposition to the peace-making at Utrecht kept him from rewards in the great Tory ministry, but he served George I as president of the Council from 1714-16. After this, somewhat disgruntled with the policies of the Whig ascendancy, he retired to the country emerging only rarely to speak in the Lords for or against some measure in which he was interested.

The position attained by Finch was owed originally to his family connection and the prominence of his father. As he himself rose in office, patronage extended his influence even more than the many relatives of his own and his wife, who formed a by no means unanimous group. He had, besides, considerable support from one sector of Anglican churchmen. Never a brilliant administrator, he was respected as incorruptible, with a personal life beyond reproach. Finch was immensely interested in the passage of the Toleration Act of 1689 and did much to persuade William that the Anglican church was important to the stability of his government.

Nottingham was a persistent but moderate Tory. He did not subscribe to theories of divine right and passive obedience. He placed great emphasis on the authority and power of parliament but opposed any extension which might threaten the valuable institution of monarchy, as for example the Exclusion bills of 1679-80 or the Triennial Act of 1684. Yet he

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supported George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, in proposing expedients to guard the Protestant religion against a popish successor. He was scrupulous about the oath taken to James II and unwilling to declare the throne vacant; yet, faced with the accomplished fact of William's accession, he was prepared to serve him faithfully. A comprehension in the church of less dissident dissenters and toleration for the rest was, he felt, the best way to peace and national unity. He helped to obtain toleration but not union, though he would not have quarreled about changes in liturgy and articles which might have furthered it. On the other hand, he firmly believed that all public servants should take the tests and be conformers, and he did not tolerate occasional conformity, pressing for an act against this practice early in Anne's reign. Nottingham was prepared for the Hanoverian heir to visit England and, as a result, lost Anne's favor. He was never involved in Jacobite conspiracy. Like John Evelyn he found himself in the dilemma of a royalist who could not, beyond a certain point, support him he regarded as rightfully king. To such Tories, England was ruled by king in Parliament united by a national church. To protect this unity and order, persecution was to be avoided, but careful attention to the balance of prerogative and juridical rights was necessary. Change was to be eschewed unless circumstance forced it, as in 1688, upon all upholders of the Constitution.

CAROLINE ROBBINS
Bryn Mawr College

The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime *by Wallace MacCaffrey. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968.—xiv, 501 pp. $10.00.*

The Elizabethan age to the popular historian is the epic of Good Queen Bess, the defeat of the Armada, the Tilbury speech, daring captains, and brilliant artists. To the scholar it is a rich quarry from which may be mined monographs on legal and financial institutions, on administration and administrators, and on parliamentary and religious development. Professor MacCaffrey's book is both scholarly with breadth and literary with sobriety. The reign of Elizabeth I followed on the thirty-year religious, social, and political crisis of the mid-sixteenth century. For the first fifteen years of its life, moreover, the new Elizabethan regime itself was precarious indeed. In 1558 Elizabeth acceded to the throne of an England disastrously defeated in war and driven from the Continent, bankrupt alike in its treasury and its

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foreign and domestic policies, and menaced by contested succession and religious civil war. By 1572 the new regime had thwarted attempts to alter the succession and restore Roman Catholicism, crushed the revolt of the northern Earls and the Ridolfi plot, neutralized the Catholic rival Mary Queen of Scots and put to death the dangerously overmighty, if vacillating, Duke of Norfolk, and won the confidence of the political classes and restored effective leadership. MacCaffrey examines the years between the accession of Elizabeth and the execution of Norfolk, "the testing-time of the regime," and describes the emergence of the new pattern of power relationships on which the regime securely established itself.

MacCaffrey's approach is narrative. He recounts political developments from 1558 to 1572, focusing particularly on the membership of the Council, "that all-important pillar of Tudor government," in the reign of Elizabeth, serving "not only as a continuing committee for central public business but also as a powerful policy-making body and as the fulcrum of active politics." He presents admirably the personalities of Elizabeth's councilors, their policies and conflicts, and the changes over the years in conciliar composition. He coordinates skillfully English, Scottish, and Continental events. His appraisals of the Queen, William Cecil (Lord Burghley after 1571), and Robert Dudley (the Earl of Leicester after 1564) are especially masterful and suggestive. The testing-time did more than settle the question of the survival of the new regime (at least until 1601). It marked the last stage in the crisis of political and religious instability, 1536-1572, and, still more momentously, it marked "a fundamental turning-point in the history of English politics," the beginning of the transfer of power from the monarchy to the gentry, that problematical transition from "medieval" to "modern."

There were two major obstacles to English political stability and the new regime. The first, the absence, so evident from 1540 to 1558, of effective leadership at the top, the Elizabethan regime overcame by the collaboration of the Virgin Queen with her "surrogate husbands" Cecil and Dudley and to a lesser extent with the whole Council. The second was harder to overcome: "It arose from a new phenomenon in English political life—the presence of a large body of organized, coherent, and very articulate public opinion on the great political questions of the age, shaped by the new faith and shared by a large segment of the aristocracy, which it was impossible either to ignore or effectively to control" (p. 474). Here the regime evolved a clumsy, makeshift, but workable arrangement through which the Council bridged the gap between the Queen and the countryside and especially

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mediated between "the cool indifference of the monarch" and "the ardent Protestant activism of her subjects."

MacCaffrey's arguments for the existence of an "English Protestant ideology," "the new ideology [which] came to permeate a large segment of the aristocratic classes throughout the country," are less than convincing. To be sure, he qualifies the notions of "ideology" and "ideologues" in the first fifteen years of the reign of Elizabeth, conceding that they were diffuse rather than organized, political rather than religious, moved by contingencies rather than doctrinaire strife, and indeed pretty amorphous except for an alleged but vague "ideological core." But this clearly is not the description of ideologues, but rather of *politiques*, the stance of whom is the very antithesis of ideology. Although MacCaffrey previewed these notions in 1963 and 1965 in *Past and Present*, he cites not his articles but Michael Walzer's *Revolution of the Saints* (1966) and A. B. Ferguson's *Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (1965), which do not support the argument. MacCaffrey's "English Protestant ideology" is an unhappy phrase because of its systematic, dogmatic, and even chiliastic connotations. At best it is an overstatement for "Protestant" leanings, self-interest, and the haphazard but largely negative religious consensus; at worst it is an anachronism. There are also some rather trifling but nonetheless irritating details—for example, Anglicisms like "sequence" and "group" as plural nouns—and the inevitable generalization with which the specialist would quarrel: "From the late 1490's down to the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536-1537 England enjoyed a long generation of civil peace." Given the excellence of the book, of course, these details are quibbles. MacCaffrey's emphasis on ideology no doubt reflects the general reaction against narrowly economic or personal-political emphasis in the past. But is "ideology" any more illuminating than "interest" or "connection" in early Elizabethan political history? It seems doubtful that "ideology" in any but the most nebulous sense is an appropriate term for the welter of ideas, interests, and prejudices of the early Elizabethan politicians. What of the role of place and patronage in the regime so brilliantly sketched by MacCaffrey in his essay in *Elizabethan Government and Society* (Bindoff *et al.*, eds., 1961)? To ask these questions is not to detract from the value of MacCaffrey's excellent narrative of the shaping of the Elizabethan regime.

T. R. MURPHY
American University

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A Nation Divided: Canada and the Coming of Pierre Trudeau *by Peter C. Newman. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969.—xv, 469, xix pp. $7.95.*

In this book Peter Newman has produced another first-class account of recent Canadian politics. In an earlier volume (*Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years*, Toronto, 1963) he subjected the Diefenbaker era to blistering analysis. The present work carries his story through the years (1963-68) when Lester Pearson presided over Canadian affairs. It concludes with Mr. Pearson's retirement at the age of 71 and Pierre Trudeau's succession to power.

Perhaps no one ever came to the prime ministership with more renown attaching to him than Mr. Pearson. He had risen to the top permanent post in the Department of External Affairs. Drawn into politics, he acquired international fame as secretary of state for external affairs. Then in 1963 he succeeded Louis St. Laurent as party leader and prime minister.

The Pearson administrations saw a good deal of accomplishment. Above all, Lester Pearson moderated the conflict between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada. Thereby he gained time for the nation. As a party leader, moveover, he left the Liberals so strong and well organized that they went on to win a firm majority under his successor. Abroad, Canada continued to enjoy high reputation and influence as a middle power.

Yet the weight of Mr. Newman's assessment is upon Pearson's shortcomings as politician and as statesman. The qualities that had brought him success as a civil servant and diplomat were not enough for political leadership in a democracy. He had little appeal to the voters either on the platform or on television. His campaigning at election times lost rather than gained votes. And so he never won a majority in the three appeals to the people made while he led the Liberals.

Nor was it because he was a minority prime minister, Newman argues, that Mr. Pearson failed to provide Canada with the vision, the sense of purpose, that she needed or even to get full credit for what he actually achieved. He was too completely pragmatic in approach. There seemed to be no consistency or pattern in his policies. He accomplished a good deal but he failed to rally the people and the country seemed to flounder. It is paradoxical and rather sad that this highly intelligent, idealistic, and patriotic man should have been more successful as party manager that as democratic leader.

This long but continuously interesting book contains a gallery of

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political portraits. It is also a political history of a crowded half-decade and more. Much light is thrown on Canadian-American relations, especially economic. The decline of John Diefenbaker, marked by his loss of the leadership of the Progressive Conservative party, provides material for several engrossing chapters. Relations between the two Canadas receive a good deal of understanding analysis. There is a fascinating account of Trudeau's selection as leader of the Liberals in 1968.

Mr. Newman is the editor-in-chief of the Toronto *Daily Star*. He has the journalist's eye for relevant and revealing detail. He also has the realistic conceptions of politics and politicians that are apt to impress themselves on those who are close to the scene of action. He knows how things are done in Ottawa. His fascinating book provides an agreeable way for Americans to learn a great deal about the complex and difficult problems that face their northern neighbor. The author gives a sombre picture of the sixties. It remains to be seen if Canada has found in Pierre Trudeau the man who can bring unity to a divided nation.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College

Australian Parties in a Changing Society: 1945-67 *by Louise Overacker. Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire, 1968.—xi, 337 pp. $A 5.95.*

Professor Emeritus Overacker's new book is a sequel to *The Australian Party System* (New Haven, Conn., 1952) and readers of the new book will profit greatly if they know the old one. One of the great changes which has overtaken Australian society since 1945 is the multiplication in the universities (themselves multiplied) of political scientists and the concomitant multiplication of specialist publications. A consequence of this is that the bibliography in the new book is more rigorously confined to "political science" than that in the earlier one. No doubt political scientists will rejoice in this, but as one who has grown old as a generalist, I find it a bit deplorable. What appears to be happening is that Australia is being chewed up into those bits which are digestible by the academic specialists and the task of seeing Australia whole, in the past and in the present, is left to a few recalcitrant generalists who, when they intrude into the specialist "bits," as they inevitably do, run the risk of being sniffed at as amateurs.

Professor Overacker's concentration is on political parties, their or-

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ganization, management, ideology, fortune in political combat, in and out of office, and about all these matters her performance is splendid. The exposition is remarkably lucid, the data scrupulously supported by footnotes to often elusive sources. She miraculously succeeds in making clear the tangled muddle into which the Labor party has fallen since it lost federal office in 1949, though I wonder if she is not a little optimistic about its future under Mr. Whitlam's leadership. Her discussion of the Country party is very good, but I wonder if her repeated warning that the demographic tide is running against it is as relevant to forecasting its future as its continued success in resisting the redistribution of seats in the House to its disadvantage. Is Mr. McEwen really a King Canute? Her account of what keeps the Democratic Labor party in business is first class, but surely the DLP's final testing will come in the pending general election. Her full analysis of the Liberal party, including its symbiotic relation to the Country party, is admirable, but may not the LP be viewed by history as simply Robert Gordon Menzies in full political armor? Finally, her view of the Communists is sober and factual when the temptation is strong to introduce the comic note.

In spite of the fact that Professor Overacker incorporated the idea of change into her title, I think she should have kept in mind also the tag, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. She should have made more use of the historians. Even a nation in as rapid change as Australia has its historical background. Many readers of this foreground book, lacking historical background, will assume that items that look like change are change: for example, the overrepresentation of the Country party in coalition federal cabinets and even the current dishevelment of the LP-CP federal cabinet. The first dates from 1922 when Sir Earle Page made his deal with Stanley Melbourne Bruce; the latter has been a consequence of too long in office for liberal-conservative combinations since their initiation circa 1908.

Nevertheless this is an $A+$ book of its kind.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN
University of Texas

Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France *by Geoffrey Warner. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1968.—xvii, 461 pp. $8.95.*

There is a peculiar fascination about Pierre Laval. Something of the air

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of a slightly *louche* Greek tragedy hangs over his political career, especially those latter years that ended with the doctors fighting to keep him alive long enough to face a firing squad. Of all the Europeans who chose to play the card of collaboration with Nazi Germany, Laval was probably the most remarkable. In 1940 he had been briefly tempted to play the opposite card of emigration to the United States; one cannot help wondering how modern French history, in that case, might have been altered.

Laval's story has already been told a number of times, but almost always by people with an axe to grind. Professor Warner, on the contrary, is coolly clinical in his analysis. He has sifted all the available evidence with scrupulous care and skill and has really tried to arrive at a dispassionate judgment. This has not been easy since the French archives for the period remain closed, and the chief sources for certain episodes are personal accounts by self-serving participants. Warner analyzes these materials shrewdly and convincingly. He has also made excellent use of the German archives for the war years, which have been ignored by other biographers of Laval and which sometimes confirm and sometimes modify received opinions about the Vichy era.

After a very brief sketch of Laval's early career, one-third of the book focuses on the 1930s and two-thirds on the war years. The chief stress in the former period is on foreign policy, and the chief surprise is Mussolini's profound hostility toward Laval. In 1938 and 1939, for example, Rome ruled him out as a possible ambassador or special envoy—something that Laval never suspected. As for the war period, Warner examines in careful detail each of the controversial episodes (such as Laval's dismissal by Pétain in December 1940) and offers a thoughtful, nuanced conclusion. He recognizes a change in Laval's mood after his return to office in 1942, but doubts the thesis that Laval had now abandoned his earlier belief in a German victory and that he devoted himself henceforth to hoodwinking the Germans as defeat came steadily nearer. Warner insists that right up until the allied landings in Normandy, Laval believed that the German army would not be beaten. Warner thus flatly rejects the argument that Laval can be considered a peculiar kind of resistance leader who sought in his own devious way to thwart the Germans. Rather, he remained a loyal collaborator throughout; and his defenders would make a better case for him if they were to contend that, realistically, collaboration was the most sensible policy for France so long as Germany had a chance of winning. Many of Laval's judgments were disastrously wrong, though not, according to Warner, for ignoble reasons. His real fault was not deviousness but a blind belief in his own infallibility; his complexities concealed "a frightening tendency towards over-simplification" (p. 422).

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On a few minor points, I would quibble with Warner's judgments. On the great majority of issues, I find him quite convincing. Until additional sources become available, it will be hard for anyone to write a fairer or more thorough book about Laval.

GORDON WRIGHT
Stanford University

Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898-1905 *by Christopher Andrew. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1968.—xii, 330 pp. $11.00.*

A young man of eighteen when the Franco-Prussian War broke out, Théophile Delcassé reacted profoundly to the defeat: he would devote himself to the restoration of his country's position. He made foreign affairs his domain, first in journalism, then throughout his political career. A republican of the Left, disciple of Gambetta, he kept generally aloof from the troubled domestic politics of his country. This contributed to his uninterrupted seven-year tenure of the foreign office, made for continuity of policy, earned him the trust of his own service, and established his standing in the diplomacy of Europe.

On how to recover place, two schools of thought emerged in France; their divergent approaches may be summed up in the words *revanche* and *empire*. Delcassé definitely belonged to the second, which held that by focusing exclusively on the German danger and the wrong of the Frankfurt peace, France was allowing a diminution of her place in the world. In either view, escape from isolation was a precondition, and Delcassé welcomed the Russian alliance, differing from the skeptics, who emphasized the lack of common interests, by calling it an absence of differences. Yet the chief obstacle to imperial expansion was Britain rather than Germany. Moreover, the British establishment in Egypt continued to rankle, and it would take a long time for the French to acknowledge the irretrievability of the abandonment of 1882. It was logical that Delcassé should favor Marchand's expedition to the Nile, the attempt to strike at the British position from the rear.

His beginnings as foreign minister in June 1898 seemed auspicious: mediating the Spanish-American War, standing up to the British in Siam, and liquidating the tariff war with Italy. But soon a larger cloud filled the horizon; Britain was adamant at Fashoda. France's surrender was a measure of Delcassé's statesmanship though it rankled no less

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for that. Still hoping to retrieve the Egyptian position, he proceeded to enlarge the scope of the Russian alliance and even sought German cooperation.

But he also took a more modest view of the possibilities of empire for France, seeing Indochina and Madagascar as little more than bargaining counters, envisioning, instead, an extension of France from North Africa to the Congo. A logical corollary was an uncompromising position in regard to Morocco. It was proper to deal with Italy and with Spain, but only very late did he come to accept the idea of the Egypt-Morocco *quid pro quo*.

Things have changed since Delcassé's time. *Empire* and *imperialism* have become bad words. But in the context of his day Delcassé's policy proved wholly justified; within his limitations—they undoubtedly existed—he served his country well. He disregarded the advice of his most trusted counselors in ignoring Germany in Morocco. This was at once illogical and rash, yet in the end his reckoning proved correct. For Delcassé had taken a just measure of the influence of the German factor in the English position. In one of his most valuable and interesting chapters, Andrew brings out evidence of the degree of English support at the time of the first Moroccan crisis, even if only in the form of "indiscretions" on the part of Britain's service chiefs and others. He also makes good use of his findings about the *cabinet noir*, a factor often unduly neglected. In sum, a valuable contribution.

René Albrecht-Carrié
Barnard College

Raspail: Scientist and Reformer *by Dora B. Weiner, with a chapter by Simone Raspail. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.—xiv, 336 pp. $11.00.*

François Victor Raspail, born in Carpentras in 1794 the son of a restaurant owner, died in Paris in 1878 a socialist deputy. Over 100,000 persons attended his funeral; Louis Blanc spoke and Marx and Garibaldi sent telegrams. Trained as a theologian, he was not the first nor the last to use the techniques thus acquired as an opposition politician. Early a liberal, he fled his hometown because of the white terror in 1816. In Paris he immediately joined the *carbonari* and freemasons. He earned a meager living as a teacher, studying in his spare time chemistry and botany. Between 1820 and 1830 he made a number of discoveries for which he has rightly been called a genius.

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He invented histochemistry and pioneered in cellular theory and the microbial theory of disease. It is typical that this political outsider cultivated microscopy, shunned by official French medicine.

In 1830 his political activities as a socialist-democrat begun to dwarf all his other occupations. The judges of that benign king Louis Philippe ruined his paper, *The Reformer*, and often sent him to prison where he started writing popular science books, some of which contained his "medical system."

His system was heretic and popular, like homeopathy. As a matter of fact it was far more reasonable and useful. It had a harmless panacea, camphor, emphasized hygiene against invisible disease-producing animals twenty years before Pasteur and sanitary operations thirty years before Lister. Raspail was now persecuted as a quack.

The year 1848 brought him again to the foreground as a democratic leader—and into prison and exile. After his return he served as a deputy from 1869-70 and again from 1876-78. His parliamentary activities often centered around social medicine: the fight against epidemic diseases, for prison reform and the like. After his death the same Establishment that had dragged him into court and jail for more than half a century used his name on squares and boulevards.

This strange life was above all due to objective circumstances. Not even a respected scientist who had opposed the Church, royalty, and the faculty the way Raspail had could hope for an official career or recognition. But it was also due to Raspail's character, which showed not only paranoid traits (J. J. Rousseau was far worse off in this respect and yet molded a century), but also a pride and dignity incompatible with a "career."

Raspail is a prominent and typical French 48er and an important figure in the history of science. *Engagement* was not rare in scientists of his and the following generation. We owe gratitude and admiration to Professor Weiner for having tackled a difficult task and done so well. She has written a scholarly and yet eminently readable book.

ERWIN H. ACKERKNECHT
University of Zurich

The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933-1945 *by J. S. Conway. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1968.—xxxii, 474 pp. $10.00.*

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Whereas several earlier works have emphasized the reaction of the German churches to the Hitler regime, this careful study by Professor Conway of the University of British Columbia elucidates the methods by which the Nazis were able to impose their totalitarian rule on the Christian churches; it looks at the tangled skein of church-state relations from "the other side of the hill," as it were. It is only by placing the debate on the extent of the churches' collaboration with or resistance to Nazism in its full context, the author suggests, that we can escape superficial judgments. By paying attention to the extent of the Nazis' persecution of the churches we will prevent too easy condemnation of churchmen for having failed to resist the onslaught of tyranny. On the other hand, the limited successes of the churches in standing up to Hitler's dictatorship can often be traced to the divisions among the foes of Christianity.

The picture of Nazi policy toward the churches that unfolds from Conway's work is quite remarkable. When speaking of totalitarian regimes we have come to think of systems of total control, monoliths that are run with maximum and ruthless efficiency. Of ruthlessness there was indeed plenty in Nazi Germany. The churches were deprived of most of their property, their ministers were defamed through false charges of currency smuggling and sexual perversion, Christian youth and trade organizations were dissolved, the denominational press was suppressed, and several thousand clergymen were imprisoned in jails or concentration camps. While houses of worship were allowed to stay open, the regime insisted that the churches limit themselves to purely "spiritual" matters concerned with the next world. According to Goebbels, only one solution could bring about peace between church and state: "Back into the sacristy! Let the churches serve God, we serve the people." In the struggle for the minds of the German people the totalitarian regime would tolerate no rivals.

But behind this resolute opposition to organized Christianity hid a multitude of personal rivalries and different views on tactics that caused almost uninterrupted dissensions over the choice of policies to be followed. The availability of large quantities of captured state and party documents makes it possible to follow the unsteady course of church-state relations in all detail, and once again we are struck by the chaos prevailing within the upper ranks of the Nazi leadership. Hess feuded with Rosenberg, Himmler battled against Goebbels, Schirach fought Goering, and amidst all these rival feudal tributaries stood a confused Hitler and the Minister for Church Affairs Hanns Kerrl, who in vain struggled for a consistent policy.

Conway's study is valuable for the light it sheds on a dark chapter

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in German history. It also supports the argument of earlier students of Nazism who warned us against equating totalitarian control with efficiency and clear direction.

GUENTER LEWY
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Weimar Germany's Left-Wing Intellectuals: A Political History of the Weltbühne and its Causes *by Istvan Deak. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968.—ix, 346 pp. $9.75.*

The last two decades have seen the appearance of many scholarly studies of the German Right, Nazi and non-Nazi, which attempt to trace and analyze the pathology of modern Germany. Deak's study of Weimar Germany's left-wing intellectuals constitutes a welcome attempt to redress the balance in scholarship. His focus, it should be said, lies not on the intellectuals connected with any one of the leftist parties, but on a group of radical intellectuals who edited—brilliantly edited—the independent, always dissenting and crusading weekly *Die Weltbühne*. Among Germany's left-wing intellectuals, they can easily be considered the elite.

The story which Deak tells is moving and tragic. It is the story of those who thought of themselves as the "other Germany," who aimed at turning Germany away from its traditional nationalistic and militaristic course, and who tried to conjure up a world of love and brotherhood and equality. It was the tragedy of the *Weltbühne* authors that even after the revolution of 1918 they remained "homeless" and that their impact was above all one of pounding opposition and self-styled negativism (Kurt Tucholsky: "We Negatives").

Deak has analyzed the *Weltbühne* authors, their backgrounds, views, struggles, with admirable insight and expertise. The majority of them were of bourgeois parentage and Jews—a fact which, Deak emphasizes, is by no means incidental. But he has in turn skillfully evaded the all-too-easy thesis which would derive the journal's radicalism from its predominantly Jewish composition. This thesis does not adequately explain the *Weltbühne's* principled stance. Deak has satisfactorily demonstrated that the journal, in response to the increasingly reactionary policies of the Weimar Republic during the twenties, went through a process of radicalization which frequently made it condone the position of the Communists.

The too-glowing profile of the *Weltbühne* might be explained by

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Deak's understandable affection for the last of the journal's distinguished editors, Carl von Ossietzky, a thoroughly upright and fearless fighter who finally went the way of martyrdom under the Nazis. For the rest, however, Deak's overall assessment of the writers of the *Weltbühne* must be challenged. Their politics, being utopian, were bad politics. Or they were nonpolitics, if not antipolitics. The *Weltbühne's* objections to the Social Democrats can be reduced to the fact that the latter had chosen to enter into that business of politics which, by definition, is never wholly clean. Indeed, I find that Deak himself tends to take over from the *Weltbühne* authors a bias against Friedrich Ebert, that "former saddler's apprentice," and against the Social Democrats, "a group bereft of pride, of the will to rule," which is harsh, very harsh. The Social Democrats in the course of their attempt to build a better Germany had to make compromises, and they failed. But the left-wing intellectuals, in their own way, also failed. They would have served the "other Germany" better by a greater awareness of political realities, by less perfectionism and acidity and more humility and constructiveness. The *Weltbühne* hardly was in a position to show the way to "redemption." Instead it was itself part of the pathology of modern Germany.

Deak's book is an absorbing pioneering work. But the story of the other left-wing intellectuals, like those writing for *Sozialistische Monatshefte* and *Die Gesellschaft*, has not yet been written. Only when this story has been told and the position of the *Weltbühne* can be seen in perspective, will a more definitive assessment of the *Weltbühne*'s impact on Weimar Germany be possible.

KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER
Smith College

Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Józef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland *edited by Wacław Jędrzejewicz. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1968.—xxxvi, 679 pp. $17.50.*

With the posthumous publication of his papers, Józef Lipski joins those ambassadors to Germany (Henderson, Coulondre, and others) whose recollections help explain the diplomatic antecedents of World War II. Lipski had frequent access to the luminaries of the German government, whose private conversations he recounts, and his dispatches to Warsaw report in detail Germany's drift from eager friendship with Poland in 1934 to open enmity in 1939, correcting many distortions of the Polish

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White Book of 1940. The documents, which are arranged chronologically, have been selected to cover the major problems of the period. The disorders which the local Nazi party stirred up in the Free City of Danzig and the disputes about the Corridor and the respective national minorities occupy much space. The documents on Poland's role in the Munich crisis are particularly enlightening. They indicate clearly that Poland forestalled possible Russian intervention and discouraged concerted action by the western powers because she hoped to profit from an eventual partition of Czechoslovakia.

Lipski reports his observations minutely. Apparently he assumed that his superiors in Warsaw would interpret and assess the information he supplied, for, unlike Coulondre, he largely refrained from conjectures of his own. The conjectures which he ventured show that he had no particular insight into Nazi Germany. Though he realized that the diplomatic climate was changing after the Munich crisis, when Ribbentrop put extensive demands to Poland, he drew no further conclusions on the future of Germany's relations with Poland. As late as February 1939 he still described Hitler's "basic program" as "the revision of the Versailles Treaty." Many of Lipski's contemporaries also failed to understand Nazi Germany. Lipski, however, a seasoned diplomat, had been concerned with German affairs since 1925 and was accredited to the government of a state deeply and traditionally antagonistic toward his own country. One might have expected him to be sensitive to the implications of Nazi rhetoric and to the intentions of Nazi foreign policy. That he was not may be ascribed in part to his commitment to the Declaration of Nonaggression of 1934, which he had helped negotiate, and in part to an inclination to think that Hitler, though he might be dangerous, was certainly rational. Above all, Lipski's lapse must be ascribed to his resolve that relations between Germany and Poland should—and could—be cordial and to a conviction that both governments stood to gain from amity and to lose from hostility.

The editor has supplied an analytical table of contents and a useful bibliography, but otherwise his work is more that of an admirer than that of an historian. Though he is entitled to assume that his readers have some knowledge of German-Polish relations, such an assumption does not justify erratic, vague, and occasionally erroneous annotation. Nor is much to be gained from the interpolation of various articles which Lipski wrote between 1947 and 1957. These pieces, written in retrospect and derived from published sources, distort Lipski's running account of the events he witnessed and, except where they reproduce personal reminiscence, they are neither novel nor penetrating. The translation, if not felicitous, appears correct. Inevitably a translator who ren-

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ders his own language into another encounters difficulty—the copy editors of the publishing house should have polished the translation.

C. M. KIMMICH
Columbia University

The Soviet System and Modern Society *by George Fischer. New York, Atherton Press, 1968.—xii, 199 pp. $7.50.*

Professor Fischer's monograph, published under the auspices of the Bureau of Applied Social Research and the Russian Institute of Columbia University, constitutes a detailed analysis of biographical data concerning higher full-time officials of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. His sample is chosen from people holding specific party positions in 1958 and 1962; his emphasis is primarily upon differences in the previous career experience of these important party officials, depending upon the year at which they reached the selected posts. Fischer's theme is the rising importance within party officialdom of the "dual executive," the man who has had work experience either in industry or agriculture and who also has been a party official supervising and guiding economic organizations.

This theme is developed as a contribution to the broader argument that modern industrial societies need not be organized along pluralistic lines with independent power centers, but may alternatively follow a monistic model in which top political executives acquire and then use "enough technical skills in the various major spheres (most of all the economic sphere) to *counteract* the proliferation of specialized activities" (p. 14). The modern industrial society of the Soviet Union—which is described as beginning in the mid-1950s—is perceived as following the monistic model and as being able to function effectively without large amounts of social autonomy. The dual party executives are viewed as the political leaders who make this model work, and the increase in their importance is treated as partial evidence that "modernity" in the Soviet Union is developing along quite different lines from those to which we are accustomed in the West. In this book, Fischer concentrates upon presenting and developing this partial evidence rather than on developing a detailed case as to its significance for the broader argument.

Fischer's sample consists of only 306 individuals, but these constitute at least 69 per cent of all those who held the designated party positions between 1958 and 1962. This sample is analyzed closely—but very clearly—for changes in educational background, class back-

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ground, nationality, areas of career prior to appointment to the current position, and political standing as indicated by membership in the party's central committee.

However, Fischer's results suggest a major question of the degree to which his sample is representative of top-level party officials. Eighty-seven per cent of the sample consists of people filling party positions at the level of the individual republic, republic capital, and province. Since these administrative units are linked to nationalities and since the party stresses the placement of an individual of the locally predominant nationality in the top party role within an area, we find that individuals of the Russian nationality are underrepresented in this portion of the sample. Russians constitute 88 per cent of the sample of officials at the all-union level, but only 45 per cent of the remainder of the sample. This phenomenon suggests that the positions below the all-union level may not, in fact, be filled by the most important party officials working at the republic, province, and city level. Contrary to what Fischer implies, this issue does seem relevant to the question of the existence of a national trend towards dual party executives.

An equally important question is whether Fischer should not lump together both his dual executives and those party officials who have worked entirely within industry or agriculture prior to reaching their current posts. It would seem that both of these groupings consist of people who combine party and economic-sector work, since all are now carrying out important party functions. When these two categories are joined, Fischer's trend is much less pronounced.

Finally, there is a very real issue as to whether a trend can be established for such a brief period—particularly in view of the fact that the entire span was dominated by a single party leader. Fischer makes a pretty good case for this, but I remain troubled.

Despite these comments, Fischer's work can be highly recommended as constituting a very careful, imaginative, and informative treatment of his narrow subject.

DAVID GRANICK
University of Wisconsin

The Third Department: The Establishment and Practices of the Political Police in the Russia of Nicholas I *by P. S. Squire. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968.—viii, 272 pp. $11.50.*

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In the *Slavonic Review* (1960) Mr. P. S. Squire informatively surveyed the problem of internal security when Nicholas I on July 3, 1826 "provided Russia for the first time in her history with the foundations of a multifarious supervisory network operating under imperial control." After Sidney Monas's excellent *Third Section: Police and Society in Russia under Nicholas I* (1961) appeared, Mr. Squire, who reviewed it in the same journal, "thought it appropriate to narrow his field and produce a work of 'administrative history' intended to supplement [that] more general account" of the same division *(otdelenie)* of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery. Since his inquiry into the British and Hapsburg diplomatic archives produced meagre relevant results, he relies on the same "fragmentary . . . nevertheless voluminous" published materials in order "to examine the system of political investigation and surveillance" characteristic of the epoch of Nicholas I. He raises seven, strictly ten, questions which he believes specialist historians need answered. His main new contributions appear in chapter 1, "The Preliminary Phase: 1801-1825," and chapter 3, "The History of the Creation of the Corps of Gendarmes." The former treats none of his guiding questions, although it relates to the first. No other account rivals his initial summary of Russian endeavors with political police from Ivan IV through Alexander I, although he does not draw connections with other countries in Europe. New, too, is the delineation of the Corps of Gendarmes, created in 1826 as the hydra heads of the Third Section throughout Russia, with the administrative districts tabulated and usefully presented in two maps. The other four chapters go over ground well surveyed by Monas with his broad perspectives, exuberance, and illuminating indications of contemporary atmosphere. Comparisons would be inescapable even without Mr. Squire's explicit indications.

Some of Mr. Squire's positions on political police seem to me unproven. He is confident that a centralized police will be necessarily effective and unique. Napoleon likely envisaged both possibilities and consequent dangers to himself. In any event, as the Hapsburg ambassador, Metternich, noted in June 1809, the master of administrative centralization made sure that he would have several separate police organizations, not simply Fouché's, so admired or feared. I should think that the experience of both Alexander I and Nicholas I would prove that not centralization but the masters provide or prevent effectiveness. Secondly, the belief that uniforms or more generally public knowledge of the existence of police can seriously interfere with, let alone prevent, secret activities suggests either naïveté or understandable inexperience with what can be done simply through a

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passport office or a special branch. Thirdly, while leaning over backward to find good intentions in Benckendorff's original proposals for a police ministry in 1826, the author strangely omits the urging to intercept mail as the best and most extensive secret police.

In an "administrative history" it is disappointing to find so little about postal interception and the address office or system of registering residence and movement. One may wonder whether the managers of the political police were in fact as all-powerful as the author and Monas insist. Without more extensive study of the administration from full sources, I do not see how the point can be established. The author carefully reports some mildness, some remedying of administrative misdeeds, some ineffective warnings of the need to free public opinion and to ameliorate the conditions of serfs who formed the mass of Russian society, but he rightly insists that it is impossible to regard the political police "as anything but a pernicious organization" which created a general atmosphere of suspicion and oppression. "Laws are written for subordinates and not for those who make them," its first chief insisted.

D. E. EMERSON
University of Washington

How Communist China Negotiates *by Arthur Lall. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.—291 pp. $2.95.*

This is a most welcome addition to a small number of significant studies on the foreign policy of Communist China. The author is the former Indian ambassador to the United Nations and India's representative to the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference on Laos. He is thus well qualified by background to provide insight into China's negotiating behavior. What distinguishes this volume, however, is not the author's noteworthy record of diplomatic service, but that he has not succumbed to either cold war stereotypes or the hostility which now marks Sino-Indian relations. Mr. Lall brings to this work the detached viewpoint of the scholar; he is neither enemy nor apologist.

The substance of the book is twelve chapters which provide a thorough review and analysis of the Geneva Conference on Laos. Since the records of that conference have not yet been published and since the inside story of the conference is not well known, Lall corrects a major deficiency in the literature on Southeast Asia. In the process, he sheds considerable light on the international behavior of Communist China.

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The author also provides an analysis of China's negotiations with three of its Asian neighbors, Burma, Nepal, and Ceylon. While these case studies are significant in formulating hypotheses about China's foreign policy behavior, it should be asked why Lall did not examine Peking's negotiations with the United States or the Soviet Union or with India, Pakistan, Japan, and Indonesia? Certainly the author's choice could not have been motivated by a lack of drama or a lack of information. Indeed, one suspects that the author wanted only to pad his analysis of the Geneva Conference and this could be accomplished more painlessly by avoiding the more complex problems of Peking's relations with the other major powers of Asia.

The book also attempts to provide a broad perspective for interpreting China's foreign relations through a series of short introductory chapters which investigate the nature of the Chinese presence in international negotiations, the background and training of Chinese negotiators, and the general approach and attitude of Communist China toward international negotiations. These are important chapters which offer analyses comparable to the better journal articles on China's foreign policy. The chapter on the background and training of Chinese negotiators is fascinating, but its lack of depth indicates the overextended scope of the study and the limits of our knowledge about Chinese foreign policy. The chapter on Peking's general approach to foreign policy is excellent, but would have been strengthened if the author had been able to relate it to the substance of his case studies. Moreover, a truly comprehensive study of China's foreign policy must involve not only an analysis of the general principles of policy, the policy process, and the instruments of policy, but also the concrete manifestations of that policy toward each major geographical area.

This book is not the definitive study of China's foreign policy or negotiating behavior, but it is an important landmark in the search for such a book. In essence, it offers a limited overview of China's foreign policy as a bonus to a superb case study.

DENNIS M. RAY
California State College at Los Angeles

Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution *by Robert Jay Lifton. New York, Random House, 1968.—xviii, 178 pp. $4.95.*

Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolu-

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tion *by Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.—viii, 279 pp. $6.00.*

In an article published in the *Political Science Quarterly* of June 1967, I suggested that Mao's Cultural Revolution was partly motivated by the effort to perpetuate the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" after the death of the thinker. Dr. Lifton sees it as a quest for "revolutionary immortality." He considers the Cultural Revolution a form of anxiety related to both the anticipated death of a great leader and the "death of the revolution." Hence a quest for rebirth. After discussing these points, Lifton turns to the following aspects: "immortalization of words," the merging of purity and power, and technology and psychism. He concludes in the last two chapters of the book that Mao, confronted by psychological limitations, which resulted in the replacement of inner enthusiasm by outward compliance of the people, manifested the "end of charisma." To take a "last stand," Mao turned from "hero to despot." The author explores these themes from a professional psychiatrist's point of view.

In spite of limited source material and the use of technical terms, Lifton has produced a refreshing essay on the Cultural Revolution. His diagnosis seems to be correct, but one might be skeptical about some of his detailed analyses. For example, his explanation of Mao's poems must be treated with caution, for even Kuo Mo-jo, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and a noted literary figure close to Mao, admitted he misinterpreted the chairman's poems. Dr. Lifton has made no attempt to analyze Mao's dreams, which apparently are unknown to outside analysts.

The book by Gray and Cavendish is intended for background reading. The authors based their analysis on the principle that ideological explanations of events should be accepted only after all practical responses to problems have been exhausted. They reject the assumption that the Chinese Communist leaders act in order to maintain their power rather than maintain their power in order to act. They believe that while the Cultural Revolution represents a struggle for power, it marks a struggle "based upon concern with real issues of national policy."

Of the five chapters the one dealing with "Problems and Politics 1949-65" is the best summary of the period. The chapter on the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" is fragmentary but the chapter on the "Revolution in Culture" is well written. The book was written for the general reader at a time when the struggles which it describes had not come to an end. Hence the weakest part of the book is the

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last chapter dealing with the 1966-67 crisis, although at times it contains penetrating remarks and interpretations. The authors' acceptance of the official explanation of the role of the Red Guards—an explanation made exclusively in ideological terms—must now be altered. In August 1968 the theory had changed that the workers "must exercise leadership in everything." The authors tend to rationalize Mao's policies and view them in the best light.

The second half of the book consists of documents and articles. It is always difficult to decide what should be included in an appendix of this nature; much sometimes depends on the material available in English. One might argue that some of the articles should be replaced by documents more relevant to the book, such as the decision of the CCP Central Committee concerning the Cultural Revolution adopted on August 8, 1966. Misspelling of several Chinese names is apparently due to typographical errors.

CHÜN-TU HSÜEH
University of Maryland

Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939-1946 *by Ba Maw. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968. —xxiii, 460 pp. $8.75.*

Not since the appearance of the late Sutan Sjahrir's *Out of Exile* in 1941 have students of Southeast Asian affairs been presented with the real autobiography of a leading nationalist who, for some years, played a prominent role in his country's turbulent modern history. (President Sukarno's "autobiography," as recorded by Cindy Adams, does not quite belong in the same category of writing.) Both Sjahrir's and Ba Maw's books, in fact, were written in exile; Sjahrir's while colonialism lasted and thus some years before its author's sudden rise to political prominence, Ba Maw's after the revolution he had helped kindle had washed over and past him. (Sjahrir, who similarly fell from grace, died in virtual exile, once again, in Switzerland five years ago.) But there is little else that *Out of Exile* and *Breakthrough in Burma* have in common. The bulk of the Indonesian leader's slender volume consisted, after all, of personal letters written to his wife in faraway Europe; it thus constitutes a private, introspective, and at times almost tortured intellectual monologue. Not so the large (and, I should add, most handsomely produced and richly illustrated) volume by Dr. Ba Maw, premier of British Burma and Naingadaw Adipadi (head of state) of the Burmese government established during the

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Japanese occupation; it is a proud, extroverted, and brilliantly written piece of work obviously aimed at securing for himself a lasting place in Burmese, and indeed in Asian, history.

Unquestionably, historians will find Ba Maw's memoirs a gold mine of detailed information, replete with personal judgments and insights which they will have to test in the light of other (albeit very meager) sources on the period. Unquestionably, too, many of them will be irritated by the author's undaunted ego, by his sense for the dramatic, and above all by his conviction that he was, at least usually, right. No doubt, our author is not a modest man—but then, to misquote Winston Churchill, he really doesn't have much to be modest about. For this British-trained barrister with his Bordeaux Ph.D., who jumped into the limelight of Burmese public life as defense counsel for Saya San in the early 1930s, quite obviously knew how to play the political game both by the rules of British constitutionalism and those (far more difficult ones, one should think) of the Japanese occupation. Opportunist, schemer, collaborator? All these labels have been tacked onto Ba Maw by quite a few self-righteous critics at home and abroad. Yet, whatever his shortcomings, Dr. Ba Maw emerges from the pages of his autobiography as an honest man. I do not, and cannot, assert that everything in *Breakthrough in Burma* is literally true, for no man could hope to be *that* honest or equipped with such an unfailingly correct memory. And, as I have said, scholars will compare and contrast his words with whatever other contemporary records they can find. (One major work on the Japanese occupation of Burma is being completed in this country right now.)

Rather, Ba Maw's honesty lies in the fact that he neither minimizes his role during the Japanese interregnum nor apologizes for it. On that score, he emerges as a true giant among the lame apologists who have pleaded that they had no option but to bow before superior might or, more ingeniously still, that their sole reason for "collaborating" had been their desire to save their hapless compatriots from even worse Japanese exactions. (Sukarno and most wartime Filipino leaders, for example, have used such arguments.) But the erstwhile Adipadi not only recalls with real pride the attainment of Burma's independence in 1943, he also pays genuine homage to General Hideki Tōjō, wartime prime minister of Japan. Surely, nothing would have been easier (or cheaper) than to kick Tōjō, the condemned war criminal, a bit deeper into his grave. But to Ba Maw he has remained the epitome of true, Asian rectitude. *Breakthrough in Burma* therefore deserves our most careful attention, not only for its intrinsic interest as the story of a colorful, power-hungry, patriotic, and eminently

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literate Southeast Asian of an era that is rapidly receding into stereotyped quasi-history, but also because it forces us, among many other things, to take the cataclysmic years of World War II seriously—in a "Southeast Asian-centric" way, rather than with the misleadingly benign, somewhat condescending, attitude of the Allied victors in that war.

HARRY J. BENDA
Yale University

The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy *by Stanley A. Kochanek. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968.—xxv, 516 pp. $13.50.*

In the field of modern India studies, no lacuna has been more widely noted and lamented than the lack of a thorough political study of India's Congress party. An obvious reason has been the magnitude and complexity of the task, allowing little likelihood that any single volume could of itself fill that gap. This volume advances no such claims for itself, but it has succeeded in narrowing the gap.

Professor Kochanek's main interest lies in finding an explanation for the unusual degree of success achieved by the Indian National Congress in surviving the difficult transition from revolutionary movement to governing party. He distinguishes three periods in the changing relations between the national party and the national government: a transitional period, 1946-51; a period of centralization, 1951-63; and a period of divergence, 1963-67. (A postscript deals briefly with the party's "loss of hegemony" after the 1967 elections.) He focuses his analysis on (1) relations between Congress president and prime minister; (2) the role of the Congress Working Committee; and (3) sources of Congress recruitment and the nature of the leadership elite in party and in government.

The author is at his best in analyzing the first of these categories and least effective with the last, despite a neat array of tables. A major problem is that those characteristics of candidates which most readily lend themselves to computation are seldom identical with those which most affect success or failure at the polls. The Congress party, in each successive general election, sought to apply the lessons learned from previous elections. The strategy employed by the Congress leadership can better illuminate the dynamics of "one-party democracy" than any number of tables setting forth the age, education, occupation, etc. of the Congress members of successive Parliaments, especially when unaccompanied by

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comparable data on unsuccessful Congress candidates and their successful and unsuccessful rivals from other parties. The point need not be belabored here. The flaw is generic to the method and not specific to this study.

In the expectation that the author will build further on the foundations laid here, two general criticisms will be expressed and a corrective suggested. Where the actions and probable motivations of individuals are concerned, the analysis does not always allow for the subtle differences in boundaries permissible in Indian as opposed to Western—and particularly American—personal relationships. The Indian tolerance for didacticism and ideological disagreement is wide; Indian delicacy in many other matters is highly constraining. Some distortion appears to have crept in here, and, again, in not bringing out more sharply the nature of the issues on which deep divisions remained within the leadership under the facade of unity. The habit had become deeply ingrained to submerge these differences in bland, virtually meaningless generalizations. The analyst can accept these generalizations as expressions of fixed policy only at considerable peril. The corrective? Further immersion in the vast and growing store of autobiographical material. The author has made a good start in perusing the private papers of the late Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, and Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla. But outsiders, Congress rebels and cast-offs, no less than Congress stalwarts, have their contribution to make.

These counsels of perfection aside, it should be stated that the study as it is is useful and that the author displays qualities of sympathy, zest, acuteness, and scholarship which whet the appetite for further studies under his authorship.

MARGARET W. FISHER
University of California, Berkeley

Political Communication: The Public Language of Political Elites in India and the United States *by Satish K. Arora and Harold D. Lasswell. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969.—viii, 312 pp. $6.95.*

One of Harold Lasswell's more remarkable attributes is his enthusiasm for participating in empirical research to test and expand the propositions about politics stemming from his theoretic writings. The present book is such a collaborative effort with Satish Arora, currently at the National Institute of Community Development in Hyderabad, India. It

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provides a content analysis of front pages of the *Times of India* and the New York *Times* for the 1950s—following the format of Lasswell's earlier RADIR studies: Who focuses attention upon what values, issues, and regions?—in exploring the "relatively stable perspectives" or ideology of responsible Indian and American leaders.

Its main part is a sensitive account of the realm of political discourse in the two countries. A primary focus is the national self-image. India's is the language of moralistic introspection, the authors find; its values are those of Hindu interpersonal ethics and sensed cultural superiority. American rhetoric, confident to the point of arrogance, celebrates self-reliance and American good will, merging values with specific institutions allegedly ordained by the Founding Fathers. Another focus is the nation's place in the world. India, the authors conclude, entered into the international arena of the early 1950s with a set of perspectives that mirrored its internal climate of moralism, but which its leaders had to revise drastically when they encountered "the brutal stabs of reality." The United States, in contrast, spoke the jargon of morality while proposing brinksmanship from a position of strength as the proper answer to perceived Soviet expansionism. Extensive direct quotation and contextual elaboration convey a sense of both the texture and depth of these ideologies as well as their flexibility in responding to specific situations.

In its quantification of the material presented in the two newspapers the study is less successful. Categorizing communicators, issue areas, and regional focuses of concern rests upon well-established procedures, to be sure. Here the authors find that a single man, Jawaharlal Nehru, dominated the front pages of the *Times of India;* and, in contrast to the United States, which paid about equal attention to both, India devoted almost 50 per cent more attention to domestic than to international affairs. More problematic is the analysis of demands made in terms of Lasswell's value-configurative approach. The authors do not specify their coding procedures, but one suspects that a more carefully drawn scheme would have uncovered a more extensive networks of demands and expectations. As it is, the 408 front pages at which they looked yielded but 328 value demands, over two-thirds of them in the Indian press. Even this small number, however, suffices to confirm the authors' impression that "the world political role of the United States brought with it an acute sense of power" and that, as expected, "the Indians emphasize ethical and religious values in projecting the national self."

It is at the interpretive level that the book is at its best. The developmental pattern of dynamic ideology, the authors suggest, is

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from emphasis on deference values (power, rectitude, respect, and affection) in the precolonial days to welfare values (well-being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment) thereafter. The nature of the postcolonial world, in which the British *raj* could not be held responsible for all failures, eluded most Indian elites; they were unable to exercise adequate initiative in forging a national identity that could cope with the stresses of nationhood. The exception, Nehru, could be seen as additional support for Erikson's hypothesis that a leader can provide a group identity through his quest of a private one. Even so, however, for a nation such as India that was realizing its values, the direction of ideological change "will be toward accepting the self with less exaggerated distortion of the image as perceived; toward greater realism in setting goals and appraising capabilities; and toward the strategy of reciprocity rather than special treatment as a way of dealing with the world community."

Such findings encourage readers to ignore a certain lack of caution in separating direct inferences, based on data generated in the study, from (thoroughly plausible) theoretic extensions. Moreover, it is not clear whether ideology is an independent influence on the actions of elites or simply a medium for post hoc justification to nonelites. And the authors' assertions that common frames of reference are essential to the coordination of large social units assumes an intensity and scope of interaction among constituents which may not obtain for India or any other national entity. These and more minor irritations notwithstanding, the book remains important as an approach to the dynamic relationship among ideology, action, and experience in the political arena.

RICHARD L. MERRITT AND WILLIAM P. TOWELL
University of Illinois

Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite *by James C. Scott. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968.—x, 302 pp. $8.75.*

Interest in the analysis of cultural personality has given rise in recent years to a number of suggestive and sometimes illuminating studies of non-Western, postcolonial societies, prompted for the most part by the desire of Western social scientists to understand and explain the dynamics of modernization and nation building. The present work is a useful addition to this corpus, not least because its emphasis is less on the pathology

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of the phenomena examined (as in the common assumption, for example, that the cultural stresses of colonial rule and postcolonial change have misshaped the psyche of the governing elites of new nations) than on the importance of (relatively) realistic patterns of adjustment to perceived social and economic circumstance. Scott is primarily concerned with the "Westernizing bureaucracy" rather than with politicians. Taking a random sample of just-below-top-level, English-educated civil servants in Malaysia, he examines in detail the content of their latent personal political ideology. The sample is small—only 17 persons out of a universe of about 500 falling within the defined range—and multiracial, containing statistically roughly appropriate numbers of Malays, Chinese, and Indians. The techniques of inquiry used are based on those developed by Robert E. Lane and involve extended in-depth interviewing.

The non-social scientist (and perhaps others) may feel some uneasiness concerning the restrictiveness of the sample, and consequently about the validity of generalizations drawn from it—either to all Malaysians of the kind or, even more, to those of similar groups elsewhere in the non-Western world. Mr. Scott himself, to be fair, utters clear warnings to this effect, but argues, with justice, that it is worth trying to see the wood as well as the trees. And the trees are excellently observed. With an insight into and sensitivity for Malaysian life which is certainly owed in part to the intimacy and involvement of his field work, Scott explores the basic value orientations of his respondents to human nature, social behavior, and the allocation of resources. These are characterized by consistent belief in the existence of asocial self-interest as the principal font of action in men, in the notion of limited good (in which economic or other success can be achieved only at the expense of competitors), and in a consequent mistrust of the possibilities of social cooperation except when constrained by external sanction. The political implications of this conspectus for Malaysia, and by extension for other parts of the non-Western world, are that in circumstances of scarcity and no fair shares for all, a politics of social trust cannot, in all reality, be expected. From further inquiry, in the final section of the book, Scott finds that support for liberal democracy is relatively weak among the group examined, who prefer on the whole a paternalistic authoritarian regime which can control competition and impose cooperation. The conclusion drawn—that stronger attachment to social trust and liberal political institutions must await the confidence bred by a more rapidly expanding social product—while not necessarily a gloomy one, must temper all hope with caution.

This is a most interesting book about Malaysia (*pace* Scott's disclaimer that he is not principally concerned with the uniqueness of the Malaysian experience) and a thoughtful contribution to the literature on the

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role of ideology in postcolonial settings in general.

WILLIAM R. ROFF
Columbia University

Nation-Building and Community in Israel *by Dorothy Willner. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1969.—xii, 478 pp. $10.00.*

Miss Willner's study not only fulfills the high expectations of specialists who have long awaited her informed analysis of the new immigrant villages in Israel. Her extended and analytically enriched final product, a study of both village development and nation-building, is an illuminating synoptic account of Israel as a whole society.

The book employs several different methods somewhat eclectically. The author reports the empirical findings of anthropological field work conducted under her direction in a group of villages as well as her direct experience in the central, regional, and local administration of Israel's immigrant rural settlement project. She examines critically recent sociological and anthropological studies in the light of theoretical models currently popular in economic development research, general political sociology, and organizational analysis. She also brings to bear her knowledge of the general history of resettlement in Israel, evidently based on the main published Hebrew accounts and personal interviews.

The book demonstrates the advantages an intelligent anthropologist enjoys in approaching the topics of planning, economic development, and political modernization, or what might in summary fashion be termed systematic contemporary history. Not being bound to any particular theoretical discipline, Miss Willner's use of social science is undogmatic, free, and elastic, as well as fairly exhaustive. Not being inherently biased against analytical theory, she applies historical insight with perceptive attention to the new historical problems and perspectives suggested by social science.

Her reports on the motivations and attitudes of administrators are shrewd and illuminating, if impressionistic, first-hand accounts. Regarding the background, values, and process of adjustment of the villagers, she examines data from current literature, her own field work, and personal impressions in order to verify, or falsify, generalizations that have been proposed. The main conclusion is an emphatic endorsement of the importance, for the success or failure of village

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development, of idiosyncratic features rather than of one or another proposed dynamic model. But it is precisely her critical examination of the proposed models which enables Miss Willner to highlight *significant* idiosyncratic features.

A major contribution of Miss Willner's book is its historical introduction, setting village development in the context of nation-building. Here she develops her major theoretical insight: the thesis that Israel's success in modernization and development depends on having reversed the "order of basic transformations" usually encountered among the new nations. These, she points out, are generally "new states" constituted from "old societies" and preexisting "communities," who seek by developing and utilizing appropriate "organizations" to create a "national identity." In Israel there was first a traditional "national identity"; then were created appropriate "organizations" that successfully established new "communities" and eventually a new "society," and upon this basis the new state was built and was able to function effectively.

The discussion of the terms involved is a useful contribution of the book. The thesis is suggestive, even persuasive, and provides enlightening interpretation of the subsequent materials. But there is nothing like the kind of formal testable proof that Miss Willner requres in her critical examination of other generalizations. On the other hand, the introduction serves another, perhaps not precisely intended, purpose: it is an excellent general survey of the major values and general atmosphere of society in Israel, on a level comparable with that available in Hebrew to well read Israelis.

BEN HALPERN
Brandeis University

The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Series A: Letters, Vol. I: Summer 1885–29 October 1902 *edited by Leonard Stein in collaboration with Gedalia Yogev. London, Oxford University Press, 1968.—xlii, 447 pp. $8.75.*

The long-awaited publication of the Weizmann papers and letters has finally got under way. The eminent statesman and chemist also had a deep historical sense and it was on his own initiative that back in 1940 serious consideration was given to the preservation of relevant documents from his growing private collection. He was aided in this undertaking by a number of scholars and particularly by his wife,

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who, until her death in 1966, evinced a deep interest in collecting these source materials which she realized would prove of great value to future historical research. Assisted by a number of close friends, especially Meyer Weisgal, chairman of the editorial board, who sketches the history of the project in his general foreword to this volume, the Chaim Weizmann National Memorial, established in 1952 by the government of Israel and the Jewish Agency, was able to assemble much of the correspondence, the originals of which had been scattered over many countries.

Even so, the editors faced formidable tasks. To begin with, they had to sift no less than 23,000 letters in addition to speeches, circulars, and other administrative materials which emanated from Weizmann's office but often dealt with purely technical aspects shedding little light on his personality and activities. They reduced this bulk to some 15,000 letters which they are planning to publish in a series of volumes. To judge from their selection included in Volume I, which covers only 320 letters, the series is going to be a very long one, particularly after it enters the most decisive years of Weizmann's activities, beginning shortly before the First World War and ending with his death in 1952. Perhaps somewhat greater selectivity might profitably be applied in future volumes to reduce the number of documents which are either repetitious or of minor intrinsic significance.

Remarkably, the epistles here published shed relatively little light on Weizmann's personality. Not even in the letters written to his future wife, Vera Khatzman, during the first two of their six-year courtship (1900-1906) does he speak much about himself. These letters, constituting the largest group in the volume, are almost entirely devoted to reports on Weizmann's Zionist activities. Only occasionally does he write like an ardent suitor. Except for numerous complaints about his overwork, his feeling tired, and his failing health, we learn little about what was going on in his innermost thoughts and emotions. True, in his letter to Miss Khatzman of June 3, 1901 when he was twenty-six years old, he confessed: "Do you know, during these days right after your departure I have been engaged in a terrible self-analysis, and have discovered many, very many, shortcomings. So many, Verochka, that I am getting frightened." But in the same context he also declared that "it is *imperative* that private life should not interfere with the fulfillment of public duty" (pp. 119ff. No. 84).

We learn little more about Weizmann's professional activities, although his achievements as a student of chemistry (for about two

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years he had been serving as lecturer in chemistry at Geneva University) were quite noteworthy. As is well known, these studies ultimately proved very useful to him in his wartime contributions to the defense of Great Britain and, indirectly, helped him greatly in his negotiations with the British government leading up to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. That he assiduously worked in the laboratory, which was also the mainstay of his livelihood, is reflected also by occasional asides in his letters. At one juncture he complained to Ahad Ha'am that he was but a "Canaanite slave" in the laboratory—the Hebrew equivalent of an extremely hard worker (pp. 227f., No. 156). Yet it is surprising to learn that in 1902 he was toying with the idea of giving up his scientific teaching and research in favor of a full-time job in Zionist cultural work—an idea from which he was dissuaded, in part, by Vera's strong protest (pp. 363ff., No. 280).

Most of the contents of this volume, four-fifths of which cover only the two years of 1901-1902, are devoted to such organizational activities as the preparations of the Youth Conference which, after many delays, met in Basle on December 18-23, 1901 shortly before the Fifth Zionist Congress. Out of all this hard work emerged a new so-called Democratic Fraction, a term used to designate "more than a group and rather less than a Party." While this group of like-minded leaders did not endure, it did exert considerable influence on the World Zionist Organization during the last years of Theodor Herzl's life. Over much opposition, Weizmann and his associates prevailed upon the Zionist leaders to adopt an expanded cultural program, which included the idea of founding a Jewish University. We learn from these letters about Weizmann's intensive efforts to collect the necessary data concerning anti-Jewish discrimination in Russian and other universities; budgetary problems and curricula in existing schools of higher learning; Jewish student groups in various countries; and the like. He originally envisaged two Jewish universities, one in Palestine primarily devoted to Jewish studies and another in a European country offering instruction in the various branches of science and letters. In his youthful exuberance, Weizmann evidently underestimated the difficulties of the task. But with his usual perseverance he never let the idea drop until he laid the foundation stone of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in July 1918.

The editors of this volume have done yeomen's work in translating Weizmann's multilingual letters (at first predominately in Russian; only a few in Hebrew and German) into idiomatic English and providing them with excellent footnotes, headnotes, and bridgenotes. They also supplied a detailed biographical and a general index.

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Undoubtedly one of the most time-consuming and least rewarding parts of their work consisted in such negative findings as that certain events or personalities mentioned in a letter could no longer be identified or that a certain paper to which Weizmann referred was no longer extant. It may be hoped, however, that some of these lacunae may yet be filled by future research at the Wiezmann National Memorial and elsewhere.

SALO W. BARON
Columbia University

The American Approach to the Arab World *by John S. Badeau. New York, Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968.—xi, 204 pp. $4.95.*

This is a work of reflection on the problems and prospects of American policy in the Arab states situated at the core of the Middle East by the U.S. ambassador to the UAR from 1961 to 1964. It is thoughtful, realistic, and circumspect. Its two basic intellectual points are, first, that there can be no U.S. or, for that matter, no Great Power policy which one can call "Arab policy" because, second, there is no such political entity, or even category of study, as the "Arab world." Hence, the restrained title of the book, emphasizing approach rather than policy. To the extent that America's basic interests in the Arab Middle East constitute an aspect, or part, of its global strategic and political interests, to that extent, America must deal with the Arab states. But can one distinguish between an approach and a policy, or should one think in terms of bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual Arab states? If one entertains the latter approach, is speculation about America's particular attitude and approach to such current manifestations of radicalism in the Arab world as revolutionary nationalism and socialism essential, or imperative?

The author's diplomatic experience has enabled him clearly to distinguish basic American interests in the area as these are related to wider commitments in the world. He has intelligently and lucidly set these against the available implements of foreign policy, the dilemmas of policy, and tested them in a case study of the Yemen. Throughout this discussion, Mr. Badeau is conscious of limitations upon the capabilities and flexibility of any Great Power's policy toward a group of states which profess unity in the attainment of a suprastate national ideal and yet are so disunited in action; which generate so

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much conflict in their relations with each other and with the outside world; and which are collectively—at least outwardly—engaged in and committed to a confrontation with a state and society whose existence they reject, the state of Israel. That no external power can completely police or control such a situation, as the author argues, is obvious. This disability was, incidentally, plain to the Israelis at least before June 1967.

The book is at its weakest—and misleading—when it discusses American policy in relation to internal developments in the Arab states: what the author calls the "new forces" in the Arab world. Here Mr. Badeau is confined to generalizations at best and misconceptions at worse. He asserts that the leaders of the new Arab nationalism are different from those who led the Arab countries after the Great War. He observes (p. 48) that "The older leaders were the products both of Western education and of the Islamic reform movements of the nineteenth century. . ." while the new ones are not; they know the West only at second hand, owe no debt to Muslim political thought, and have a secular dedication to the tasks of modernization. Yet, in many ways, that is what older leaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did, they adopted enthusiastically—at least outwardly—liberal Western European secularism.

Mr. Badeau asserts a revolution versus traditionalism dichotomy in the Arab world today and suggests that revolutionism is the tide of the future. While this may be so at first glance, it is important to move from generalization to the posing of certain fundamental questions. How genuine is this dichotomy, beyond its reflection of conflicting state-national interests, a struggle for leadership and power? Is there a real difference in the nature and principle of rule (the normative concerns of power, its organization, exercise, and use) between the so-called revolutionary and reactionary Arab? Case studies for the examination of this condition can be easily conducted in any of the Arab states. What is the relation between the political ideas (or ideologies) so far articulated and actual political behavior?

The same criticism applies to the author's suggestion that there is a mutuality of interests and a cultural affinity between the United States and the Arabs. What is a Western intellectual? How far does the Arab Westernized intellectual approach that condition? What happened to the so-called Westernized Arab intellectuals in the last twenty years? It is possible that the author has confused vociferous Arab nationalist consensus with social and political cohesiveness needed for action. The lack of social cohesiveness among citizens of different Arab states is paralleled by the same shortcoming within

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individual Arab national-state communities. Nor is the rather Western notion of the common good a highly rated Arab individual and collective value.

How then does a Great Power identify itself on an official level with Arab development and progress? It can, as it has in the past, suggest the infusion of artifacts into Arab society, hoping that these will produce social change and modern men. The problem until now is that there are no signs that a serious revaluation within Arab society is forthcoming. Moreover, will such an American attitude (especially toward the revolutionary regimes in the Arab world) make any practical difference?

In practical political terms it may be comfortable to advocate the identification of a Great Power with a volatile nationalism which prefers loyalty to an abstract absolute rather than to a well defined territory (the *sine qua non* of nationalism). But it is also facile. Nor is it safe to argue that Arab nationalism is a sufficient resistant to foreign control. The best resistant to such control is perhaps when nationalism becomes a reflection of an individual and social-political commitment by Arabs to a cohesive society, one which promotes and protects the common good. This development is not evident in most Arab states, including the radical ones.

Mr. Badeau's book is welcome for its realism as regards the capabilities and limitations of American policy in the Middle East. Unfortunately, this reviewer cannot equally welcome it for its depicting of the nature and characteristics of the "new Arab world."

P. J. VATIKIOTIS
University of London

Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century *edited by William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968.— x, 427 pp.*

This collection comprises the edited results of a stimulating conference held under the auspices of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago in October 1966. Although the papers are uneven in quality and scope, and some important problems are not touched, the overall level of originality and significance is high, particularly in the relatively neglected field of modern Middle Eastern social history.

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The editors' introduction summarizes the highlights of the conference discussions, but it would have been more useful for many readers if these highlights had come at the end of the paper or papers to which a discussion refers. Then the editors might have included a substantial essay drawing general and comparative conclusions and raising new questions, tying together the volume's material and filling in some of its lacunae, instead of leaving each paper to stand on its own.

This reservation aside, the editors, authors, and designers have turned out a most useful and attractive book. The book begins with a fine brief summary by Stanford Shaw on nineteenth-century Ottoman reforming officials and their reforms, followed by a substantial and important paper on "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables" by Albert Hourani. Mr. Hourani traces the varying relation of local notables to reform in different parts of the Ottoman empire, showing that in Arab Asia the notables generally either were an obstacle to reform or took advantage of such reforms as the Ottoman land law of 1858 to create large private landed estates. The theme of the notables' power to obstruct reform in Arab Asia is taken up later in the volume in papers on nineteenth-century Syria by Moshe Ma'oz and Shimon Shamir. Both make excellent use of British Public Records Office documents and Arabic and Turkish material, and Ma'oz summarizes skillfully much important material in his book on *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968). Ma'oz shows in detail how local notables and *ulama* managed to dominate the newly instituted elective councils and use them to hinder reform; both Ma'oz and Shimar show the difficulties in enforcing reform encountered by the Ottoman governors of Syria. In view of Ma'oz's study, one must be skeptical of one conclusion voiced in Roderic Davison's essay, that the indirectly elected local councils were significant instruments of modernization and of implanting representative principles. Pending a more thorough study of these councils' functioning throughout the empire, one might guess on the basis of the Syrian example that the councils were as much an instrument to block modernization as to encourage it and that they might be seen as part of a continuing pattern in the Middle East of the use of representative institutions by the existing power elite for their own purposes.

Also included are excellent papers on the economic and social history of Syria by Dominique Chevallier and of Egypt by Charles Issawi; both indicate how the nineteenth-century distortion of the local economy in the interests of Western manufacturers and traders created economic and social problems and tensions that profoundly affected the whole society. Issawi's paper makes excellent use of comparative

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material; Chevallier discusses the European-caused drain of precious metals, encouragement of Christian middlemen, and undermining of largely Muslim artisans and traders that underlay some of the tensions and uprisings in Syria and Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century.

A fine paper by Nada Tomiche on Egyptian women in the first half of the nineteenth century is one of the few serious contributions to this important subject. Concerning Muslim religious reactions to modernization there are only an outstanding comprehensive analysis of the Sudan by P. M. Holt and a brief but excellent case study on the rectors of al-Azhar, 1798-1879, by Afaf Marsot. In the only paper on Iran, Hafez Farman Farmayan has given the most comprehensive survey that exists in English on internal intellectual and political influences on Iranian modernization, though one might question the weight he assigns to manuscript travel accounts and to Naser ed-Din Shah and his trips abroad.

There is not space here to discuss all the papers in this volume, some of which are of a rather limited or specialized interest, but only one or two of which have little to say. The other contributors to this fine volume are Kemal Karpat, Ercümend Kuran, Gabriel Baer, Kamal Salibi, Jacques Berque, Allan Cunningham, Fritz Steppat, Jacob Landau, and Richard Chambers. This review has concentrated on themes and items that especially struck the interests of the reviewer, but some of the other ideas and essays should be of great interest to those concerned with the modern Middle East.

In several papers this volume indicates that modernization was not the steady one-way progressive process that some models and discussions assume. At almost every step there were negative or "reactionary" features: among them were the rigidification of the confined position of women and of the conservatism of the Azhar after the shock of French conquest and Muhammad Ali's forcible reforms (discussed by Tomiche and Marsot); the reinforcement of the landed and political power of many local notables; economic dislocations and growing gaps between rich and poor and between Muslims and non-Muslins as a result of the Western impact; and the undermining of local autonomies as a result of centralization. More explicit treatment of such contradictions in the history of the Middle East since 1798 could lead us to a better understanding of a total social process that is usually subsumed under the fashionable but inadequate and rosy-hued term, "modernization."

NIKKI R. KEDDIE
University of California, Los Angeles

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Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism *by Firuz Kazemzadeh. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968.—ix, 711 pp. $15.00.*

Firuz Kazemzadeh's study is a masterpiece in that it is the work of a master of both the subject and the available materials. In 1864, as Russia prepared to renew the drive across Asia, Gorchakov armed her representatives abroad with arguments in a circular dispatch. There was "an imperious necessity" for an onward movement "where the greatest difficulty is to know where to stop" (pp. 7–8). The British had to decide whether, or where, to try to stop them. Some thought that Russia might prove "a safe ally, a better neighbour than the Mahommedan races." Others really believed that Britain was in danger in India and even, in consequence, in Europe. The final stand did not come for twenty years. Gladstone cried "halt" after the incident at Penjdeh when Britain was isolated and exposed as a result of the diplomatic consequences of the occupation; Russia gave way, although she held all that she had gained. The first hundred pages of Professor Kazemzadeh's book are the best available account of that long struggle.

Fear about the ultimate control of Afghanistan had finally hardened the British attitude. About Persia the British were always less firm. Some few Englishmen wanted political control, but they were few and Curzon's failure in 1919 showed how right they had been. British governments rarely had political ambitions with regard to Persia. It was only individuals who were ambitious, and they usually for profit. This is certainly true of Reuter, but also very likely of Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff, about whom Professor Kazemzadeh's judgment that he "firmly believed that the large-scale investment of British capital in Persia was the surest means of ensuring Britain's position in that country" (p. 241), is a charitable assessment of his motives.

The subtitle of this most useful book is misleading. It is not a study in imperialism. It is an account of the fate of a relatively small but important country during the age of imperialism. The book ends, as it begins, with an excellent account of a major episode in Anglo-Russian relations—their agreement in the face of the growing fear of Germany, of which the principal, though incidental, victim was Persia. Another sufferer was the image of Great Britain in Persian and in many British eyes. The demands of security in a time of international stress are difficult to reconcile with the wish for a moral and beneficent role in the affairs of the world. Gladstone learned this in

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Egypt. Another Liberal statesman, Grey, did so when he accepted the arguments for an alliance with Russia.

Professor Kazemzadeh undoubtedly exaggerates the importance of the part which Persia played in the calculations of successive British governments. His book is about Persia and it is in the nature of things that he should do so. But he is quite right to see, arising from Grey's abandonment of Persia, a shock to British opinion and a loss of moral force in other parts of the world, of which the effects are, perhaps, still with us. The dilemma was well expressed by Cecil Spring-Rice. "If Grey," he wrote, "can get *real* agreement with Russia, it is well worth sacrificing Persia—though I doubt whether a great country can afford to be mean even in the smallest things" (p. 495).

H. S. DEIGHTON
Pembroke College, Oxford

The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation *by Stanislav Andreski. New York, Atherton Press, 1968.—237 pp. $6.95.*

As the title indicates, Professor Andreski's book is another of the type pioneered by René Dumont's *Africa is Off to a Bad Start.* Andreski, who has taught and worked on research in Africa for eight years, examines in some detail a number of the social and political developments of postindependence Africa from a highly critical point of view in order to correct what he calls "the error which underlay the idealism of the Africans." His critique, which is aimed chiefly at the westernized elite of leadership in Africa, centers about the corruption widespread among the politicians who came to power at independence. He finds corruption so prevalent, in fact, that it has almost become a system of government, under which countries are ruled by what Dr. Andreski calls a "bureaucracy." The continuation of mismanagement at high levels of government and the civil service, ill-fated experiments in socialist economics, and pressure from a constantly rising population serve to make his forecast of any rapid improvement in the African situation very pessimistic.

To readers who have followed the trend of events in Africa since 1960, much of Dr. Andreski's criticism will be all too familiar. Many observers have been disillusioned at the rise of authoritarian control, the slow rate of progress in many countries, and the failure of the governing elite to uphold standards of public probity. But in making

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his point the author fails to take full account of the difficulties faced by the new governments at independence and of the highly charged emotional context in which they were required to operate.

Unfortunately, the author's opinions appear often to be based on "all-Indians-walk-single-file-at-least-the-few-I-saw-did" type of evidence. He tends to generalize for the continent or for a country from individual instances and to make sweeping statements to buttress opinions for which he adduces no proof whatever. Such statements, for example, as "The recent military coups—in consequence of which the majority of African states came under military rule," tend to undermine the reader's faith in Dr. Andreski's knowledge of his subject. The book has more than its share of such factual errors of a more or less serious nature.

Fundamentally, Dr. Andreski's quarrel with the African elite is that they are not Europeans. He appears to have absorbed most of the standard expatriate cliches about Africans, and, by implication at least, he appears to believe that the disappearance of the colonial administrations was the real beginning of Africa's present predicament. The reviewer cannot help wondering why Dr. Andreski spent several years teaching in African universities in view of his condemnation of African university teachers as politicians, not intellectuals. He argues, he "cannot designate as 'intellectuals' the creative writers in Europe, while affixing this label to all the diploma-holders in Africa." Agreed, but Africans would make this distinction also. Has the author ever heard of the new African literature? If so, he makes no mention of it; perhaps because much of it has been written by these same diploma-holders, who by his definition are not intellectuals.

Many of the random observations and opinions in the book are both valid and interesting, of course, but taken as a whole the volume contributes little to the organized study of contemporary African social problems. Unfortunately, it reveals more about the author than it does about Africa.

L. Gray Cowan
Columbia University

Panafrikanismus: Zur Geschichte der Dekolonisation *by Imanuel Geiss. Frankfurt am Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1968. —489 pp. DM 48.*

Imanuel Geiss is a pupil of Fritz Fischer and an expert in his own

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right on subjects as diverse as modern German history and African trade unionism. He has now written a comprehensive history of pan-Africanism which supersedes valuable earlier accounts like Thomas Lionel Hodgkin's *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London, 1956) and Colin Legum's *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (New York, 1962). Geiss first of all discusses the social and ideological roots of pan-Africanism in the past, starting with the slave trade, American slavery, and what he calls "proto-Panafricanism." He then gives an account of the black settlement movements in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the role of the missions in West Africa, the impact of the Ethiopian churches, and other related subjects. The second portion of the book covers the period 1900 to 1945. The author deals with the precursors of pan-Africanism in the nineteenth century, the various pan-African congresses, the part played by Du Bois and Garvey, the development of pan-Africanism in the French-speaking world, Great Britain, and the U.S., and finally the Fifth Pan-African Congress at Manchester, England in 1945. A short concluding section traces in a somewhat summary fashion the development of pan-Africanism between 1945 and 1966. It also attempts to place the movement in a wider historical setting.

Geiss considers that pan-Africanism has always been the concern of tiny minorities, the intellectual elites among black Americans, black West Indians, and black Africans, especially West Africans. The pan-African ideal has suffered from contradictions between the desire for modernization and the search for an often unduly romanticized past to establish an ideological identity. For this and other reasons, pan-Africanism has sustained disastrous blows since the fall of Nkrumah. According to Geiss, "Panafricanism at present is paralyzed to such a far-reaching extent that a new start can only be made after a thorough-going reevaluation of its premises and contents."

This valuable work has certain weaknesses. All too little has been said concerning the white actors in the drama of decolonization. (Pan-Africanism, for instance, also used to be a rallying cry for some white South Africans and for certain British settlers in Rhodesia and Kenya.) The author might also have given more attention to certain theoretical aspects. Pan-Germanism is not mentioned among the "pan-" movements discussed on page 330. Yet the writer would have been eminently qualified to include pan-Germanism in his comparative analysis, as well as other aspects of German nationalist and romantic thought. (Léopold Senghor, for example, acknowledged the debt he owed to German romanticism, while concepts such as Max Scheler's notion of the German "proletarian nation" arrayed against Western

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capitalist imperialists—a notion developed during the First World War—might also have been mentioned.)

There is a detailed bibliography which lists published as well as unpublished sources. This is itself a fine research tool, though there are some omissions. But despite these criticisms, Geiss's book will surely remain the German standard work on the subject for many years to come.

LEWIS H. GANN
Stanford University

Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State *by W. Scott Thompson. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1969.—xxvii, 462 pp. $13.75.*

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's hugely ambitious efforts for himself and his country are the subject of this book, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-66*. This policy was strongly conditioned by at least five factors: the *Osagyefo's* personality and ideals which determined the way he conceived Ghana's and Africa's interests; the country's internal politics; its historic links with the West; the interests of the leading world powers in that period; and the political fact of Ghana being the first of the sub-Saharan states to achieve its independence in the twentieth century, thus giving it an unnatural importance. It follows, therefore, that no analysis of Ghana's foreign policy can be either complete, or even completely comprehensible, if it is discussed except in terms of everything that happened in the country at the time. This is a difficulty which faces all writers engaged in studies of the foreign policy of any developing or revolutionary-minded state. Mr. Scott Thompson understands this difficulty very well, and he has tried to relate the development of Nkrumah's foreign policy to political changes within Ghana. It is not really his fault at all that he has been unable to provide enough of the political background to sustain the wealth of information he has collected on Ghana's foreign policy, for to have done so would have required a book at least twice the length of the present one. The author has had to face another difficulty—the problem of trying to organize his material in a way susceptible to logical analysis. Nkrumah's policies were often contradictory and not always rational. Nkrumah—who sought to cast himself in the role of Africa's Lenin—was, in fact, a highly pragmatic politician, not to say an opportunist. His policies could be influenced as much by a whim, or even a prejudice, as by a carefully presented argument. Moreover, like Fidel Castro, he was a ro-

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mantic; his ideas of reality were, not infrequently, pure hallucination—as in his relations with the late Patrice Lumumba. But unlike Castro, Nkrumah's Ghana had considerable resources—at least at the beginning; and it had much more room for maneuver both within the continent to which it belongs, and within the area of world politics. It was therefore possible for Ghana to play an important role in the postcolonial politics of the Third World, if only Nkrumah had been able to see this role clearly and to operate within the realistic limits set by Ghana's influence and resources. Certainly, his initial contributions to popularizing pan-Africanist political ideas and to strengthening the concepts of nonalignment were both exciting and valuable. But each of his policies invariably ended in failure. One writes this knowing that the end might not yet have come for Nkrumah, who sits patiently in his place of exile in Conakry, the prophet of his own "second coming." One should be careful not to write him off thus prematurely; but if Nkrumah were ever to lead Ghana again, he would profit greatly by reading Scott Thompson's impressively informative dissection of the men who made Ghana's policies between 1957-66.

It is astonishing to read just how ineptly Nkrumah handled his relations, foreign and internal. He quarreled with Western countries without abandoning his dependance on their goodwill. He courted the Russians, while at the same time developing his own revisionist Marxist theories as expounded in *Consciencism*. He joined with the radical states of the Middle East, but cherished his relations with Israel. And he joined with the African establishment in the Organisation of African Unity, while seeking to subvert the status quo of many of his neighbors. No wonder that even as skillful a guide as Scott Thompson seems, at times, to flounder in the thickets of Nkrumah's headquarters at Flagstaff House.

It is unlikely that any worthwhile contemporary history of Ghana will be written in the future without relying heavily on this work, especially because of its valuable source material—much of it classified as highly confidential which, fortunately, the author was able to rescue from the reckless bonfires lit by soldiers after their successful coup against Nkrumah in 1966.

COLIN LEGUM
London

Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa *by N. J. Rhoodie. Pretoria, Academica, 1969.—xii, 429 pp.*

Afrikaners complain that their point of view is not appreciated out-

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side South Africa. It is true that their books reach few English readers; this one was first published in Afrikaans in 1966. One wonders why it has now been translated into the kind of turgid English which too many Afrikaners write and which is hard to read. Professor Rhoodie, of the University of Pretoria, adds virtually nothing to our knowledge of the theory or practice of apartheid in the Republic and Rhodesia, which he is at pains to defend. I cannot imagine any serious English-speaking specialist, in South Africa or beyond, who will be influenced in the slightest degree by the disingenuous arguments or the old scraps of information in these tedious 400 pages, written in a spirit hard to distinguish from the propaganda issued by the State Information Office.

Here is a taste of it: "No unbiased observer currently entertains any doubt that the White sub-continent of Africa is to-day involved in a life or death struggle to protect its lawful interests against the malicious and militant interference of certain anti-White as well as ideologically anti-Western countries" (p. 363). Or this: "South Africa's Whites are branded as 'settlers' by the communists and black racialists" (p. 365). Compare this with the recent manifesto on southern Africa issued after the conference of east and central African states in Lusaka: "Our stand towards southern Africa involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins" (New York *Times*, May 2, 1969).

The only value of this book is to reveal the level on which most earnest Afrikaners think and write about race relations in their own country. Their outlook owes virtually nothing to the empirical tradition of Anglo-American sociologists. It evidently does owe something to the influence of German theorists of an earlier epoch. As a result, there can be no fruitful debate between the advocates and the opponents of apartheid, as everyone knows who has lived in South Africa and worked in this academic field. Professor Rhoodie makes no attempt to deal with the large critical literature that not only foreigners but liberal and progressive white South Africans have produced in increasing volume since 1930. That is the main reason why this book is pathetic.

JULIUS LEWIN
Royal Commonwealth Society
London

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Southern Africa and the United States *edited by William Hance. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1968.—171 pp. $6.50.*

Race, Peace, Law, and Southern Africa *edited by John Carey. Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1968.—211 pp. $7.50.*

Race, Peace, Law, and Southern Africa is a published discussion forum in which a Sierra Leonean diplomat, G. B. O. Collier; an Afrikaner lawyer, D. P. De Villiers; and an American lawyer and diplomat, F. T. P. Plimpton read proposed statements in response to a long background paper by R. T. and H. J. Taubenfeld. The Taubenfeld paper, after stating some of the relevant facts, goes into a lengthy (120 pages) and ponderous (346 footnotes) survey of legal points concerning the status of human rights and the use of sanctions and force to change the Southern African situation. It ends by suggesting that partition, though of course not along the lines of apartheid policies, might be the only practical solution in the long run. Plimpton in a brief two pages states that the United States and Britain are unlikely to impose the naval blockade it would take to topple the white regime of South Africa. The other two participants take pedictable stands for and against apartheid. The South Africa expert will not learn anything new from the book, and neither will the layman, except in the first thirty pages of the Taubenfeld paper. I admit, however, that, as a non-lawyer, I may have missed a few legal niceties.

The book edited by William Hance contains much more substance. Vernon McKay and Hance present partly contradictory arguments. The latter concludes against American "disengagement" in South Africa because, under present conditions, he thinks that such a policy would weaken the internal economic forces working against apartheid. McKay, on the other hand, does not believe that industrialization will undermine apartheid and he favors continued American "pressure" against South Africa. Both papers contain a mass of useful and up-to-date information on such things as the South African police and armed forces, wages, demography, migration, investments, exports and imports, urbanization, employment, and the effect of "border industries," "influx control," and "job reservation." McKay also gives a useful survey of the pro-Rhodesian and South African lobbies among American far right groups.

Leo Kuper's article is an astute analysis of the various ideological trends within the non-white opposition in South Africa; he rightly stresses the widely different positions of Africans, Indians, and coloreds vis-à-vis the dominant whites and the society as a whole. Finally, the themes of Edwin

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Munger's paper are the obvious one of Afrikaner-English *rapprochement* and the dubious one of a profound change in white attitudes toward non-whites and the outside world. "An isolationist laager mentality may have given way to a positive and dynamic reaching out," he states (p. 83) and he safely concludes that "South Africa's future is fluid, evolving, unclear" (p 84). Interestingly, when Munger deals with violence, his treatment is completely one-sided in its omission of government violence against the people.

My conclusion is: read the Hance book and skip the Carey.

PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE
University of Ibadan
Nigeria

British Land Policy at the Cape, 1795-1844: A Study of Administrative Procedures in the Empire *by Leslie Clement Duly. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1968.—xix, 226 pp. $8.00.*

Many books and articles have been written on land policies in the nineteenth-century British empire, but most of them have dealt with Australia and New Zealand and "the Wakefield system" or with Canada. Southern Africa, strangely, has been relatively neglected, though it would seem that there was no area in which issues involving land would be of greater significance.

The story told here is one of neglect and incompetence. Downing Street during most of the period described showed no interest in the interior of Cape Colony beyond the negative objective of avoiding frontier wars. Its sporadic interference in the area of land disposal was usually in the form of dispatches which betrayed little understanding of the problems of the colony and were usually not followed up. Thus, though the title of the book is *Land Policy at the Cape*, Professor Duly demonstrates that there was little evidence of policy emanating either from London or Cape Town: "London's attitude was at best a series of convictions and desires dependent upon the interests and talents of its makers and enforcers." Officials at Cape Town were generally unfitted for their responsibilities, and surveyors frequently did not know their jobs. Consequently there was little relationship between paper policy and the realities of land usage. The author tells of people still waiting after thirty years for approval of their requests for recognition of their titles by the office in Cape Town.

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There was some improvement after 1835 as a result of reforms in the administration of land policy instituted by Governor D'Urban, but at no time was there evidence of an understanding of how any land code could be effectively translated into actual policy.

The theme of neglect, ignorance, and incompetence continues almost undeviatingly throughout the book. In my judgment, the author fully documents his indictment, though I might enter a mild caveat that he perhaps somewhat underrates the capability and understanding of some members of the Colonial Office staff. This is a solid piece of research, well founded on sources in South Africa and Great Britain. It merits the reading of anyone with an interest in nineteenth-century British policy in southern Africa.

The assumption from which the author began his work is that a study of land policy provides insight into the character of imperial administration generally. This is certainly true, and it is to be hoped that this study will be followed by another comparing the characteristics of policy in the various frontier communities which comprised the colonies of settlement in the first half of the nineteenth century. Was South Africa an island of neglect so far as land policy was concerned? The author suggests that Britain lost interest in colonization in South Africa after the apparent failure of the Albany settlement scheme of 1820. Would not a continuing governmental interest have exacerbated the problems of South African society? The author indicates that when the imperial factor intervened in land policy it usually made a bad state of affairs worse. That generalization can be extended to other aspects of South Africa policy.

JOHN S. GALBRAITH
University of California, Los Angeles

A Monetary Policy for Latin America *by Pierre Uri together with Nicholas Kaldor, Richard Ruggles, and Robert Triffin. New York, Frederick A. Praeger for The Atlantic Institute, 1968.—xviii, 147 pp. $15.00.*

This book is a postscript to the conference volume *Inflation and Growth in Latin America* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964) by a group of participants in the conference (held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1963) who evidently came away with an urge to salvage usable elements in the inchoate "structuralist" theories of inflation and to

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integrate them with "monetarist" theories. From the titles of the seven brief chapters that comprise the text, one might infer that it was addressed to all students of underdeveloped societies; and many of its ideas do deserve general circulation. But the argument of the central chapters on "Characteristics of Monetary Evolution in Latin America" and "Schemas of Inflationary Mechanisms" is so full of implicit allusions to the literature (and so devoid of explicit references that could orient a noneconomist) and needs so much amplification and correction that only economists can make much sense of them. The difficulties of the noneconomist reader will be accentuated by the fractured English in which the book is written. We can be grateful to be in direct contact with Pierre Uri, rather than seeing what a translator could make of his French. But it takes some familiarity with formal economics to reconstruct the meaning of a reference to an enterprise of "optional size" (p. 45) or to sort out (pp. 54-55) the passages where *revenue* denotes receipts of the fisc from the passages where it denotes the personal income of an individual. The introductory chapter on "Latin America and the Monetary Debate" and the final chapter on "A Strategy for Growth and Stability," however, put some valuable ideas in a form that should be accessible to nontechnicians.

While Uri warns us firmly against trying to formulate or criticize policy without institutional knowledge that can tell us of "the reactions certain programs can set off," the book is weak on the institutional side. A reference (p. 10) to "salaried workers" where the context indicates that reactions of wage-earners are in question seems at first sight to be merely a slip, natural to a writer whose native tongue is a romance language. But scrutiny of the book shows no awareness of the sharp rift (almost comparable to a caste barrier) between salaried *empleados* and wage-earning *obreros*, which is typical of Latin American societies, and of the interplay of the two distinct pay-escalating processes of these two groups. The reference to *unions* (p. 23) implies that labor organizations are an autonomous force in Latin American economies; whereas in all but two or three countries, most observers see labor pressures to raise pay scales as channeled almost exclusively through politics. On page 4, we are told that Latin American countries have "only rudimentary banking structures"—a dictum which overlooks the fact that in most Latin American countries the greater part of the money stock consists of checking deposits, the existence alongside money of large stocks of what the IMF calls "quasi-money," the high ratio (almost everywhere more than 200 per cent) between checking transactions and gross national product,

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and the fact that for lack of other well organized capital-market institutions the banks in most of Latin America are closely linked to the process of capital formation. As a reservation to endorsement of a Kaldor-type progressive tax on family expenditures, we are told that "one cannot overlook the administrative difficulties this would add to those of an income tax" (p. 56). But the authors do not seem aware that income-tax administration is so rickety in virtually all Latin American countries that the minimum flow of information necessary for decent income-tax administration is not being obtained, and getting the supplementary flow needed to graft on an expenditure tax is a stark impossibility for the visible future.

The technical reader will be much interested in the statistical appendix, which occupies no less than 56 pages. A guide to its intended uses will be found in the chapter on "Characteristics of Monetary Evolution in Latin America." For many purposes (particularly for formal tests of "monetarist" simplifications) the annual time-unit of these tables will not serve, and the IMF's quarterly series from 1957 onward must be used. The interesting attempt at a "Total Financial Analysis" in Table 5 might profitably be extended to cover all years instead of only two selected years for each country. The quantitative analyst will find his fingers itching to get at the possible econometric uses of an annual series of the variables this calculation would yield—likewise to formulate and test algebraic versions of the "schemas" in chapter 4, whose verbal formulations in the text seem to risk major errors of omission and double-counting. The tricky issues of cause and effect in the relation between rates of inflation and slowdown of growth could be made more manageable by use of quarterly data and dynamic model-structures.

Despite the good reasons for delay cited in the prefatory material, one regrets that this book was not made available while the proceedings of the conference were fresh. Its essential contribution is a set of powerful intuitions, as one would expect from the peculiarly fresh-minded group of economists responsible. It is full of statements that are interesting-if-true rather than of rigorous tests of such statements, so that it was not profitable to wait for more data. Nevertheless, the book even at this late date will start off a number of fruitful inquiries by healthfully irritating its readers.

ALBERT G. HART
Columbia University

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Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America *by Victor Alba. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1968.—404 pp. $12.50.*

Victor Alba is one of the most prolific of contemporary writers on Latin America. His books sometimes reflect the rapidity with which they are written, but they always have something provocative to say and give the reader pause for thought. The present volume is no exception.

This volume commences with a discussion of the evolution of the status of labor in the Latin American area since the beginning of colonization. The author traces the various kinds of servile treatment which were accorded particularly to the Indian and Negro masses of the countries. He also notes the emergence of a class of wage-earning workers, which makes possible the appearance of a trade union movement.

Alba concentrates his attention, however, on the political currents which have influenced Latin American organized labor since its inception in the last decades of the nineteenth century. He discusses the extent and nature of the influence of the anarchists and anarchosyndicalists, the Socialists, Communists, Aprista and similar parties, Christian Democrats, and the like. Each of these groups is dealt with in terms of the philosophies it represents, the reasons why it had more or less influence among the organized workers of the Latin American countries. Alba also indicates in some detail—although not always with complete accuracy—the extent of the control which each of the several political elements has exerted over the labor movement of each country.

His conclusions about the future of the Latin American labor movements are not optimistic. In the opinion of this reviewer, he tends to underestimate both the strength of the trade unions and the contributions they have made both to the well-being of the workers and to their adaptation to the modern industrial society which is evolving in these nations.

The author tends to lay too much stress on the supposed bureaucratization of the workers' organizations and the separation of the leadership of the various national labor movements from their rank and file. He argues that such bureaucratization and the evolution of a full-time labor leadership is not necessary, but at the same time he emphasizes the need for a greater degree of expertise, more knowledge of technical and economic matters, on the part of the Latin American labor leaders. I find these two points of view mutually ex-

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clusive. Only a full-time labor leadership has the opportunity to acquire the kind of expertise which Alba maintains is necessary. One of the best things that has happened to the organized labor movement of a number of the Latin American countries in recent years has been the growth of their ability to afford a full-time corps of leaders.

The growth of the organized labor movement of Latin America has been one of the most important developments in the area during the last couple of generations. The trade unions are important competitors for power, and they have made a considerable contribution toward making the Industrial Revolution a less painful process in Latin America than it has been in many of the countries which industrialized earlier. Any contribution to understanding the emergence of the labor movement is to be welcomed by serious students of Latin America.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER
Rutgers. The State University of New Jersey

The Politics of Change in Venezuela, Volume 1: A Strategy for Research on Social Policy *edited by Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1967.—xxix, 384 pp. $15.00.*

This is a report on research in progress. It is a useful volume because it allows us a rare look at a team of working social scientists involved in a dialogue with their data, themselves, and their colleagues, attempting to clarify their ideas, sharpen their methods, and deepen their analysis. The volume contains a lead essay by the late Dr. Jorge Ahumada, "Hypotheses for Diagnosing Social Change: The Venezuelan Case," and twelve chapters which report on methodological and substantive aspects of the research, six of which plus an introduction and "postface" were written by the editors, jointly or singly. Ostensibly the lead essay by Ahumada serves as a guide to concrete research tasks on more limited and narrowly defined problems bounded by his theoretical framework. Unfortunately, Ahumada does little more than repeat ideas which have become part of the accepted wisdom among *pensadores*—whether here or in Latin America —writing on development. He scarcely offers what can correctly be termed hypotheses, working or otherwise, and there is little apparent connection between his essay and the actual reports in this volume. Indeed, Bonilla and Silva themselves rather paradoxically seem to

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recognize this: briefly summarizing his "diagnosis," they state that it is "no more than an imperfect thumbnail sketch of social change, adding little that is new and including almost everything that is controversial in available theories of social process" (p. 25).

The articles are supposed to be reports of studies linked by common concern with the feasibility and relative "social cost of alternative development strategies." The authors have in my view, however, scarcely touched this question. Rather, the value of this volume, as I see it, lies not in furthering our substantive understanding of such "costs" of development—which it does not do—but in its innovations in research design and data analysis and manipulation. The authors' contribution is in their attempt to fashion an instrument for analysis of national political systems as integral units.

Most valuable is the design of a computer program to handle the mass of tape-recorded interviews with members of the political, economic, and cultural "elites," which ran to 25,000 pages in transcription. Their invention of a simple method of linked lists of code symbols which preserves much of the ideational structure of the interviews and which allows the interviews to be simultaneously coded, indexed, abstracted, and summarized should be very useful for the further development of the method of qualitative analysis. Unfortunately, the qualitative analysis itself done by Bonilla does not go much beyond a simple description of the opinions held by the various elites. Therefore, this *technique* for reducing a mass of interview information to manageable form is precisely that and no more. It cannot substitute—and indeed the editors do not claim otherwise—for the essential theoretical and analytical task of showing the relevance of the ideas expressed in the interviews to the actual costs for different groups and classes, and these same elites, of preserving or changing the present political economic structure of Venezuela. The repeated lip service paid by the elites to "development," abstractly conceived, tells us nothing of significance about the determinants of Venezuela's misdevelopment, which maintains her people in misery while these same elites—often precisely because of the misery of the masses—live in luxury. It tells us nothing significant about the relationship between economic exploitation and the modes of political control in Venezuela. Nor do the assertions by the elites in the interviews that they wanted to deal "humanely" with the armed student movement explain why these same elites, through the *Acción Democratica* regime, tried to violently repress the student movement when the students were still engaged in legal and constitutional political activity—thus compelling the students to arm themselves for self-defense. In short, such description of interviews

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with elites which takes what they *say* as an indication of what they *do*, and which is not part of an analysis of the interests of the elites and of their role in the political economy, does little, if anything, to enlighten us about "the feasibility or relative social cost of alternative development strategies."

MAURICE ZEITLIN
University of Wisconsin

Patterns of Conflict in Colombia *by James L. Payne. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968.—xvi, 358 pp. $10.00.*

Electoral contests, legislative debates, and the violence which claimed over 100,000 lives in the 1950s are interpreted in this book in terms of one simple hypothesis. According to Payne, Colombian political leaders are motivated by an intense desire for status and their followers are driven by a desire for patronage. This contrasts with the presence of a program incentive—a desire to pass specific laws—in the United States. Combined with party loyalties, the Colombian incentives are hypothesized to lead to an unstable and violent political climate, but one in which elected officials are, in the end, more or less responsive to the popular will. Payne presents this explanation of conflict as an alternative to models of struggle between an oligarchy and the deprived.

Payne's use of "incentive theory" and game theory is ingenious and often sheds light on specific aspects of Colombian politics. Early entry into politics, rapid turnover in office, the division of parties into factions, and the coexistence of frenzied debate with a proclivity to change positions on issues, all are explicable in the light of his hypothesis. Civil strife is plausibly interpreted as a "defensive feud" between parties, with each fearing the other might exclude it from all prestige and patronage and hence seeking to strike first. The hypothesis is also consistent with the success of a National Front which rotates the presidency and divides patronage among the previously warring parties. Payne also presents a considerable store of interesting information on the day-to-day texture of Colombian politics.

Yet in a sense Payne's formal analysis fails to satisfy or to refute the theory that conflict is rooted in conditions of poverty and privilege. Payne does not explain why the desire for patronage is so strong as to make national politics the motive for carnage. The strength of that desire may be grounded in poverty. Many Colombians have no alternative to patronage for a livelihood. Not only bureaucratic jobs, but also

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peasants' crop loans are dispensed politically. Poverty may also fuel the ideological fanaticism of party identification at the village level in ways which Payne does not discuss.

Payne may also idealize the extent to which Colombian politics can secure reforms. Many reform laws have been adopted, and the congressmen's desires to win votes at any cost may help them pass. But these laws are often the occasion for only token action. As Payne shows, the budget as passed by Congress is not closely related to actual expenditure. Perhaps there are few program-oriented legislators in Colombia only because those with privileges know that the legislature is too weak to enforce real change, so that they need not enter politics to protect their positions.

MATTHEW EDEL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity *by A. W. Singham. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968.—x, 389 pp. $10.00.*

As another description of a colonial territory caught in the forces of the post-World War II dismantlement of European empires, this study of little Grenada, the southernmost island in the Windwards in the Caribbean, is welcome. The author, in giving us a case study, hopes that "eventually the data will prove to be cumulative, and that the propositions . . . will be integrated by a synthesizer or grand theorist who will present a general theory." In the main, Singham's book does make such a contribution. Beyond that, Grenada represents a special case of a colony and potential new state that never made it, but became stalled in transition, perhaps destined for some time to remain in the in-between political status of partial self-government.

In 1958 when the West Indies Federation was formed, the people of Grenada seemed on their way to becoming part of an independent West Indian nation. But by the end of 1961, the Federation had collapsed, and before the end of 1962 Grenada's hope of joining with Trinidad in a unitary state had faded too. Guyana and Barbados became, along with Trinidad and Jamaica, independent states, but the islands of the Leewards and Windwards had been "disinherited first by Britain and later by the larger territories in the Caribbean."

Earlier, like so many other colonies in the 1940s and 1950s, Grenada had been moving toward self-government through a series

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of constitutional changes. What this book does very well is to give a description of the changes in the constitutional and political orders during the period of transition from colony to near nation-state, within the context of the local social and cultural setting. Up to a point it is a familiar story. But what makes this study distinctive is the crisis of 1962 when the process of transfer of political power was brought to a halt. Singham focuses on the conflicts between waning and waxing governing elites in the period of change and then in the period of limbo when one set of hands was not yet fully off the controls and another set was already on. The most obvious clash occurred between the civil service, even though West Indianized, and the elected politicians and was personified by the struggle between the administrator who headed the government bureaucracy, J. M. Lloyd, and the trade union leader and elected political leader, Eric M. Gairy.

There are, however, three features of the book that detract from its worth to the "grand theorist." The first is that so many of the generalizations or conclusions of the author require a comparison for which the data are generally missing. Often, it is the colonial world versus the noncolonial world, sometimes it is the West Indies versus other new states, and sometimes it is some group versus others within a colonial society.

The second is that the theoretical frame Singham uses is of little help in understanding the phenomena that he is studying. In fact, his attempt to apply Max Weber's notions of authority and legitimacy results in little more than nominalism, proliferation of unnecessary terms, and confusion. Does one really have to trot Weber out to explain why two drivers in one car spell trouble? Also, one can't help but note the ironic fact that this unsuccessful effort to conform to one of the rituals of Western scholarship comes from an author who is himself among the ex-colonials and self-proclaimed intellectuals of the Third World who deliberately try to avoid "the methodological assumptions of metropolitan writers."

The third feature of the book that detracts from its cumulative worth is a simple technical one. Although systematic interviews with members of the elite and with 292 registered voters (from 310 randomly selected) were obtained, Singham does very little with the results. Although the interview schedules are given in the book, only some of the responses are presented. The book benefits from Singham's use of documents, participant-observation (a trend in American sociology today), and his own personal knowledge of the West Indies, but the reader will be made uneasy by not knowing how Singham

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resolved the contradictions that he says he found among his different sources of data. One wonders how some of the beliefs about the political and social realities of Grenada, the West Indies, and colonial polities generally that fill this book could be negated if they are, in fact, false. If Singham had made his data explicit, given the details of any contradictions, and told how he decided what was true, a synthesizer would have been able to make some assessment of the reliability and validity of his conclusions.

Despite these criticisms, the book is worthwhile. Much that he reports about political change in Grenada is useful. More importantly, perhaps, the book contains a view of the world through the eyes of a trained social scientist who happens also to be a Third World intellectual with considerable experience in the practical problems of political, economic, and social change in former colonial territories. His views (leaving aside Weber) hang together pretty well and are shared by many other ex-colonials. How correct they are remains to be seen, but they should be taken seriously. They constitute, among other things, an indictment of continuing exploitation of the former colonies by the "advanced" nations.

WENDELL BELL
Yale University

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Book Notes

The title of John D. Sprague's brief volume, *Voting Patterns of the United States Supreme Court: Cases in Federalism, 1889-1959* (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968; xvi, 164 pp. $6.50), leads the unsuspecting reader to believe that upon reading the book he will learn something new about federalism or the American federal system or—at the very least—the United States Supreme Court. Alas, he is due to be disappointed. Professor Sprague does give us a neat methodological package, based on sensitive utilization of Guttman scaling and set in a suitably modest framework that formalizes "the criteria for ordering a matrix of agreement scores and for identifying voting blocks." He also goes so far as to reveal "that it would be misleading to treat federalism cases as typical of all cases" (in considering whether a particular justice is a member of the "liberal" or the "conservative" bloc), but his very method prevents him from giving us more than that. Regardless of any other considerations, the possibility of substantive knowledge about the Court and federalism emerging from a quantitive study such as this one hinges on the criteria of inclusion and exclusion of cases used. Unfortunately, the rather complex criteria used here (developed by Professor Robert A. Horn for a larger study of which this volume is part) obscure far more than they reveal. Specially designed for use in a quantitative study, the criteria necessarily omit all considerations other than the most mechanical ones. Unfortunately, "pro-state" and "anti-state" biases cannot be determined so mechanically. Even if the nuances are ignored, some quantitative assessment of the meaning of particular cases is absolutely essential in determining such biases. To take a case decided long before the time period covered in Sprague's book, is Marshall's position in *McCulloch* v *Maryland* pro-

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state or anti-state? It is clearly opposed to Maryland's enunciated policy regarding state versus federal banking. However, Marshall had good reason to believe that a majority of the states did not espouse Maryland's view but, on the contrary, saw the establishment of the second United States Bank as a boon to their own efforts at fiscal control. As the author virtually acknowledges—therein lie the perils of such quantitative reductionism.—DANIEL J. ELAZAR, *Temple University.*

How important is the right to vote in the Southern Negro's quest for equality? Only marginally, is the answer suggested by *The Impact of Negro Voting: The Role of the Vote in the Quest for Equality* (Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1968; ix, 113 pp., $2.95) by William R. Keech. This study, a revised version of a doctoral dissertation, examines in detail what Negro voters have been able to accomplish in two contrasting communities in the South. These are Durham, North Carolina, which has an exceptionally well organized Negro voting league and a substantial Negro business community, and Tuskegee, Mississippi, a black-belt county with a large Negro majority. The author neatly shows that where the Negro voting potential is largest (as in Tuskegee), white opposition is often so intense as to preclude much change until the Negro vote actually becomes a majority. In Durham the Negroes are a cohesive voting bloc and the white candidates generally are willing to bargain and compromise, but gains for the Negro community are still very limited. Local government operates under many constraints—especially of finance—and many of the Negro's problems (of housing and employment) involve primarily the private sector of the economy. The author makes a convincing case for his analysis, though it may be that he underestimates the impact of Negro voting on statewide and national policy, which in turn affects the local scene. Part of the seeming lack of results from use of the ballot may rest on the limitations and weakness of local government itself. The Negro in the South may have a vital but largely unperceived stake in current discussions of federal "decentralization" and tax revenue-sharing.—HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE, *Harvard University.*

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